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Foreword
THE WORLD BANK GROUP HAS LONG RECOGNIZED THATpoverty reduction and growth depend on effective nationalfinancial systems. Understanding just how finance contributes
to development—and how good policy can help guarantee its
contribution—has been the focus of a major research effort at the Bank
in recent years. This research has included systematic case-study analyses
of the experiences of specific countries, as well as more recent econometric
analyses of extensive cross-country data sets. Finance for Growth draws
on this research and uses it to develop an integrated view of how financial
sector policy can be used in the new century to foster growth and bring
about poverty reduction.
At its best, finance works quietly in the background; but when things
go wrong, financial sector failures are painfully visible. Both success and
failure have their origins largely in the policy environment. Policy needs to
create and sustain the institutional infrastructure—in such areas as infor-
mation, law, and regulation—that is essential to the smooth functioning
of financial contracts. Above all, policymakers need to work with the mar-
ket to help align private incentives with public interest. As the ever-dimin-
ishing cost of communications and information technology leads to greater
integration of global financial markets, policymakers face new challenges
in ensuring this alignment. Governments must be prepared to recast their
policies to take advantage of the opportunities resulting from global inte-
gration, and also to guard against the associated risks.
This book draws on the latest research to confirm some long-held
views and challenge others. Some commentators have long regarded fi-
nance as largely irrelevant to the drive for poverty reduction; but the
evidence here shows clearly that financial development has a strong and
independent role in increasing general prosperity. Countries that build a
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secure institutional environment for financial contracts, making it pos-
sible for banking and organized securities markets to prosper, will see
these efforts bear fruit in the fight against poverty.
Good regulation of financial firms is an essential part of this story.
But regulation is also becoming increasingly complex, and this book
provides some guidelines for negotiating that complexity. Policymakers
must pay special attention to the incentives created by the regulatory
system: they should align private incentives with the public interest in
such a way that scrutiny of financial institutions by official supervisors is
buttressed by supervision by market participants. The book makes it
clear that what works best will depend on country circumstances—for
example, in some countries introduction of explicit deposit insurance
may need to await complementary institutional strengthening.
Although there is much for governments to do, there are other areas
where the public sector tends not to have a comparative advantage, most
notably in ownership of financial firms. Here again the problem is one
of incentives and political considerations. Among other problems, deci-
sions are too often based not on efficiency considerations, but rather on
desires to reward particular interest groups. For this reason, well-crafted
privatization can yield considerable social benefits. Even when, in a cri-
sis, governments find it expedient to take control of banks, their aim
should be to divest again as quickly as practicable—keeping in mind the
threats of insolvency and looting by insiders if privatization takes place
too rapidly in a weak institutional environment.
Many countries are increasingly relying on foreign firms to provide
some financial services. It is inevitable that this trend will continue. For
one thing, the financial systems of almost all economies are small in
relation to world finance. For another, the Internet and related technol-
ogy increase the porosity of national financial frontiers. Although gov-
ernments may need to adopt capital controls on inflows in some cir-
cumstances, they would be wise to make sparing use of policies that
protect domestic financial firms from foreign competition. The evidence
suggests strongly that growth and stability in national economies are
best served by ensuring access to the most efficient and reputable finan-
cial services providers. Although financial openness does introduce new
channels for importing economic disturbances from abroad, those risks
are more than offset by the gains.
New developments in communications and information technol-
ogy will be an important driver for finance, too. Not only will they
xi
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make finance more international, but they will also help extend its
reach, thereby crucially increasing the access of small enterprises and
others now excluded in practice from the formal financial system. In-
formal finance will continue to be important, of course, and that is
one of the topics taken up by this year’s forthcoming World Develop-
ment Report, 2001/2002: Institutions for Markets, which will comple-
ment the current volume.
If implemented, the financial reforms proposed in this book can have
pervasive—if often intangible—effects in expanding economic prosper-
ity. At the same time, many of these reforms will be opposed by power-
ful interest groups. The stakes in this contest are high. The World Bank
Group is committed to continuing to work with member countries to
develop and implement reforms by helping them to devise national poli-
cies that are firmly based on empirical evidence and that draw on good
practices from other countries.
Nicholas Stern
Senior Vice President
and Chief Economist
The World Bank
March 2001
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1A
S THE DUST SETTLES FROM THE GREAT FINANCIAL
crises of 1997–98, the potentially disastrous conse-
quences of weak financial markets are apparent. But
even when there are no crises, having a financial system
that does a good job of delivering essential services
can make a huge difference to a country’s economic
development. Ensuring robust financial sector development with the
minimum of crises is essential for growth and poverty reduction, as has
been repeatedly shown by recent research findings. Globalization further
challenges the whole design of the financial sector, potentially replacing
domestic with international providers of some of these services, and
limiting the role that government can play—while making their
remaining tasks that much more difficult.
The importance of getting the big financial policy decisions right has
thus emerged as one of the central development challenges of the new
century. The controversy stirred up by the crises, however, has pointed to
the weaknesses of doctrinaire policy views on how this is to be achieved.
How then should financial policymakers position themselves? This book
seeks to provide a coherent approach to financial policy design—one that
will help officials make wise policy choices adapted to local circumstances
and seize the opportunities offered by the international environment. With
informed policy choices, finance can be a powerful force for growth.
This is not a book that relies on the application of some abstract
principles; rather, our conclusions are based on an analysis of concrete
evidence. Though much remains to be learned, a huge volume of em-
pirical analysis, drawing on a growing body of statistical data, has been
conducted on these issues over the past few years. The findings of this
research greatly help to clarify the choices that are involved. Many
Overview and Summary
Financial policymaking is
one of the key development
issues
This report presents an
analysis of the evidence
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long-held beliefs have found detailed empirical confirmation for the
first time; some new and perhaps surprising discoveries have been made.
In other words, we are asking policymakers to face some facts about
finance. It is now possible to define with some confidence the need for a
refocusing and deepening of the financial sector policy agenda. In this
study, we identify and synthesize what we believe to be the key findings
of recent financial sector research, both that conducted at the World
Bank and elsewhere, highlighting the policy choices that will maximize
growth and restore the financial sector as a key sector for helping to cope
with—rather than magnifying—volatility. A few key messages have
emerged from this research.
It is obvious that advanced economies have sophisticated financial sys-
tems. What is not obvious, but is borne out by the evidence, is that the
services delivered by these financial systems have contributed in an impor-
tant way to the prosperity of those economies. They promote growth and
reduce volatility, helping the poor. Getting the financial systems of devel-
oping countries to function more effectively in providing the full range of
financial services—including monitoring of managers and reducing risk—
is a task that will be well rewarded with economic growth.
Government ownership of banking continues to be remarkably wide-
spread, despite clear evidence that the goals of such ownership are rarely
achieved, and that it weakens the financial system rather than the con-
trary. The desirability of reducing, even if not necessarily eliminating,
state ownership in low- and middle-income countries where it is most
widespread, follows from this evidence. However, privatization has to be
designed carefully if the benefits are to be gained and the risks of an early
collapse minimized.
Even governments averse to an ownership role in banking may find it
foisted on them in a crisis. The authorities’ focus then must be on get-
ting out as quickly as possible, using the market—rather than govern-
ment agencies—to identify winners and losers. Drawing on public funds
to recapitalize some banks may be unavoidable in truly systemic crises,
but they must be used sparingly to leverage private funds and incentives.
Procrastination and half-measures—as reflected in lax policies involving
regulatory forbearance, repeated recapitalizations, and their ilk—bear a
high price tag that will affect the financial system and the economy for
years to come.
Achieving an efficient and secure financial market environment re-
quires an infrastructure of legal rules and practice and timely and accurate
Finance contributes to
long-term prosperity
Governments are not good
at providing financial
services—
 —even when a crisis hits
3O V E RV I E W  A N D  S U M M A RY
information, supported by regulatory and supervisory arrangements that
help ensure constructive incentives for financial market participants. Suc-
cess here will promote growth in a way that is tilted towards the poor and
will stabilize the economy around the higher growth path; direct access to
finance by many now excluded will also be expanded.
Incentives are key to limiting undue risk-taking and fraudulent behav-
ior in the management and supervision of financial intermediaries—
especially banks that are prone to costly failure. Instability and crashes are
endemic to financial markets, but need not be as costly as they have been
in recent years. They reflect the results of risk-taking going well beyond
society’s risk tolerance. These costs are very real: they represent a poten-
tially persistent tax on growth. This can raise poverty in the near term, and
can have longer-term affects on the poor, both through lower growth and
through reduced spending on areas such as health and education.
Deposit insurance systems, an important part of the safety net sup-
porting banks, are on the rise in developing countries. It is not hard to
see why: not only will a credible system protect against depositor runs,
but they are politically popular—not least with the local owners of small
banks. However, recent evidence shows that they also lessen market
monitoring of banks. Although this may not have weakened banking
systems in developed markets, to the extent that these had already ac-
quired reasonably effective regulation and supervision, it is found to
heighten the risk of crisis and reduce financial market development where
institutions are weak. Thus, authorities considering deposit insurance
should make an audit of their institutional framework the first step in
the decisionmaking process. Good safety net design needs to go beyond
replication of mature systems, and the empirical evidence strongly ar-
gues for utilizing known market forces in order to limit the risks that
may be associated with introducing deposit insurance.
Banks, securities markets, and a range of other types of intermediary
and ancillary financial firms all contribute to balanced financial devel-
opment. A radical preference in favor either of markets or of banks can-
not be justified by the extensive evidence now available. Instead, devel-
opment of different segments of the financial system challenges the other
segments to innovate, to improve quality and efficiency, and to lower
prices. They also evolve symbiotically, with expansion of one segment
frequently calling for an upgrade in others. The future of some nonbank
sectors, notably private pension provision, are heavily dependent on re-
lated government policies, whose design needs careful attention.
But well functioning
markets need legal and
regulatory underpinning—
and a strategy based on
harnessing incentives
Good safety nets require
good institutions
Diversity is good for
stability and development
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Most developing countries are too small to be able to afford to do with-
out the benefits of access to global finance, including accessing financial
services from foreign or foreign-owned financial firms. Facilitating the entry
of reputable foreign financial firms to the local market should be wel-
comed too: they bring competition, improve efficiency, and lift the qual-
ity of the financial infrastructure. As such, they are an important catalyst
for the sort of financial development that promotes growth. Opening up
is accompanied by some drawbacks, including a heightening of risk in
some dimensions, and will need careful monitoring. It also results in a loss
of business for local financial firms, but access to financial services is what
matters for development, not who provides them.
The financial sector has long been an early adopter of innovations in
information and communications technology. Internationalization of fi-
nance (despite efforts to block it) has been one consequence. This has helped
lower the cost of equity and loan capital on average even if it has also height-
ened vulnerability to capital flows. The precise future role of e-finance in
accelerating the process of internationalization is not easy to predict, but it
will surely be substantial. If volatility may have increased, so too have risk
management technologies and their associated financial instruments.
Some related credit information techniques, including scoring mecha-
nisms, promise to make an important contribution by expanding what
is at present very limited access of small-scale borrowers to credit from
the formal financial sector. This will be achieved by lowering the barrier
of high information costs. At the same time, a degree of subsidization of
overhead costs will still likely be appropriate to contribute to the viabil-
ity of microcredit institutions targeted at the poor and very poor.
In this overview, after summarizing the main arguments of the book’s
four main chapters, we analyze the main policy implications, presenting an
illustrative stylized application to contrasting country conditions. The over-
view concludes with a prospect of future research.
Summary
THIS SECTION OF THE OVERVIEW SUMMARIZES THE REASONINGof the remaining chapters of the report. We focus on the mainfindings drawn from the empirical research, and the primary
implications of these findings. The detailed arguments and caveats are
to be found in the succeeding chapters, along with references to the
extensive body of research underlying the study.
Open markets can spur
development—
as can technology—
notably for access
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Chapter 1: Making Finance Effective
There is now a solid body of research strongly suggesting that improve-
ments in financial arrangements precede and contribute to economic
performance. In other words, the widespread desire to see an effectively
functioning financial system is warranted by its clear causal link to growth,
macroeconomic stability, and poverty reduction. Almost regardless of
how we measure financial development, we can see a cross-country asso-
ciation between it and the level of income per capita (figure 1). Associa-
tion does not prove causality, and many other factors are also involved,
not least the stability of macroeconomic policy. Nevertheless, over the
past few years, the hypothesis that the relation is a causal one (figure 2)
has consistently survived a testing series of econometric probes.
The reason finance is important for growth lies in what are, despite
being less obvious, the key underlying functions that financial
institutions perform. At one level, finance obviously involves the trans-
fer of funds in exchange for goods, services, or promises of future return,
but at a deeper level the bundle of institutions that make up an economy’s
financial arrangements should be seen as performing several key eco-
nomic functions:
Financial depth generates
growth
Figure 1 Financial depth and per capita income
Note: This figure represents the average of available dates in the 1990s for each of 87 countries.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (BDL) database.
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• Mobilizing savings (for which the outlets would otherwise be much
more limited).
• Allocating capital funds (notably to finance productive investment).
• Monitoring managers (so that the funds allocated will be spent as
envisaged).
• Transforming risk (reducing it through aggregation and enabling
it to be carried by those more willing to bear it).
Rigorous and diverse econometric evidence shows that the contribu-
tion of finance to long-term growth is achieved chiefly by improving
the economy’s total factor productivity, rather than on the rate of capital
accumulation.
It is through its support of growth that financial development has its
strongest impact on improving the living standards of the poor. Though
some argue that the services of the formal financial system only benefit
the rich, the data say otherwise. Furthermore, countries with a strong,
deep financial system find that, on balance, it insulates them from
macrofluctuations.
The evidence on the importance of each of the two major institutional
components of finance—banks and organized securities markets—is also
clear. There is no empirical support for policies that artificially constrain
one in favor of the other. Indeed, the development of each sector seems to
strengthen the performance of the other by maintaining the competitive
Bank and equity financing
are complements, not
substitutes
Figure 2 Financial depth and growth
Source: World Bank data.
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0.15 to 0.25
0.25 to 0.5
Deep (> 0.5)
Ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP in 1960
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0 1 2 3
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edge of individual financial firms. While banking is more deeply entrenched
in developing economies than securities markets and other nonbank sec-
tors (figure 3), distinct challenges face policymakers in trying to ensure
that both banks and markets reach their full functional potential. Macro-
economic stability is, of course, one key, but other aspects relate more
closely to the microeconomic underpinnings of finance.
With so much of the borrowings by firms coming from banks, the
borrowing cost depends on the operational efficiency and competitive-
ness of the banking market. In this respect, too, the performance of
developing economies falls behind. Liberalization has been associated
not only with higher wholesale interest rates, but also with a widening of
intermediation spreads—at least partly reflecting increased exercise of
market power by banks.
One path to lower financing costs through increased competition in
financial markets is through the development of equity financing. Here
the challenge is to alleviate the problems of information asymmetry. The
complexity of much of modern economic and business activity has greatly
increased the variety of ways in which insiders can try to conceal firm
performance. Although progress in technology, accounting, and legal
practice has also helped improve the tools of detection, on balance the
asymmetry of information between users and providers of funds has not
been reduced as much in developing countries as it has in advanced
economies—and indeed may have deteriorated.
Figure 3 Bank-to-market ratio and per capita GDP
Source: World Bank data.
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The current wave of policy research thus points to the desirability of
policy measures that could promote the production and communication
of information; limit the exercise of market power, whether in banking or
by insiders against shareholders; and ensure an efficient functioning of
the organized securities markets. These policies are likely to be more ef-
fective if directed to infrastructure rather than directly to the financial
structures themselves. It is in the legal area that recent research on effec-
tive infrastructure has made most progress—and in areas going beyond
the obvious and crucial need to ensure that the creditor’s rights can, in
the event of default, be expeditiously and inexpensively exercised. Natu-
rally, the government has a comparative advantage in the design and imple-
mentation of law, and it needs to address itself to updating and refining
laws and legal practice as they relate to financial contracts. Yet, to supple-
ment—or make up for the absence of—government action, there is a
clear and practical scope for market participants to amplify regulatory
structures where this is needed. Practice in some of the more successful
organized stock markets provides good examples of such private initia-
tives. This presents a promising way forward, especially where the devel-
opment of public law is difficult.
There has been a major scholarly debate on whether the precise de-
sign of laws matter, with recent research focusing on the contrasting
performance of financial systems with legal structures of differing ori-
gins. The evidence indicates that the main families of legal origin do
differ in important respects relevant to financial development—notably
in the differential protection they tend to provide to different stakehold-
ers. These differences have been shown to have had an influence on the
relative development of debt and equity markets, on the degree to which
firms are widely held, or more generally the degree to which they are
financed externally, and thus on overall financial sector development.
And the policy message from the econometric results systematically points
in one direction: far from impeding growth, better protection of the
property rights of outside financiers favors financial market develop-
ment and investment.
The growth of collective savings—including through investment com-
panies and mutual funds, as well as pension funds and life insurance com-
panies—can greatly strengthen the demand side of the equity market, as
well as widen the range of savings media available to persons of moderate
wealth, and provide competition for bank deposits. The impact is not lim-
ited to the stock market: in mature and emerging markets, contractual
savings institutions have been central in supporting numerous market-based
Collective savings media
help strengthen and
upgrade the system
 Finance needs an
infrastructure: law and
information
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financial innovations such as asset-backed securities, the use of structured
finance and derivative products, including index-tracking funds and syn-
thetic products that protect investors from market declines. The associated
learning and human capital formation, as fund managers tool up to em-
ploy such techniques, helps to enhance the quality of risk management
throughout the economy. Growth in these funds can also ensure enhanced
and stable funding for key niche segments of the financial market, such as
factoring, leasing, and venture capital companies. They can also generate a
demand for long-term investments, thereby providing a market-based so-
lution to a perceived gap that many governments have tried to fill over the
years with costly and distorting administered solutions. Regulation of this
sector is something that needs attention in many countries.
Measures that succeed in deepening financial markets and limiting
the distorting exercise of market power result in more firms and indi-
viduals securing access to credit at acceptable cost. However, what of the
poor and of the small or microenterprise borrower? What aspects need
special attention to ensure that these do not get passed by despite overall
improvement in the performance of financial systems? There is no point
in pretending that the problem of access is easily solved. Experience shows
that formal financial institutions are slow to incur the set-up costs in-
volved in reaching a dispersed, poor clientele (even with minimal deposit-
type services). In looking to improvements, however, two aspects appear
crucial, namely information and the relatively high fixed costs of small-
scale lending. Recent research focusing on technological and policy ad-
vances points to how these barriers can be lowered.
A range of innovative, specialized microfinance institutions, mostly
subsidized, has become established with remarkable success. Loan delin-
quency has been low—far lower than in the previous generation of sub-
sidized lending programs operated in many developing countries—and
the reach of the institutions in terms of sheer numbers, as well as to
previously grossly neglected groups, such as women and the very poor,
has been remarkable. This success has been attributed to reliance on
innovation in, for example, the use of group lending contracts exploit-
ing the potentialities of social capital and peer pressure to reduce willful
delinquency, dynamic incentives using regular repayment schedules and
follow-up loans or “progressive lending,” and lighter distributed man-
agement structures that reduce costs and enable lenders to keep loan
rates down to reasonable levels.
Even without subsidy, some of these techniques can be applied to
microlending to the nonpoor. Furthermore, efficient use of credit
Policy choices and new
technology may expand
access to finance—
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information can reduce the threshold size for cost-effective lending by
the formal, unsubsidized financial sector. Computer technology has
greatly reduced the unit costs of collecting information on borrowing
history and other relevant characteristics, and has improved the sophis-
tication with which these data can be employed to give an assessment of
creditworthiness. While the impact of having this information available
alters incentives and market power in subtle—and not always favorable—
ways, growth in access to credit information improves loan availability
and lowers intermediation costs.
Chapter 2: Preventing and Minimizing Crises
Finance is inherently fragile, largely because of the intertemporal leap in
the dark that many financial transactions involve. Not only is money handed
over now for the promise or expectation of money in the future, but this is
done despite the problems of limited and unequal information both as to
the characteristics of one’s counterparty (adverse selection) and as to their
subsequent behavior (moral hazard). Finance cannot be effective without
credit, but credit means leverage, and leverage means the risk of failure,
sometimes triggering a chain reaction. In these conditions, expectations
can change quickly, leading to swings in asset prices, which in turn may be
exacerbated by the possibility of crowd behavior.
Financial markets are in the business of making efficient use of in-
formation, but substantial and even growing deviations from equilib-
rium prices are possible, manifesting themselves as bubbles, or specu-
lative booms and busts. If the countless historical examples of asset
price crashes are not sufficient evidence of this, theory, too, explains
why, when acquiring information and contracting are both costly, fi-
nancial markets will never be fully efficient and fully arbitraged. Care-
fully controlled experiments confirm that individuals are not fully ra-
tional in assessing risk: they attach too much weight to recent experience
(display myopia), they trade on noise rather than on fundamentals,
and they exhibit positive feedback (or momentum) by buying because
prices are rising. As well as exacerbating asset-price fluctuations and
contributing to euphoric surges of bank lending—followed by revul-
sion and damaging credit crunches—such behavioral characteristics
also provide fertile ground for fraudulent Ponzi schemes.
 —notably in the area of
microfinance
Finance always involves
risk
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If finance is fragile, banking is its most fragile part. Bankers have to
place a reliable value on the assets they acquire (including the credit-
worthiness of borrowers), but banking also adds the complications not
only of maturity transformation, but of demandable debt, that is, of-
fering debt finance backed by par value liabilities in the form of bank
deposits. The particular fragility of finance, and within it of banking,
is true for all countries regardless of their income level, as attested to
by the occurrence of banking crises in many industrial economies in
the 1980s and 1990s. But banking outside the industrial world is more
dangerous still, where crises have been enormously costly—in terms of
direct fiscal costs, slower growth, and a derailing of stabilization pro-
grams and increasing poverty (figure 4).
Developing countries face several additional sources of fragility. Not
only are information problems in general more pronounced, but develop-
ing economies are also smaller and more concentrated in certain economic
sectors or reliant on particular export products, and accordingly are less
able to absorb shocks or pool isolated risks. In addition, emerging markets
have seen a succession of regime shifts altering the risk profile of the oper-
ating environment in hard-to-evaluate ways, including most prominently
Figure 4 East Asia poverty before and after the financial crises
Note: The “Latest” column refers to 1999 for Indonesia and Thailand, and 1998 for the Republic
of Korea, based on household surveys. Poverty lines are set at $1.50 per day (at 1993 PPP), except
for the Republic of Korea, where the national definition of poverty is about $8 per day.
Source: World Bank.
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financial deregulation. Moreover, as banking tends to be the dominant
force in emerging financial markets, there is more demandable debt, less
access to outside equity for firms, and therefore greater fragility. Collapses
in equity prices are not innocuous, but are clearly less disruptive than
bank failures, which explains the need to focus on the latter.
Financial sector regulation and supervision—the rules of the game in
the financial sector, and the way they are enforced—are essential to lim-
iting moral hazard, as well as to ensuring that intermediaries have the
incentive to allocate resources and perform their other functions pru-
dently. Although there has been a remarkable convergence on paper in
recent years, stark differences remain in regulatory environments around
the world, and weaknesses in this area serve as a potential source of added
vulnerability in some emerging markets.
Necessary though headline regulations may be, a clear lesson from
recent and historical research is that they need to be supplemented by
the use of incentives and information to maximize the number of well-
informed, well-motivated monitors of financial intermediaries. Diver-
sity in the set of monitors for banks is desirable not only because of
possible differences in information that they may possess, but also be-
cause of the varying and possible opaque incentives that they face. But
who can monitor banks? There are three main categories:
• Owners, including the board and senior management of a bank,
whose net worth should depend on the prudent performance of
the institution.
• Markets, meaning all nonofficial outside creditors and
counterparties, who should not be under the presumption that
they will be “bailed out.”
• Official supervisors, who should operate within a well-constructed
incentive structure.
The aforementioned factors accounting for enhanced fragility in
emerging markets means that they need to ensure that all three moni-
tors are performing this function vigorously. Greater information and
incentive problems certainly suggest that it is unwise to concentrate
on any one of these groups. And the higher volatility of these markets
implies that even adopting “best practice” from industrial economies
may fall far short of the mark.
This report urges that authorities go well beyond the existing Basel
guidelines. Ensuring that banks are well diversified, which in many small
Use market-based
incentives to supplement
regulations
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economies means regional or foreign banking, is important. Motivating
creditors, such as mandating that banks issue uninsured subordinated
debt, is a promising part of the solution, but requires that authorities
should focus on improving the information available to these monitors
and on the difficult task of ensuring that they are at arm’s length from
the issuing banks. Also, attention to supervisors’ incentives is warranted.
Higher present and especially future compensation (through bonuses or
loss of generous pensions) need to be coupled with protection from legal
prosecution today for effective performance of their job.
In the face of financial fragility, governments provide a safety net of
sorts, virtually always through lender-of-last-resort facilities and in-
creasingly through explicit deposit insurance. Deposit insurance is in-
creasingly popular in emerging markets because it appears to be an
effective way to stem bank runs, at least in high-income countries, and
helps foster indigenous banks. The existence of these schemes, how-
ever, may actually worsen the information and incentive environment,
increasing the scale and frequency of crises. To some extent, establish-
ment of a formal deposit insurance scheme can be expected to result in
greater risk-taking—the age-old moral hazard that tends to be associ-
ated with most forms of insurance. That would be an argument against
establishing a formal scheme, but it has to be recognized that absence
of a formal scheme can be equivalent to implicit deposit insurance—
perhaps unlimited in its coverage and potentially also entailing moral
hazard. Thus, whether to adopt an explicit system, and what kind of
system to adopt, are empirical issues.
The weight of evidence from recent research suggests that, in prac-
tice, rather than lowering the likelihood of a crisis, the adoption of
explicit deposit insurance on average  is associated with less banking
sector stability, and this result does not appear to be driven by reverse
causation. Here the qualification “on average” is key: deposit insur-
ance has no significant effect in countries with strong institutions, but
in weak institutional environments has the potential to destabilize.
This result is reinforced by the finding that banks, exploiting the avail-
ability of insured deposits, take greater risks.
Insurance reduces depositor monitoring, which is not sufficiently
compensated by official monitoring where institutions are weak. More-
over, in institutionally weak environments, having explicit deposit in-
surance is associated with lower financial sector development, in addi-
tion to a greater likelihood of crises. Although it may be paradoxical that
There is a need to go
beyond the Basel
guidelines
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the provision of insurance could lead to less of an activity, it may be that
when taxpayers in institutionally weak countries see their authorities
providing explicit guarantees, they understand that the environment is
not conducive to restraining the cost of these guarantees. The result,
then, might be that the real insurers, the taxpayers themselves, choose to
hide their assets outside the banking system, and perhaps outside the
country to avoid being taxed for coverage. This finding runs sharply
counter to the popular doctrine that deposit insurance would promote
financial deepening—and hence growth—in poor countries.
The role of good institutions—as measured in this research by indi-
cators of the rule of law, good governance (a proxy for effective regula-
tion and supervision), and low corruption—thus seems crucial in re-
ducing the opportunities for risk-taking. Good design of deposit insurance
may help lead to better outcomes, but given the delays in improving
regulation, supervision, the rule of law, and other basic institutions, au-
thorities considering the introduction of deposit insurance should first
focus on addressing these related institutions to reduce the likelihood of
excessive risk-taking. And for those who already have explicit deposit
insurance, it is by no means suggested that they should suddenly end
these schemes—doing so would likely induce a crisis—but instead should
reconsider the design of their systems in light of the evidence presented
herein. In deciding on design features, this report argues that authorities
should draw on empirical evidence and in particular utilize market forces
to ensure prudence, rather than simply attempting to copy existing
practice—itself quite diverse—of high-income countries. It is overwhelm-
ingly important that governments do not provide banks with an exces-
sively generous safety net, as this will hamper the development of other
parts of the sector, as well as potentially underwrite excessive risk-taking.
Chapter 3: Government Failure in Finance
More than 40 percent of the world’s population still live in countries in
which the majority of bank assets are in majority-owned state banks. Gov-
ernment ownership tends to be greater in poorer countries (figure 5). State
ownership in banking continues to be popular in many countries for sev-
eral reasons. First, proponents of state control argue that the government
can do a better job in allocating capital to highly productive investments.
Government ownership of
banks is greater in poor
countries
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Second, there is the concern that, with private ownership, excessive con-
centration in banking may lead to limited access to credit by many parts of
society. Third, a related popular sentiment—reinforced by abuses at, and
governance problems of, private banks in many countries—is that private
banking is more crisis prone.
Despite the worthy goals often espoused by advocates of state owner-
ship—and though there are isolated pockets of success—achievement of
these goals has generally been elusive, to say the least.
Government failure as owner is attributed to the incentives imposed
on it by the political process, and the few cases of more successful state
banks appear to be linked to a stronger institutional environment and
dispersed political powers. And important new statistical evidence sum-
marized in chapter 3 confirms that state ownership generally is bad for
financial sector development and growth. Greater state ownership of
banks tends to be associated with higher interest rate spreads, less pri-
vate credit, less activity on the stock exchange, and less nonbank credit,
even after controlling for many other factors. It is not just financial
development that is affected: one study reveals that countries that had
greater state ownership of banks in 1970 tended to grow more slowly
since then with lower productivity, especially in poor countries and
Figure 5 Government ownership of bank assets and per capita income
Source: World Bank Survey of Prudential Regulation and Supervision; La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
and Schleifer (2000).
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where the protection of property rights was weak. Credit allocation is
also more concentrated, with the largest 20 firms—often including
inefficient state enterprises—getting more credit where the state own-
ership is greater. In addition, there is some evidence that greater state
ownership is associated with financial instability.
To be sure, there are exceptions: Germany, for example, has had
little state ownership of the enterprise sector (outside transport and
finance), which has reduced the temptation of allocating credit to gov-
ernment industries. Moreover, the tough penalties there for default
and bankruptcy would make life easy for most banks, even those that
are state run. However, although it remains possible for developing
countries to find ways to reduce the damage done by state ownership,
limiting state ownership likely will be easier to implement than the
many institutional and political reforms needed to avoid the abuses
and inefficiencies of state banking.
The potential scale of gains from bank privatization are borne out
from detailed investigation in World Bank research of one country with
comprehensive data and a major privatization experience, namely Ar-
gentina. This research suggests that in an incentive-compatible environ-
ment, the conduct of privatized banks—as reflected in their balance sheets
and income statements—over time begins to resemble that of the other
private banks. This is especially true in terms of the ratio of their admin-
istrative costs to revenues, and most importantly in terms of credit ex-
tended to public enterprises, consistent with the evidence above on im-
proved allocation of resources. As part of the privatization process, the
shedding or more efficient employment of staff, though less significant
for the overall economy, works in the same direction.
As compelling as the case is for private sector ownership in banking,
shifting to private ownership in a weak regulatory environment can lead
to crisis—witness the examples of Mexico in the early 1990s, Chile in the
late 1970s, and numerous transition economies. While abrupt and pre-
mature privatization can be dangerous, so too can be a strategy of hanging
on to state ownership. Not only is there the evidence that this lowers growth,
but also as the Czech experience points out, continued public sector con-
trol of the banking system appears to have facilitated looting—the prac-
tice of firms continuing to borrow without the intention of repayment.
For most countries, abrupt and total privatization is not called for. For
one thing, many countries reached an advanced stage of development
with modest state ownership. Also, though, a sudden move to private
ownership from a lengthy period of state ownership seems particularly
Privatization can lead to a
more efficient banking
sector—
but the process should be
handled with care
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dangerous. The authorities would have to be either quite confident in
their level of institutional development, or be selling to foreign banks of
impeccable repute—and must be willing to gamble on this bet. Accord-
ingly, moving deliberately but carefully with bank privatization—while
preparing state banks for sale and addressing weaknesses in the overall
incentive environment—would appear to be a preferred strategy. Prepa-
ration, in addition to improvements in infrastructure, could include some
linkage of compensation for senior managers of state banks to the future
postprivatization value of the bank—such as through stock options, an
approach that appears to have helped in Poland. To be sure, this approach
can only succeed if the process is credible, otherwise the deferred com-
pensation will be too heavily discounted to have any value. As also noted
below, sale of state banks to strong foreign banks can be a way of bringing
good skills, products, and the capacity to train local bankers, and may
even facilitate a strengthening of the regulatory environment. As long as
the foreign banks are motivated to protect their reputation to behave in
line with the highest fiduciary standards, this approach will increase the
speed with which allocation decisions are made on market principles while
minimizing the odds of a crisis.
When a banking crisis occurs, authorities need to decide when and
how to intervene. When the problem is not systemic, bank creditors and
supervisors should be left to proceed as usual on a case-by-case basis
through standing channels. However, widespread bank insolvency may
force even a government not disposed to take a significant ownership
position in the banking sector to become involved in restructuring banks
and even their assets (for example, nonfinancial firms) in the process. In
many cases, systemic crisis has led to a substantial increase in govern-
ment ownership or “care-taking.” Yet the evidence on governments’ lim-
ited efficacy as owners of banks suggests that they will not excel at
restructuring failed or failing banks either.
How then can one decide when the crisis has reached systemic propor-
tions and when the government should intervene with other assistance? It
is not really feasible to speak in terms of mechanical triggers for this kind
of judgment. For one thing, the relevant data either come with a lag, or are
very imperfect measures of crisis. Besides, as the economy approaches
known thresholds, moral hazard increases and bankers and other market
participants may take excessive risks. The authorities would then have little
option but to bring forward their intervention even though the trigger has
not been reached. Because of such problems, most financial authorities
have decided on constructive ambiguity as the main solution.
Governments should
intervene only when the
crisis is systemic—
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Once the decision to intervene has been taken, the government has
several goals. The first is to maintain or restore a functioning financial
system. This goal is difficult to debate, though the best means of doing
so are not always clear. Second, the government must contain the fiscal
costs of its intervention. Care must be taken in designing restructuring
plans, such that a preoccupation with minimizing short-term cash costs
does not translate into larger long-term fiscal liabilities. On a related
third point, governments must also ensure that their restructuring helps
minimize the prospects for subsequent crises—notably in terms of the
implicit incentive structures.
Unfortunately, as implemented in many countries, government-funded
bank recapitalization programs—injecting capital usually in the form of
bonds into banks—all too often miss the opportunity to create strong
incentives for future prudent behavior. This then suppresses the message
that poor performance is costly. Recapitalization without establishing
some corresponding financial claim on the bank—and then exercising
that claim—is no more or less than a transfer from taxpayers to share-
holders, which is the group that keeps the residual value of the bank.
So if government funds are to be injected, there has to be some gov-
ernment involvement. Governments that inject equity will want to make
sure that it is used only where needed to fill an insolvency gap, and
certainly that it is not looted. Yet they must recognize that they are not
likely to function well as bank owners; accordingly their equity stakes in
banks should be for a limited period only. One way of achieving both of
these goals is for the authorities to make some amount of funding avail-
able for recapitalization of banks, but only to those that
• Secure matching of private sector funds in some ratio.
• Agree to restrict dividends and other withdrawals by insiders for
some time (likewise, contracts for senior managers should be struc-
tured to emphasize deferred performance-linked compensation).
• Adhere to stringent transparency requirements.
The virtue of such an approach is that it removes from government or
government-sponsored agencies the selection of winners, a process that
is ripe for abuse. By openly stating the terms on which it will assist banks
and their new shareholders, and ensuring that those terms provide good
incentives for the restructured bank going forward, the government is
making the best use of market forces while minimizing its direct owner-
ship involvement.
Use the market to identify
banks to be “rescued”
—and prepare a clear exit
strategy
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Chapter 4: Finance without Frontiers?
Along with the rapid—albeit uneven—expansion of international debt
and equity flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI), there has
also been a sharp recent increase in the provision of financial services in
many developing countries by foreign-owned financial firms. Financial
globalization increases the potential for obtaining growth and other ben-
efits from finance, but it also increases the risks.
In a world where even the largest developing countries have financial
systems whose size is dwarfed by the scale and mobility of global fi-
nance, policy thinking needs to be refocused on the limited but impor-
tant scope for domestic policy actions to maximize each country’s capac-
ity to secure the best provision of financial services, from whatever source,
and to contain the risks of importing volatility.
Apart from China, Brazil is the only developing country with as
much as 1 percent of the world’s financial system. The financial sys-
tems of developing countries are small, and should be managed with
that in mind (figure 6). Small financial systems underperform. They
suffer from a concentration of risks: the smaller the financial system,
the more vulnerable it is to external shocks and the less able its finan-
cial system is to insulate or hedge those shocks—unless the financial
system is itself securely integrated in the world financial system through
Figure 6 National financial systems ranked by size
Source: International Financial Statistics.
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ownership and portfolio links. Small financial systems also provide
fewer services at higher unit costs, partly because they cannot exploit
economies of scale and partly because of a lack of competition. Regu-
lation and supervision of small systems is disproportionately costly,
and even a well-funded effort would be hard pressed to ensure stability
if finance is restricted to domestic institutions operating locally. Many
financial systems fall short of minimum efficient scale and thus have
much to gain from outsourcing financial services from abroad.
It sometimes seems that a boom-and-bust roller coaster has been im-
ported when the capital account has been liberalized. Undoubtedly, with
the wrong incentives, this has been a threat. There have also been tan-
gible gains from external liberalization, and above all there is an inevita-
bility about further opening-up to foreign capital markets and financial
institutions. However, despite a huge research literature, there is noth-
ing near a professional consensus on whether the net impact of full capi-
tal account liberalization on growth, poverty, or volatility should be re-
garded as favorable or not.
Governments can no longer hope to maintain a permanent and wide
gap between actual and market-clearing exchange rates and real whole-
sale interest rates without a panoply of administrative controls on inter-
national trade, as well as on payments, to an extent that is demonstrably
damaging to growth and living standards. That premise does not in it-
self rule out milder forms of control, including taxes and restrictions on
the admission of foreign-owned financial service companies (such as
banks), on the purchase by foreigners of local equities, and on interna-
tional capital movements. The evidence, however, suggests that such re-
strictions should be used very sparingly.
The internationalization of the provision of financial services, includ-
ing the entry of reputable foreign banks and other financial firms, can
be a powerful generator of operational efficiency and competition, and
should also prove ultimately to be a stabilizing force (figure 7).
Some countries have remained slow to admit foreign-owned financial
firms to the local market, fearing that they will destabilize the local finan-
cial system and put local financial firms out of business, with the ultimate
result that particular sectors and particular national needs will be poorly
served. There is no hard evidence, however, that the local presence of for-
eign banks has destabilized the flow of credit or restricted access to small
firms. Instead, the entry of these banks has been associated with signifi-
cant improvements in the quality of regulation and disclosure. The very
threat of entry has often been enough to galvanize the domestic banks into
Foreign bank entry can
strengthen the system
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overhauling their cost structure and the range and quality of their services,
with the result that foreign entry has often proved not to be as profitable
for the entrants as they may have anticipated.
There may be some downside: pressure on domestic banks from for-
eign competition could present prudential risks if it erodes franchise
value of high-cost operators to the point where they begin to gamble for
resurrection. Also, there is the risk that some less reputable foreign bank
entrants might prove to be unsound. Evidently these considerations re-
inforce the urgency of strengthening prudential regulation. Actually, the
arrival of reputable foreign banks is usually associated with a systemwide
upgrading of transparency (especially if the banks bring improved ac-
counting practices with them).
The most dramatic structural developments in international finance
for developing countries over the past decade or so have been the growth
in cross-border equity investment, whether in the form of direct for-
eign investment (where the investor takes a controlling stake) or in the
form of portfolio investment in listed or unlisted equities. The dra-
matic stock market collapses in East Asia during 1997 and 1998 took
much of the shine off what had seemed an almost trouble-free liberal-
ization of several dozen equity markets in the previous two decades,
highlighting questions about the consequences, benefits, and costs of
equity market liberalization.
Despite some setbacks—
Ownership structures matter for
crisis avoidance
Figure 7 Comparing the share of foreign and state ownership in crisis
and noncrisis countries
Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001c).
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For a country that has an active equity market, opening that market
to foreign investors is a decisive step that can be expected to influence
the level and dynamics of asset pricing. More than thirty sizable stock
exchanges in emerging market economies undertook significant liber-
alization mostly concentrated in a ten-year period from the mid-1980s
to the mid-1990s. So it is natural to ask: did the expected effects occur
in practice? Were stock prices higher on average than they would oth-
erwise have been? Was there an increase or a fall in the volatility of
stock prices?
In practice, these questions are tougher to answer than might appear
at first sight. Overall, though, it appears from research findings that eq-
uity prices have increased, thereby lowering the cost of capital, without
an undue increase in volatility. Opening up has also accelerated improve-
ments in disclosure and the efficiency of the local stock markets, even
though these have lost some of their share of the increased business in
the listing and trading of local equities.
Before the explosion in international equity investment, the classic form
of international finance involved debt flows: international borrowing and
lending. Though carefully designed tax-like measures can be somewhat
effective in damping short-term debt flows, openness to international flows
inevitably impacts domestic interest rates and the exchange rate. Here is
where the risks arise, and where macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary
policy has long been directed to containing those risks. Exposure of finan-
cial intermediaries and others to exchange rate risks, both direct and indi-
rect, can be a particularly severe source of problems.
Domestic financial liberalization would be possible even without open-
ing up the economy to international capital movements; with the
opening-up, it becomes unavoidable. Capital account liberalization weak-
ens and distorts a repressed domestic financial sector, eventually forcing
domestic liberalization. If the process is long drawn out, partial liberal-
ization of external and domestic finance can result in a very risky and
unsound situation emerging.
Liberalization both of domestic and international finance has resulted
in a convergence of interest rate movements, though developing countries
are now experiencing some increased interest rate volatility and a struc-
tural risk premium, partly reflecting exchange rate and other policy risks.
Continuing developments in computing and communications tech-
nology seem sure to reshape the way in which financial services are de-
livered worldwide. To some extent the impact on developing economies
—equity market
liberalization has lowered
the cost of capital without
much increase in volatility
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will be an acceleration of the trends of recent years, but there will be
qualitative changes too. Economies of scale for some financial services
are declining, but increasing for others, while the synergies between fi-
nancial and other economic services are also changing and often increas-
ing. This will alter the organization of the industry, with consolidation
in some areas and fragmentation in others.
This process may present some opportunities for financial service pro-
viders in small developing countries, especially where the unbundling of
financial products leaves subproducts that can be efficiently produced with
low sunk costs, and exploits advantages of location rather than scale. How-
ever, the greater potential benefit in prospect for developing countries will
be for users of financial services, including services that have often not yet
been well developed—such as pensions and other forms of collective
savings—and international payments. Technology should allow those coun-
tries to access these services on terms comparable to consumers in ad-
vanced countries, especially insofar as physical distance from the provider
begins to lose much of its importance. Undoubtedly, the accelerating pres-
ence of the Internet will begin to make direct international financial trans-
actions available even to small firms and individuals.
The likely speed of these developments, and the extent to which they will
displace the need for a local presence of financial service companies, remain
unclear. The question that will be increasingly asked is whether smaller de-
veloping countries need to have local securities and debt markets in the
traditional sense, and even how much of banking needs to be domestic. For
policymakers in developing countries the questions will shift to considering
the stability of domestic financial institutions in the face of the increased
competition. Increased access to foreign financial services will entail more
use of foreign currency, and this will accentuate the risks of exchange rate
and interest rate volatility for countries that choose to retain their own cur-
rency. Once again, heightened prudential alertness will be needed.
Policy Implications and Stylized Applications
T HE GENERAL APPROACH EMERGING FROM THIS STUDYshould be clear. Evidence on the importance of sound financialinfrastructure is more important than anyone thought. Unregu-
lated financial systems will fail, often catastrophically, but the wrong type
of regulation is counterproductive. The right  type of regulation is “incentive
Increasingly, countries can
choose which financial
services to buy and which
to build
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compatible”—that is to say, it is designed with a view to ensuring that the
incentives it creates for market participants help achieve its goals rather
than hinder them. More specifically, the right type of regulation
• Works with the market, but does not leave it to the market.
• Keeps authorities at arm’s length from transactions, lessening the
opportunities for conflicts of interest and corruption.
• Promotes prudent risk-taking, meaning risks borne by those most
capable of bearing it, for example, removing distortions that lead to
too little direct investment, too little equity finance, too little long-
term finance, and too little lending to small firms and the poor.
In short, this is financial policy that is market-aware.
The wrong  type of regulation includes financial repression—the main-
tenance of below-market and often negative real interest rates, and forced
credit allocation. Repressive policies, in many cases the wrong response
to an earlier round of crises, created some of the problems we see today,
including the underinvestment in skills and in the infrastructure that are
needed to support a market-based financial system. The design of the
financial safety net also requires careful attention if it is not to become
another type of misplaced regulation.
Another wrong solution is excessive reliance on one type of monitor to
oversee intermediation. Prudential supervision is by now a universal fea-
ture of financial policy, but supervisors are hard-pressed to keep up with
financial technology and the speed with which the risk profile of banks
can change. Enlisting the help of private sector participants by arranging
for well-funded investors to have something at stake in the continued vi-
ability of banks, and hence the incentive to monitor them, will be an
increasingly important support to direct official supervision. Establishing
appropriate incentives for supervisors themselves—recognized in some cases
during the 19th century—will help as well and is an idea whose return is
long overdue. Political structures that increase the risk that reforms such as
these will be delayed need to be addressed, too; in the opinion of some
scholars, it is here that the deepest causes of the wave of crisis of the past
two decades should be sought.
The recommendations of this report are mutually supportive in some
obvious ways. For example, financial systems that are not supported by
effective infrastructure and incentives systems will not be entrusted
with much of society’s savings. A less obvious link is that countries that
Financial policies should
be market-aware
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provide heavily subsidized deposit insurance or a lax regulatory frame-
work will miss out on the benefits of a diversified financial system,
because nonbank and capital market development will suffer. Simi-
larly, excessive state ownership is demonstrably bad for competition
and usually features active or passive discouragement of foreign banks.
The present condition of the financial system in many countries is far
from ideal, and achieving the goals set out here may seem impossibly
distant. Yet there are practical implications for all types of countries and
all types of initial conditions. Without attempting to provide a detailed
tactical design for reform in each case, and without pretending to do
justice to the true diversity of country conditions, it is worth briefly
sketching the policy implications that can be drawn for policymakers in
four contrasting stylized scenarios. Although the initial conditions fac-
ing policymakers differ widely, the principles of good policy that emerge
from these research findings have an equally wide application.
(a) A small low-income country dominated by state-owned
financial institutions.
Here we picture a low-income country, such as many in Africa—but also
elsewhere—where the legacy of financial repression and state ownership
has hampered the development of a vigorous private financial system.
The lessons of chapter 3 are the most immediately relevant for this coun-
try. Government ownership has resulted in credit being directed to
underperforming state entities; incentives and professional capacity are
weak in the banking system, and there may still be a hidden inheritance
of doubtful loans. The priority for the state must be to divest itself of its
bank holdings and to create a credible policy stance sufficient to attract
reputable international bank owners.
Legal infrastructure may need upgrading here, too, as discussed in
chapter 1, although it is likely that judicial enforcement is the more rel-
evant weak spot. In financial regulation, the political independence of
the supervisors is an issue (chapter 2). Clear legal protection for them is
crucial. The temptation to bolster the emerging private banks with a for-
mal deposit insurance system should be resisted in view of the demon-
strated moral hazard effects.
Although this country needs nonbanking financial services, such as
those of securities markets, it is likely too poor and too small to sustain a
liquid securities market on its own (chapter 4). The authorities need to
be aiming to remove barriers that prevent borrowers and lenders from
accessing international capital markets. Evidently this will need to be
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supported by stable and sustainable macroeconomic policies, as policy-
induced macroinstability may be amplified by this opening-up of capital
markets. Achieving minimum efficient scale—both in market infrastruc-
ture and in such aspects as payments systems—is going to be a challenge.
Exploring the possibilities of regional cooperation on these fronts should
bear fruit. If democracy is weak and ethnic conflict high, a significant
level of uncertainty will likely prevail, which will deter physical entry by
good foreign banks, as will low population density. E-finance or joining a
regional financial system may be the best hope of getting access to higher-
quality financial services.
(b) A transition economy with weak rule of law.
Where the rule of law is weak, the financial sector cannot be expected to
function well. Tackling this situation will be the primary challenge. The
message from chapter 1 is that market participants may have to supple-
ment formal law with private contracts that establish bright-line rules
that can easily be verified and enforced, possibly using enforcement
through external jurisdictions.
Because the credibility of domestic institutions is so weak, it is hard
to align private incentives with social goals. Certainly it will be undesir-
able to institute deposit insurance, as observed in chapter 2, although it
may be hard to withdraw insurance from existing state-controlled banks,
which retain an important quantity of household savings in several tran-
sition economies. Leveraging credibility by allowing foreign institutions
to enter and to compete in the retail market is a preferable solution,
which is all the more reason to privatize many such banks as expedi-
tiously as possible (as proposed in chapter 3), although with care to en-
sure that the new owners have significant capital at stake.
This economy is likely to have a de facto open capital account, with
market participants already obtaining financial services from foreign sys-
tems (chapter 4). It would be better to recognize this through a formal
liberalization so that such access is not an underground or illegal activity.
(c) A lower middle-income bank-dominated country emerging
from a crisis.
Most bank-dominated, middle-income countries have recently experienced
banking crises associated with an undue burden of debt. As they seek to
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recover from these crises, the policy messages are clear. Getting the state out
of a direct role in restructuring as fast as possible is important, including
using the private sector to identify the banks and nonfinancial firms that
are fit to survive. In the medium term, authorities need to find ways to
lessen reliance on short-term debt finance. Improved protection of minor-
ity shareholders, as noted in chapter 1, is needed to help boost the possibil-
ity of issuing outside equity. And no doubt, improvements to the availabil-
ity and reliability of information will spur nonbank finance.
Also important is better monitoring of the banking system. Even to
the extent that the crisis was brought on by external factors, virtually
every crisis uncovers banks that have ventured far out on the risk frontier,
and that may account for a large fraction of the fiscal cost. In addition to
ensuring that excessive risk takers are not “bailed out,” better monitoring
is crucial here to convince financial sector participants that incentives
have changed. Often, even if a formal deposit insurance system was not
in place before the crisis, blanket coverage may be now, and it is impor-
tant that this coverage begins to be limited as soon as possible. If the
banks still are fragile or suspect, however, great care is needed, and intro-
ducing a subordinated debt requirement—addressing the enforcement
problems noted in chapter 2—can both improve monitoring and increase
the share of unguaranteed liabilities. Then over time the authorities can
announce a schedule of reduction of the ceiling amount of deposits cov-
ered by an explicit system. For countries with relatively limited numbers
of banks, the German system of private deposit insurance and mutual
liability among the private banks in the scheme has much to recommend
itself as a way to maximize market monitoring.
Official monitoring of banks also will need improvement, and cor-
recting the “balance of terror” noted in chapter 2 will complement greater
central bank independence and allow for vigorous oversight.
Admitting foreign banks also can help stabilize and improve the sec-
tor, and middle-income countries are more likely to have good and eager
entrants, while chapter 4 shows how beneficial openness to international
equity markets can be.
(d) An upper middle-income country with a still-shallow financial
system.
The financial development of some upper middle-income countries re-
mains below average. They seem to have all the basics, but depth, term
finance, and a full range of services are lacking. Here, too, the research
findings of each chapter are relevant. Often term credit is absent because
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of uncertainty, both macroeconomic and structural. If high inflation has
been a culprit in the past, convincing demonstrations of a longstanding
commitment to low inflation is important. Although dollarization (or
adoption of some other currency) is one way out of this dilemma, it can
create additional problems to the extent that the country is not an opti-
mal currency area with its partner. Another solution, which also can help
ensure the quality of regulatory oversight, is fixed and long terms for the
central bank governor, ending the ability of finance or prime ministers to
remove them without a solid majority of parliament.
The development of long-term suppliers of finance—insurance and
contractual savings institutions—also will contribute to a deepening of
that end of the market, as it has in Chile, without costly distortions.
Markets with poor services can benefit from competition. If there is still
a significant (20 percent or more) share of the banking sector in state
hands, further privatization will help in this regard. Limiting the state
banks’ role is also shown to increase nonbank financial sector develop-
ment, which will improve competition at short and long ends of the fi-
nancial market. These more sophisticated financial systems will retain
many financial services on-shore, but will also rely on the international
market for risk-spreading and for more exotic services.
Technology of credit-scoring and credit information can be adopted
to help improve the reach of the financial system and the access of small
entrepreneurs to it (chapter 1). The incentive conditions and the abil-
ity of the authorities to supervise intermediaries effectively can be greatly
enhanced in this rather sophisticated environment by relying on care-
fully designed requirements that have the effect of bringing additional
private sector monitors into the picture.
The Next Generation of Research
T HIS REPORT REPRESENTS THE CULMINATION OF ONEgeneration of research on the financial sector, not the firstgeneration, but perhaps the first that has been systematically
based on statistical data from across the world. The research findings
provide “first-order” solutions to policymakers: overall guiding principles
and a sense of strategy. It also highlights key policy issues for the next
generation of research. In many cases, the first-order solution needs further
amplification and specification beyond overall principles.
For example, given the principles of incentive-based regulation from
chapter 2, which particular aspects of bank regulation and supervision
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deserve greater priority at different stages of development? Or, the case for
reducing state ownership in many countries is clear, but how far should
authorities go and how quickly? And given the dangers associated with
bank privatization, what are the lessons on how to do this process? Al-
though research has begun in this area, it comes too soon after the
privatizations to provide definitive answers on the long-run effects. Also,
although a basic approach to bank restructuring is proposed in this vol-
ume, a more systematic exploration of the links between bank and enter-
prise restructuring, informed by case studies of systemic crisis countries,
would help to guide authorities’ decisions in a crisis.
Another area of relative ignorance is how corporate governance and
ownership in the financial sector affects reform strategies. When insid-
ers or “oligarchs” control banks and other important intermediaries,
they may be able to so influence, or even seize control of, the regula-
tory apparatus that effective oversight is nonexistent. Although many
accept that “one size does not fit all” in the reform process, coming up
with practical rules and guidelines for authorities to know when it is
safe to proceed along different reform paths is an important priority.
Case studies of bank restructuring episodes will likely yield useful les-
sons in general, but especially in this area, such as by highlighting the
fate of different approaches to preventing excessive concentrations in
ownership and control.
Our discussion of foreign entry also reveals a range of wider ques-
tions about the shifting patterns of financial firm ownership and own-
ership concentration that need more in-depth research. And, though
financial repression is almost a thing of the past in most countries,
taxation of finance is still a pressing issue awaiting a synthesis, whether
in regard to novel transactions taxes, to international tax competition,
or to other aspects.
Ongoing developments in e-finance promise to change the financial
landscape in emerging and mature markets. The likely decline in the
cost of entering foreign markets may greatly increase the extent to which
residents of almost all economies “import” their financial services. This
rapidly evolving area needs to be monitored to identify policy problems,
options, and solutions. Policymakers will certainly want to know how it
will affect credit to small and medium-scale enterprises, though there
will be many other effects that also need to be studied. And while e-
finance may improve long-run stability, in the near term the increase in
competition could have destabilizing consequences. There is already a
and monitoring the effects
of e-finance
Moving beyond general
principles—
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demand to know how countries are handling these pressures and how
they are regulating “e-banks” and electronic exchanges.
The trends noted or urged here—better infrastructure, improved in-
centives, less state ownership, and a more receptive view to importing
financial services—will all surely contribute directly or indirectly to a con-
siderable expansion in the role of nonbank intermediaries and capital
markets. How to regulate efficiently these markets to contain systemic risk
could be the  key research question of the next few years.
The last several years have seen impressive leaps in our understanding
of the importance of the financial sector in development and in the knowl-
edge base for many key issues, but there is still much to be learned.
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"Money is the greatest factor in life and the most ill-used.  People
don't know how to tend it, how to manure it, how to water it, how
to make it grow."
Spoken by Margayya, the “financial expert,” in the eponymous
novel by R.K. Narayan (1952)
M
UCH OF THE RENEWED FOCUS IN RECENT
years on the financial systems of developing
countries reflects the rapid and often spectacular
deepening in the scale and complexity of the
the financial systems of advanced economies.
This deepening suggests that the nature of
contemporary economic progress may be more finance-intensive than
previously thought, and that policymakers in developing countries may
need to pay more attention to ensuring that their countries’ financial
systems can and do function effectively.
For the good reasons reviewed below, policymakers around the world
have now made financial strengthening a priority: everybody seems to
want to build deeper, more sophisticated financial systems in the ex-
pectation that this will contribute significantly to economic perfor-
mance. This perspective is not uncontroversial, but against the con-
trary view that finance merely follows and adapts to real economic
progress, there is a solid body of empirical research strongly suggesting
that improvements in financial arrangements precede and contribute
to economic performance.
This then raises the question of how a country can develop a more
effective financial system. Is bigger always better? Is there a clear-cut
preference for the shape of finance in terms of the relative importance
Making Finance Effective
Economies are becoming
more finance intensive
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of different types of intermediary or market? And what of the
infrastructural elements needed to support finance? These matters have
become the subject of an active research debate, especially over the
past decade when financial systems in transition economies had to be
built essentially from scratch, requiring policymakers and scholars to
go back to first principles. Contrasts between the shape and approach
to structure and infrastructure in different advanced economies have
become the focus of examination—paradoxically just at a time when
these contrasts have begun to erode.
While there is still much more to be learned from comparative analy-
sis of the causes and consequences of contrasting financial sector per-
formance, recent research allows several important conclusions to be
drawn now. The widespread desire to see an effectively functioning finan-
cial system is warranted by its clear causal link to growth, macroeconomic
stability, and poverty reduction. Attempts to discriminate between dif-
ferent structural types of external finance through a preference for bank-
ing over market finance, or vice versa, are unwarranted, though, and
could be counterproductive.
Efficient functioning of all these markets in intertemporal commit-
ments requires a supporting infrastructure for information disclosure,
contract enforcement, and competitive behavior. This contractual and
information infrastructure should, if anything, be biased in the direc-
tion of directly protecting the interests of the external funds provider :
the long-term interests of the would-be user  will be poorly served by an
infrastructure that gives potential providers so little protection that they
withhold their funds. In addition, the infrastructure should be fashioned
in such a way as to limit the exercise of market power not only in bank-
ing, but also by insiders—whether in a firm or in the securities markets—
against outside shareholders.
To what extent all of these financial services will—or need to be—
provided at home by domestic financial firms and markets, instead of
being imported or supplied by foreign-owned firms, is a key question to
which we return in chapter 4.
Here it is worth pausing to clarify what we mean by financial devel-
opment, which subsumes both institutions and functions. Starting with
money itself, specialized institutions, including intermediaries, mar-
kets, and agents, tend to become increasingly pervasive in an economy’s
financial activities, displacing bilateral arrangements. However, it is
worth bearing in mind that, especially in developing economies, much
A well-functioning
financial system
requires a supporting
infrastructure
There is a clear causal link
between finance and
development
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of finance is provided within the family, through partnerships or unin-
corporated business. Still, while finance can and does exist without
specialized financial firms, our discussion is confined to organized  fi-
nance, that is, with funds processed, intermediated, or managed by
specialized financial firms or traded in organized markets.1
More important than the institutional form taken by these firms and
markets are the underlying functions of finance that they perform. While
the most evident financial activity relates to the transfer of funds in ex-
change for goods, services, or promises of future return, it is essential to
dig deeper. In fact, the bundle of institutions that make up an economy’s
financial arrangements can be seen as providing the bulk of the economy’s
need for several functions deeper than that of simply trading and trans-
fer (Levine 1997; cf. Merton and Bodie 2000):
• Mobilizing savings (for which the outlets would otherwise be much
more limited).
• Allocating capital funds (notably to finance productive investment).
• Monitoring managers (so that the funds allocated will be spent as
envisaged),
• Transforming risk (reducing it through aggregation and enabling
it to be carried by those more willing to bear it).
Most textbooks, in addition to the focus on payments systems, dwell
on the mobilization and allocation functions, but the monitoring and
risk transformation functions are crucial as well. Though the financial
sector has no monopoly on the economy’s stock of intellectual capital, it
is these deeper functions that justify characterizing the sector as func-
tioning like the brain of the economy.
Monitoring means that intermediaries do not merely collect infor-
mation on firms and allocate loans or investments to them, but also
continue to keep track of the recipients’ activity and to exert corporate
control, whether by enforcing covenants on existing contracts or ulti-
mately by withdrawing or not renewing their financing. These activities
are valuable precisely because information is difficult to acquire and costly
to verify. In this way, intermediaries serve as “delegated monitors” (Dia-
mond 1984), without which it would be difficult to separate firm own-
ership and management.
Risk transfer and mitigation likewise can be underrated; the variety
of the associated financial instruments and the fact that they occasion-
ally backfire often results in this function receiving less weight than it
The main functions of
finance
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deserves. Some risks can be alleviated simply by access to liquidity.
Thus, entrepreneurs with access to liquid savings—their own and oth-
ers—may be more willing to undertake riskier but high-yielding projects
that raise growth, or investors may be willing to finance a project (or
country) if they know that they can get out of it by selling, without
their action so driving down the price that the option ceases to have
value. Specific risks that all face—from typhoons or El Niño events for
farmers, to technological shifts for e-entrepreneurs—also can be eased
by sharing the risks with investors. Specialized instruments are invented
regularly to unbundle and repackage various risks.
How Finance Helps
WE SHOULD THUS SEEK THE MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS OFfinance to economic performance in three dimensions.The first, and likely the most important, is whether there is
an overall contribution to long-term average economic growth ; second,
whether it contributes additionally to poverty reduction; and third,
whether finance succeeds in stabilizing  economic activity and incomes.
In all three dimensions, recent research findings suggest an unambiguously
positive role for the formal institutions of finance.
Almost regardless of how we measure financial development, we can
see a cross-country association between it and the level of per capita
income (figure 1.1). Association, however, does not prove causality and,
as the charts show, there is even a very wide variation between the level
of financial development between countries at comparable income lev-
els, and this variation persists over time (figure 1.2). Nevertheless, over
the past several years, the hypothesis that the relation is a causal one has
consistently survived a testing series of econometric probes.
Formal empirical exploration of this issue dates back over 30 years,
and there has been a steady accumulation of evidence.2 Possibly the most
striking basic indication that the relationship is one of causality is the
fact—evident in figure 2 of the overview—that the level of financial
development back in 1960 can help to predict subsequent economic
growth even after account is taken of other known determinants of growth
(including the catch-up effect of a low initial level of per capita income
and the 1960 level of school enrollment). First displayed by King and
Levine (1993a), for economic growth up to 1989, this predictive power
has continued to be present as growth data for subsequent years is added.
Financial development
causes growth
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Perhaps the most persuasive of the more recent studies (Levine, Loayza,
and Beck 2000) uses a richer data set for the period 1960–95 to make a
more comprehensive assessment in particular of the key issue: could it be
that the process of economic growth itself feeds back on financial develop-
ment, rather than the other way around? Some aspects of the financial
Figure 1.1 Financial development and per capita income
Note: This figure represents the average of available dates in the 1990s for each of 87 countries.
The vertical bar shows the interquartile range; the financial depth of 50 percent of the countries at
each stage of development lie within this range. The median is shown as a horizontal bar. Data for
the bond market in low-income countries is available only for China and India.
Source: BDL database.
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sector clearly are determined prior to recent growth, and what Levine,
Loayza, and Beck show, in essence, is that each country’s level of financial
development can be partly predicted by one such prior factor, namely the
origin of its legal system (that is, which of the British, French, German, or
Scandinavian traditions it is based on).3 As we will see, this is not the only
role for legal factors in our discussion, but in the present context they
provide the essential econometric instrument . Levine, Loayza, and Beck
go on to show that the predicted  level of financial development is also
correlated with long-term growth (even after also controlling for other
standard determinants of growth), thereby seeming to rule out the idea
that the finance-development link is all or mostly reverse causality.
Levine, Loayza, and Beck’s favored measure of financial development
is the ratio of bank (and near-bank) credit to the private sector, expressed
as a share of GDP. The emphasis on the private sector reflects the fact
that credit to government does not much involve the functions of allo-
cation, monitoring, and risk management. Thus it is not just a measure
of financial depth, such as the ratio of money to GDP. Nor is it exactly a
measure of the private sector’s role in the allocation of credit; a better
measure of that is the ratio of the central bank’s to other banks’ assets. It
is worth noting that both of these alternative measures also correlate
with GDP growth, and both survive the test for reverse causality. And
Figure 1.2 Financial development over time
Note: The vertical bar shows the interquartile range; the financial depth of 50 percent of the
countries at each date lie within this range. The median and mean are shown as upper and lower
horizontal bars.
Source: BDL database.
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similar results are available for measures of stock market capitalization
and liquidity, as discussed below.
Even higher than would be predicted by a naïve simple regression of
growth rates on financial development, the size of the estimated effect is
substantial (figure 1.3): a doubling of the ratio of private credit (say, from
19 percent of GDP to the sample average of 38) is associated with an
average long-term growth rate almost 2 percentage points higher (box 1.1).
To be sure, neither this nor other financial sector ratios are policy vari-
ables, and the healthy development of the sector depends on the quality of
the infrastructure and incentive environment in which it functions.4
It is through its support of growth that financial development has its
strongest effect on improving the living standards of the poor. Some argue,
however, that the services of the formal financial system only benefit the
rich, and even suggest that there may be a price to pay for finance-supported
growth in the form of a worsening of the income-distribution in financially
developed economies. Nevertheless, available empirical evidence is against
any such tradeoff: on the contrary, measures of financial development are, if
anything, positively (albeit weakly) correlated with the share of the bottom
quintile of the income distribution. Note that poverty in a country is deter-
mined by the numbers of the poor and their income. Faster growth affects
both. The recent literature on the interrelation between inequality and growth
points to the importance of wealth inequality in dampening growth and to
Finance-led growth is
pro-poor—
Figure 1.3 Naïve and modeled impact of financial development on growth
Source: Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000).
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a feedback from growth in the direction of reducing inequality. Analysis by
Li, Squire, and Zou (1998) of data on inequality in 49 countries suggests
that financial development is a positive catalyst in both of these relation-
ships. It is statistically associated across countries not only with higher growth
whatever the level of wealth inequality, but also with lower income inequal-
ity (as measured either by the Gini coefficient, or by the share of the top
quintile) whatever the rate of growth. Further research is needed to see if
these results are valid over time, as well as across countries.
The results are not implausible, however. For example, even having
access to secure forms of savings can protect poor farmers from the
IT IS TEMPTING TO USE ESTIMATED REGRESSION
coefficients to project what might happen in a country
if one of the explanatory variables were to be changed
by policy. To begin with, one needs to recognize the
limitations of regression analysis; the hazards of noisy
and incomplete data and the probability that
alternative modeling specifications can alter the
quantitative results. Even when we have satisfied
ourselves that the selected regression is as good as we
can hope for in the current state of knowledge, three
further tests must be satisfied before we use the
estimated relationship to predict the impact of policy.
First, the relationship must be free of endogeneity
bias. Second, there must not be relevant omitted
variables that are correlated with the variable being
manipulated. Third, the variable really must be con-
trollable.1
Take the relationship discussed in the text: pri-
vate credit ➔ growth. At least the first two problems
are clearly relevant and have to be navigated.
The first issue of endogeneity (loosely referred to
in the text as “reverse causality”) is what has been
handled in the cited literature by means of instruments;
this can considerably alter the measured impact, of-
ten—though not always—reducing it.
The second issue is also very important. Indeed,
it is clear that the private credit variable is only a
proxy for a multidimensional but unmeasured im-
pact of financial intermediation on productivity. It
works in the regressions, because it tends to be cor-
related with the other dimensions, but if it becomes
a focus of government policy, the traditional correla-
tion with the unobserved, omitted variables will cer-
tainly break down, and the hoped-for impact on
growth will not occur. (An analogous problem is well
known in the theory of monetary stabilization, where
it is known as “Goodhart’s Law.”) In a nutshell, sim-
ply boosting credit growth is no guarantee of healthy
long-term output growth.
Controllability may be more of an issue when it
comes to the institutional factors discussed later in
the chapter and elsewhere. Do we really have reliable
ways of measurably improving legality, say, or the
quality of administration? Here the direction of ap-
propriate policy change may be easier to identify than
its likely quantitative impact.
Box 1.1 Using regression coefficients to infer policy effects
1. Controllability does not imply an endogeneity bias unless the variable has been manipulated by policy in response to distur-
bances in the estimated relationship.
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various idiosyncratic shocks that they face, reducing the likelihood that
a bad year will put them into the poverty statistics, and access to other
financial services can allow them to adopt more advanced technologies.
What of the risk-reduction function? At the microeconomic level, a
wider range of financial instruments, including insurance contracts, can
pool risk, as well as shifting it to those more willing to bear it.5 And it
seems from recent research that financial development also tends to re-
duce aggregate economic volatility. For example, Easterly, Islam, and
Stiglitz (2001) find the level of financial development (here measured
again by the private credit indicator discussed above) to be a strong and
significant explanatory factor in a regression explaining the output growth
volatility of some 60 countries. A doubling of private credit from 20
percent of GDP to 40 percent is predicted in this regression to reduce
the standard deviation of growth from 4 to 3 percent per annum (figure
1.4). Interestingly this improvement is not sustained with further finan-
cial deepening: indeed, the authors’ estimates suggest that very high
values of the private credit measure of financial development could be
associated with higher  volatility of output growth, though the data in
this range are sparse. Another warning sign from this study is that vola-
tility in monetary aggregates is also associated with output volatility.
—and generally a
stabilizing force—
The deeper the financial system,
the smaller is economic volatility
(except perhaps where the share
of credit in GDP is very high).
Figure 1.4 Financial depth and macroeconomic volatility
Note: The figure shows the data and fitted value in a regression of the standard deviation of
annual GDP growth on financial depth (conditional on other control variables).
Source: Based on Easterly, Islam, and Stiglitz (2001).
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Finance is better at protecting against some sorts of shock than oth-
ers. As shown by Beck, Lundberg, and Majnoni (2001), financial
development (measured with the private credit indicator) insulates out-
put growth from terms of trade shocks, but it actually seems to mag-
nify the impact of inflationary shocks on output volatility in low- and
middle-income countries. Perhaps it is not surprising that inflationary
shocks can matter more in a more deeply monetized economy, but
this, too, is a warning sign that expansion of finance is not risk-free.
Indeed, deeper finance without the institutional and incentive features
recommended in this report can lead to a poor handling or even mag-
nification of risk, rather than its mitigation.6
The aggregate empirical evidence thus points to financial develop-
ment having an unambiguous long-term growth effect, and also to be
stabilizing and pro-poor. The finance-growth link is especially well sup-
ported by a range of different methodologies, but what mechanisms
are involved, and can they be strengthened by judicious policy design?
Furthermore, are there risks in seeing financial deepening as a quick fix
or short-term engine of growth?
Further empirical exploration by Beck, Levine, and Loayza (2000) has
helped to pinpoint the most likely channels through which finance contrib-
utes to long-term growth. They show that financial development is not reli-
ably correlated with either national savings ratios or with capital deepening
(figure 1.5: where the arrow is almost vertical rather than almost horizontal).
—but can amplify
inflationary shocks in
low- and middle-income
countries
It’s through productivity—not
volume—of investment that
finance helps growth.
Figure 1.5 Relative contribution of financial development to productivity
and capital intensity
Source: Based on the econometric findings of Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000).
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Therefore, the contribution of finance to long-term growth is to improve the
economy’s total factor productivity rather than the quantity of capital.
This meshes well with the finding of Bandiera and others (2000—
based on a detailed examination of the multidimensional process of fi-
nancial liberalization in eight countries over a quarter century) that
liberalizing reforms aimed at financial development do not reliably in-
crease aggregate saving. On the contrary, the indications are that liberal-
ization overall, and in particular those elements that relax liquidity con-
straints, may be associated with a fall in saving. Even a lower overall rate
of saving is quite compatible with more rapid growth if it comes with an
improved efficiency in the allocation of investable funds.
Although the role of finance in contributing to growth comes through
its contribution to productivity rather than the quantity of capital, more
developed financial systems do make external finance available to more
firms, and specifically tend to favor economic sectors where, for one
reason or another, firms need to call on outside finance. Thus, when
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) compared the actual growth
rate of several thousand firms from 30 countries with each firm’s esti-
mated capacity to finance long-term growth from internal resources,
they found that a greater proportion of the firms in financially devel-
oped economies were growing faster than this benchmark. This suggests
that financial development is in this sense associated with wider access
to external finance. Likewise, looking at the aggregate financing of firms
in 36 manufacturing sectors in more than 40 countries, Rajan and
Zingales (1998) found that it was the economic sectors that, based on
U.S. experience, need to rely most on external finance that grow more
rapidly in more financially developed economies.
If specialized financial firms are good at monitoring the users of funds,
more reliance on external finance could represent an improvement. In
themselves, however, these firm-level and sectoral findings do not neces-
sarily point to a greater efficiency in the allocation of investable resources.
After all, efficiency improvements may require diverting finance away
from certain firms or sectors. A recent study by Wurgler (2000), also
using sectoral data, goes some way to closing the circle by showing that
sectoral investment is more responsive to sectoral output growth in fi-
nancially developed economies. Put another way, in financially less-
developed economies, an output slump in a certain sector is less likely to
result in investment being cut back in that sector, and vice versa. Evi-
dently this, too, is an imperfect measure of allocative efficiency, but it
does cast additional light on the processes at work, which apparently
More finance means
external funding for more
firms and in particular
sectors
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include the mobilization of—though not necessarily an increase in—
savings, reallocation of investable funds, and increased reliance on exter-
nal providers of finance to firms, and as such to more external monitor-
ing of firms’ managers.
Finance also impacts growth positively over shorter periods. Levine,
Loayza, and Beck slice their 35 years of data into 7 equal subperiods and
find that the correlation of growth rates with the level of financial devel-
opment is still as high as it is over the longer term. Indeed, if we shorten
the period even further, we can find even stronger correlations between
private credit expansion and economic growth—but these can be mis-
leading. It is, after all, necessary to distinguish between (a) sustainable
growth based on steady productivity gains helped by shrewd allocation
of capital resources and monitoring of managers, and (b) transitory growth
based on unsustainable rates of borrowing.
This alerts us to a need for caution in pushing for credit expansion as
a way of achieving finance-driven growth. Bigger is not necessarily  bet-
ter. To be sure, it is a distinguishing mark of the high-income, advanced
economies that their financial systems are large in terms of
• The amount of funds intermediated and processed.
• The number and range of firms they embody and the services that
they provide.
• The economic resources they employ.
The econometric results we have described suggest that the associa-
tion is to some extent causal, but it is almost obvious that a headlong
rush by developing economies to emulate the scale of advanced financial
systems is unwise and potentially costly. For example, attempts to make
a dash for financial depth (to improve economic growth through invert-
ing the finance-growth equation) can and have misfired badly:
• Engineering too rapid a rapid growth in domestic credit leads to
inflation and depreciation or to institutional insolvency (getting
this right is partly a matter of macroeconomic stabilization policy—
some of the biggest failures here have been associated with inflow
surges of foreign capital, as discussed in chapter 4).
• Creation of publicly owned banks to force the pace of interme-
diation may instead stifle the creation of financial capacity (see
chapter 3).
Finance works in
the short run too—
but beware: bigger is not
necessarily better
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• Protection of the financial services sector as an “infant industry”
can lead to excess costs and poor services (box 1.2).
Instead, the policy lessons must be derived from closer observation of
the processes by which the financial systems of advanced economies have
evolved to provide solutions to the financial requirements of firms—
and households—in increasingly complex economic environments,
thereby providing the platform for further productivity advances. To a
large extent, these processes have been market-driven, and many of them
occurred in periods when there was little direct government activism in
financial markets. Governments in developing countries that want to
build on this success can best do so by responding to market needs—not
indeed to the particular needs of individual market participants, but to
the needs of market functioning overall. In other words, the aim should
be not to try to engineer directly an expansion of the financial sector,
but to adopt policies that enable financial system participants to deliver
the services in which they specialize with the maximum effectiveness,
and to ensure in particular that the deep functions most needed by each
economy that can be provided by finance are adequately catered to.
Policymakers should focus
on the effectiveness of
financial systems
THERE IS A VALID ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE HERE
that has been seen as relevant, especially for some
smaller economies. This is to see finance as a
potentially important export sector. To some extent
a successful export finance business can be expected
as a spin-off from effective domestic finance. The
United Kingdom’s huge net export earnings from
financial services reflect the legacy of a quarter-
millennium of technological leadership in finance,
built on the Dutch experience in the late 17th century
and placed initially at the service of government war
finance. Technological and human capital
sophistication has also helped Hong Kong and
Singapore achieve comparable roles in their region.
There is some natural tendency for international
Box 1.2 Finance as an export sector
finance to concentrate in a small number of centers,
each reflecting a pool of liquidity and expertise, and
several regional financial centers have benefited from
the existence of repressed financial systems in their
geographical neighborhood. (Furthermore, routine
back-office financial services can be exported without
requiring such a high systemic investment in human
resources.) Unfortunately, few have been successful.
Many countries attempting to develop finance as an
export business have not developed the requisite legal,
regulatory, and supervisory structures and have,
instead, sought to employ aggressive tax or regulatory
competition. What were envisaged as centers of
financial expertise have sometimes become little more
than centers for money laundering.
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Since developing these services involves considerable externalities and
network effects, a passive stance is not enough (cf. Stiglitz, 1994).
Policymakers must work with the market to ensure optimal financial devel-
opment, both helping to coordinate the development of interlinked mar-
ket structures, and also creating the necessary infrastructure for finance.
We look in turn at structures and infrastructure.
Structure
THIS QUESTION OF HOW TO CHOOSE THE OVERALL DESIGNof a financial system emerged suddenly and acutely with thecollapse of the planned economy, and the urgent requirement
to create a new structure for finance in more than a score of transition
economies. Almost immediately, a latent debate between the merits of
intermediated and nonintermediated “market” finance came to the fore.
This debate has taught us much about the way in which financial systems
work, in particular how apparently different institutional structures can
perform in apparently quite different ways, but with similar efficiency,
the same deep economic functions.
Though the premises of the debate—that bank-based financial sys-
tems and market-based systems can be unequivocally ranked in their
ability to deliver financial services needed for growth and prosperity—
seems, as we will see, to be a false one, it is certainly true that the institu-
tional structures surrounding banks and securities markets have often
and for long periods evolved quite differently in different countries.
How are the funding needs of a venture to be externally financed
when they are too large to be provided by the promoter themselves?
External providers of finance need to satisfy themselves in advance that
the returns are commensurate with the risks involved and to continue
keeping an eye on things thereafter.
One financing strategy is for providers and users of funds to rely on a
bank: a more or less large specialist intermediary that takes the risk of
financing the venture on its own books, pools the risk from many ven-
tures, and achieves economies of scale by avoiding duplication in ap-
praisal and monitoring. The bank in turn is kept on a tight leash through
its reliance on short-term financing from a large number of depositors,
which also has the advantage of giving the depositors liquidity. Bank
financing clearly makes sense when information about creditworthiness
Debt and equity—the basic
structural elements
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is easy to interpret but costly to acquire—as for example in a mature
industry; the depositors have no reason to disagree with the bank
management’s information-based judgments.
An alternative financing strategy is for financial claims on the venture
to be sold directly to fund providers. If there is a lot of disagreement on
the prospects of the venture, this might be a better way of enabling fin-
anciers to be matched to the ventures they believe in. Selling financial
claims on the open market, where there are both optimists and pessi-
mists among the suppliers of funds, might be a better bet for those seek-
ing finance for innovation than trying to rely on the judgment of a mono-
lithic intermediary (Allen and Gale 2000).
The liquidity of these claims is enhanced by having them listed on an
organized securities exchange; without such liquidity, the pool of open
market investors will be limited.
Formal financial systems in most countries are dominated by banks, but
in some of the most advanced countries the ratio of stock market capitaliza-
tion to banking assets is very high, and there is a general tendency for the
market-to-bank ratio to increase with the level of development both over
time and cross-sectionally (figure 1.6, box 1.3). Does this imply that an
increased role for market-based finance should be a goal of policy?
This question has been extensively analyzed in recent econometric
research, with a striking conclusion: the trend for a general increase in
Figure 1.6 Three measures of the relative development of banks and organized securities markets
GDP per capita
Bank domestic assets/market capitalization
(a) Relative scale of assets:
bank domestic assets and market
capitalization (log scale)
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(figure continues on following page)
As countries get wealthier, the
relative scale, activity, and
efficiency of the stock market to
the banking sector all increase.
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the share of market finance with economic development does not  appear
to be causal. If one takes the regression models of growth, discussed
above, and adapts them by adding various measures of the market-to-
bank ratio, the results consistently fail to show any statistically signifi-
cant impact of these measures of structure on growth. There appears to
be no effect, whether on the sectoral composition of growth or on the
proportion of firms growing more rapidly than could be financed from
internal resources; even bank profitability does not appear to be affected.
This is the case regardless of whether the ratio one employs relates to the
GDP per capita
Bank private assets/value traded (log)
(b) Relative activity: bank claims
on private sector and volume
traded (log scale)
10,000
1,000
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Source: BDL database.
Figure 1.6 (continued)
GDP per capita
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(c) Relative efficiency: measured
by the ratio of volume traded on
the stock market to (the reciprocal
of) bank net interest margin
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volume of assets (bank deposits, stock market capitalization) or efficiency
(net interest margin, stock turnover).7
We need not conclude that the type of financing does not matter.
One aspect of what seems to have happened is that firms in successful
economies have found a mixture of equity market and bank develop-
ment that suits their own particular financing needs and institutional
structures; the higher the level of income, the more likely that mixture
will be weighted toward equity. The production technology and prod-
uct market conditions facing different firms certainly play a role in
prompting different approaches to financing decisions. So this evidence
by no means runs counter to the need for an appropriate degree of diver-
sity in channels for financing in each country. Instead, the message must
EVEN BEFORE EXAMINING INSTITUTIONAL
determinants of financial development and the causal
relationship between finance and growth, certain
empirical regularities can be detected in the
macroeconomic data, linking financial depth,
inflation, and per capita GDP with a significant
variation along the time dimension.
For monetary depth (M2/GDP ratio), regres-
sion analysis of a pooled cross-section and time-
series with some 2,700 observations covering more
than 120 countries for up to 35 years from the
BDL database (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine
2000a) allows us to quantify these macroeconomic
relationships and suggests a number of stylized
facts:
Monetary depth
• increases by about three percentage points for
every $1,000 increase in GDP per capita,
• and by about a quarter of a percentage point
every year,
• but falls by about half a percentage point for
every percentage point rise in the medium-term
inflation rate.
The importance of inflation, especially high infla-
tion, in hindering financial development is stressed
by Boyd, Levine, and Smith (forthcoming). Their
regressions, which include a wider list of controls and
examine nonlinear effects of inflation, confirm the
average size of the inflationary impact on financial
depth noted above. They also show that high-
inflation countries have much lower financial devel-
opment, but that, beyond a certain point, additional
increases in inflation have little further impact.
The trend increase in financial depth has not pre-
vented a secular slowdown in the world rate of growth.
This could appear paradoxical in light of the proposi-
tion that deeper financial systems help generate growth.
One interpretation is that technological changes over
time have increased the finance-intensity of growth,
implying that deeper financial systems are now re-
quired to achieve the same rate of growth as before.
Box 1.3 Time, income, and inflation: stylized facts about financial depth
Note: These results are the estimated long-term (cointegrating) relationship from an error-correction mechanism imposing common
coefficients across countries except for a country fixed effect. Estimation method: GLS with cross-section weights.
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be that both development of banking and of market finance help eco-
nomic growth: each can complement the other.
To be sure, policy has also influenced the relative importance of banks
and stock markets in some countries. Often policies favoring one segment
have had the effect of stifling another, with the result that the financial
system has not developed the optimal range of structures for its needs. For
example, in many countries, policies of restricting information or subject-
ing dividends to multiple taxation stifles the development of equities and
fosters relationship debt finance, particularly when interest paid is deduct-
ible. Similarly, the relative repression of the Indian and Korean banking
systems compared with less interventionism in the nonbank sector clearly
contributed to the development of the latter in the 1980s and 1990s. The
restriction, from the mid-1930s, preventing U.S. commercial banks from
taking significant ownership stakes in nonfinancial firms helped make at
least larger firms more reliant on the stock market, as had restrictions from
the country’s inception on geographical diversification of banks. The striking
thing is that these restrictions did not prevent the U.S. financial system
from adequately supporting subsequent U.S. growth. A contrasting case is
that of the U.K. banks: even though public policy did not impose any
comparable restrictions on their activities, they too left room for a sub-
stantial contribution from the stock market to the development of the
U.K. financial system and economy.
The reasons for contrasting behavior of different financial institu-
tions in different countries will continue to be debated. What recent
research findings have established is that they matter much less than was
previously thought, and that it is the financial services themselves that
matter more than the form of their delivery. Indeed, the variety of the
needed services goes well beyond what can be measured in the aggregate
data for the scale and activity of banks and markets.
One reason that the dichotomy between banks and markets may not
help much to predict growth is that it does not closely correspond to the
dichotomy between debt and equity.8 A range of different financial in-
struments is necessary to enable firms in different circumstances to ob-
tain an adequate structure of their financing. Debt is the classic instru-
ment that can be used to deter insiders in a successful firm from
pretending that they are unable to remunerate external financiers.9 With
simple debt contracts, the payment is not supposed to be conditional on
the firm’s performance, and default will trigger a transfer of control
(whether of a collateral, or of the firm itself ) to the external financiers.
Provided this transfer of control can indeed be relied upon to take place (and
Information asymmetry
limits access to equity in
developing countries—
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as discussed below, this is by no means guaranteed for developing coun-
tries), this gives lenders the confidence that, even if they cannot monitor
the firm’s performance very reliably, they will be able to move in, take
control, and realize the firm’s value in the event of a default.
An interesting historical reflection helps confirm that verifiability of
outcomes is the central issue. Some of the earliest debt-type contracts,
specifically the ship-voyage (bottomry) loans of antiquity, did  actually
make payment partly conditional on one of the readily verifiable aspects
of success inasmuch as the debtor did not have to service the loan unless
and until the financed ship returned, in which case, as with the junk
bonds of more recent times, they paid off handsomely.
And it is important that there should be something left over to take
control of: debt is much more available to firms with tangible assets (esti-
mates by Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) based on the financial
accounts of a large sample of listed companies in developed and developing
countries indicate that replacing $100 of intangible assets with tangible
will increase reliance on debt finance on average by between $36 and $51).
The complexity of much of modern economic and business activity
has greatly increased the variety of ways in which insiders can try to
conceal firm performance. Although progress in technology, account-
ing, and legal practice has also helped improve the tools of detection, on
balance the asymmetry of information between user and provider of
funds has not been reduced as much in developing countries as it has in
advanced economies, and may have deteriorated. The problem of moni-
toring limits the potential for firms to have access to outside equity, and
this problem is more acute in developing countries.
Indeed, access to long-term debt financing is limited in developing
countries, even for the leading firms. Likely contributory causes are
not only information asymmetries and general opaqueness, but also
poor collateral law and weak judicial efficiency, making it hard either
to write strong contracts or to enforce them in a court of law. Exami-
nation of the financial statements even of listed companies clearly shows
that the proportion of total assets financed by debt is smaller—and
much smaller if we confine attention to long-term debt—in those de-
veloping countries for which data are available than in the major in-
dustrial countries (figure 1.7). The low average maturity of the debt
issued by firms in developing countries is not wholly explained by higher
inflation—though there’s nothing like inflation for stifling a long-term
debt market. That is not to say that these firms have substituted out-
side equity. While the data do not allow us to identify outside equity
—and along with legal
problems, limits the
availability of long-term
debt
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separately, the presumption must be that these firms have been sub-
stantially financed by retained earnings and by equity funding from
firm insiders; those who are not hampered by the problem of asym-
metric information. This is one reason for the growing importance of
private equity investment.
Much of the borrowings of firms in developing economies come
from banks, and the cost of this finance accordingly also depends on
the operational efficiency and competitiveness of the banking market.
In this respect, too, the performance of developing economies falls
Figure 1.7 Average leverage of listed firms in industrial and developing economies
Note: Data is for the average of information collected 1981–90.
Source: Based on Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999).
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behind. One approximation to this performance is the intermediation
spread. The indications are that liberalization of bank interest rates has
widened this spread (figure 1.8); indeed, while the median of average
quoted spreads in advanced economies shrank during the second half
of the 1990s to just over 300 basis points, the corresponding figure for
developing economies continued to widen beyond 800 basis points.
Some of this increase will have reflected more refined loan pricing in
the liberalized environment, better reflecting the higher default risk in
the typical developing country bank portfolio.10 Some, however, will
reflect an increased exercise of market power by banks and bankers in
internally liberalized banking markets; especially where capital has been
eroded by banking crises, banks will be keen to use their new freedoms
to build up capital through the exercise of market power. The poten-
tial need for policy measures to guard against concentration of market
power following banking liberalization is evident, but the authorities
may be slow to do so if banks’ capital is low because of previous prob-
lems: this will be like a hidden quasi-tax on bank customers to restore
adequate capitalization (see chapter 2).
Concentration of banking is also demonstrably bad for industrial
growth, but, as shown by Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), the effects are
Borrowing from banks is
costly in developing
countries—
Figure 1.8 Intermediation spreads
Note: The graph shows trends in the median intermediation spread for banks in industrial and
developing countries, 1975–99.
Source: Honohan (2001a).
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complicated by the fact that noncompetitive banking systems are par-
ticularly adapted for profiting from lending relationships with young
firms with heavy financing requirements. (In an uncompetitive market,
the banks can expect their initial investment in establishing a lending
relationship with such firms to be rewarded with a lengthy stream of
profits.) Indeed, the damaging effect of concentration is found to be
lower in sectors likely to have a predominance of such firms.
Development of the securities markets—equity as well as debt—may
provide a countervailing force to excess profits in banking. Indeed, bank-
ing depth appears to be correlated across countries with stock market
liquidity (figure 1.9). In attempting to understand stock market devel-
opment, it is easy to be distracted by the large anonymous equity mar-
kets that have become so important in the advanced economies, to the
extent that one neglects the fact that, in developing countries, even firms
with stock market listings often have the bulk of their equity held by
investors who are closely related. Indeed, in historical terms, the first
extensive use of formal equity finance was not really to tap an anony-
mous market, but served as a way of transferring ownership between
limited circles of business associates, and so it is for much of equity
today, especially (of course), but not only, for unlisted firms.11
Still, if the problems of asymmetric information can be overcome or
alleviated, outside equity is clearly a financial instrument that can offer
considerable advantages to both user and supplier of funds. Equity finance
—but equity market
development may provide a
counteracting competitive
force
Figure 1.9 Measures of stock market and banking development
Source: BDL database.
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allows the insider promoters and managers of firms time to complete longer-
term strategic projects and to recover from unexpected difficulties without
having to incur the costs of reorganization. Although the equity holders
may have ultimate ownership rights and stand to gain much if the firm
becomes very successful, these advantages depend on the effective func-
tioning of the board of directors giving all shareholders fair treatment.
When this cannot be assured, equity can be sold to outsiders only at a
discount. This has been dramatically shown for East Asia in studies by
Claessens and others (1999a, b), who have carefully documented the ulti-
mate ownership structure of 3,000 listed firms in 9 countries, tracking
group and family control, and thus the degree of de facto control by man-
agement or dominant shareholders, often through the pyramid structures
that are commonly found—and not only in that region (figures 1.10,
1.11).12 To some extent, such structures reflect the greater concentration
of economic power in developing countries (a point that has consequences
for the conduct of prudential regulation also, as discussed in chapter 2).
Increasing ownership concentration hurts stock market performance of
these shares, which trade at a discount to compensate outside financiers
for the likelihood that their interests will be relatively neglected. Here, too,
we see that the functioning of the market cannot always be relied upon to
reach the optimum, and in this case the corporate governance of the firm
and the allocation of resources are what suffer.
Some protection can be provided here by accurate and comprehen-
sive financial reporting, and by laws that require directors to work in the
best interests of all the shareholders. Of course, if laws and their enforce-
ment depend in practice on endorsement by the same elite that controls
most of the economy’s major firms, they may not be in a hurry to pro-
vide that endorsement. Still, insiders do not always benefit in net terms
from an environment in which they cannot credibly commit to fair treat-
ment of outside shareholders.
These kinds of requirement seem more important than simply es-
tablishing a formal organization for facilitating the trading of shares.
Nevertheless, once the essentials for the issuance of equities by firms
have been established, it becomes important to ensure that trading pro-
cedures and practice in the organized stock market are also such that
adequate liquidity is available at fair prices. Rapidly evolving practice
and technology from mature markets make it much easier than in the
past to adopt and implement trading and price discovery mechanisms
that are effective and, in short, ensure market integrity both for bond
and equity trading (cf. IFC 1998).
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Forced feeding of a local stock market, however, as has been attempted
in many small countries, may be putting the cart before the horse. Many
new stock exchanges have been established in recent years despite
unpromising conditions. Many have extremely low liquidity and a very
small number of stocks traded. Especially with increasing opportunities
for international alliances and cross-border listing and trading, it is un-
certain how many of these exchanges can and should survive. We will
return to the role of small financial systems in chapter 4.
Family-controlled firms holding
20 percent or more equity
dominate in some countries
Figure 1.10 Market value of family-owned firms as a percentage of the
total equity market value of the top 20 firms
Source: La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999a); Claessens, Djankov, and Lang (2000).
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Financial Infrastructure
IF WHAT IS NEEDED IS TO FACILITATE THE EFFECTIVE FUNC-tioning of both debt and equity markets—allowing them to respondto the demands placed on them by the needs of providers and users
of funds—this still leaves the question of what policy measures are
appropriate? The answer that most naturally emerges from the research
results that we have been reviewing and from the disappointing experience
from government ownership of financial intermediaries (discussed in
chapter 3) is that these policies are likely to be more effective if directed to
infrastructure13 rather than directly to the financial structures themselves.
Figure 1.11 “And the owner is...the Suharto family group”
Source: Claessens et al. (1999a).
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The lessons from examinations of financial structure point to the de-
sirability of infrastructural policy measures that could promote the pro-
duction and communication of information; limit the exercise of mar-
ket power, whether in banking14 or by insiders against shareholders; and
ensure an efficient functioning of the organized securities markets.
But what policy measures should these be? For example, what rules
and procedures would limit the tendency for participants to misrepre-
sent relevant information, to evade commitments they have undertaken,
and to exploit market power? (Here our first principle of policy forma-
tion, from the overview, comes to the fore: “Work with the market, but
do not leave it to the market.”)
It is in the legal area that recent research on effective financial systems
has made the most progress—and in areas going beyond the obvious
and crucial need to ensure that the creditor’s rights can, in the event of a
default, be expeditiously and inexpensively exercised. Naturally govern-
ment has a comparative advantage in the design and implementation of
law. One possible approach to policy design in the legal field is to seek to
update and refine laws and legal practice in areas affecting finance: to
bring the legal structure up to best practice as defined by what is in place
in one of the more advanced economies.
Some few years ago a startling assertion, backed up by detailed quan-
titative research, cast doubt on this bland prescription. In a series of
papers, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998)
suggested that the choice of legal tradition is not innocuous. Specifi-
cally, they asserted that legal systems derived from English common law
outperform those derived from the Napoleonic code, both in terms of
favoring financial development and in supporting economic growth over-
all. (According to their research, performance of the other two legal fami-
lies recognized by legal scholars, the German and the Scandinavian, lay
between that of the others.)
These initial findings by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and
Vishny can be interpreted, for example, in terms of the relative protec-
tion that is formally granted by the different legal traditions to a firm’s
managers, controlling shareholders, and other insiders as against outsider
financiers, including both creditors and minority shareholders. Indeed,
the authors identified a set of key markers indicative of this relative pro-
tection in law. For example, if a firm declares bankruptcy, can a secured
creditor seize collateral, or does an automatic stay on such seizure kick in
(an automatic stay evidently protects the insiders from secured creditors)?
Different legal systems
provide different
protection
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Is management entitled to stay in control of a firm that has filed for
reorganization under protection of a court? Are there compulsory provi-
sions for proxy voting by mail? Do all shareholders have equal voting
rights and a preemptive right to participate in any new share issues (pro-
tecting the minority shareholder)? Can a small minority of shareholders
insist on calling an extraordinary general shareholders’ meeting? Can di-
rectors be sued for oppressive treatment of shareholders?15
While the various legal markers cannot readily be assigned a quanti-
tative value in terms of the degree of protection that they do provide, the
pattern is fairly clear: using data from 49 countries around the world,
the relative protection is closely correlated across countries with the four-
way classification of legal origin, and with characteristics of legal rules
that are in turn associated with legal origin. Significantly, stronger share-
holder rights (measured rather crudely by an average of the markers) are
associated with a greater number of listed firms and with higher stock
market capitalization; stronger creditor rights are associated with a higher
level of bank credit and bond finance. This finding, that legal protec-
tions do help support financial market development, is confirmed and
reinforced by the Levine, Loayza, and Beck paper (to which reference
has already been made, and which again uses the legal origin variable as
an instrument to help control for the possibility of reverse causation).
Thus legal origin is correlated with financial development, and fi-
nance helps economic growth, but it may be a mistake to make the leap
to saying that legal origin itself was a major causal determinant of eco-
nomic growth. More recent econometric work suggests that the causal
paths are more complex. Two recent studies propose alternative mecha-
nisms, either of which seems to describe the data more accurately. Both
emphasize historical conditions in the countries adopting legal systems
from the core European countries.
• The first (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2000) distinguishes
between colonies that were exploited by the colonial power and
those that were settled by colonists: only in the latter
(econometrically identified by the lower mortality rates experienced
by colonists) could the benefits of well-designed legal and other
institutions have an effect.
• The second paper (Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard 2000) empha-
sizes what they call legality, that is, the degree to which legal insti-
tutions are actually working effectively. In practice, legal origin
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does also correlate with legality, and with the same ranking. But
Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard take a different tack, arguing that
countries where alien legal systems were directly transplanted from
the source country to unreceptive environments (or even to recep-
tive environments if the transplant was indirect and hence some-
how imperfect) failed to develop effective legality.
Each of these views leads to a different explanatory variable, and the
econometric results indicate that each of these variables outperforms the
legal origin as an explanation for economic growth. Perhaps the key
message from these studies is not that successful development required
benevolent colonial leadership, but rather that the nature of the histori-
cal interaction with European centers was often destructive of or inimi-
cal to the effectiveness of local institutions.
The last word has not been written on this matter, but even if it is not
itself a strong independent causal influence on economic growth, the
debate and the analysis of the role of legal origin has deepened our un-
derstanding of legal structures in the functioning of financial systems.
The research has shown that the differential protection of different stake-
holders has had an influence on the relative development of debt and
equity markets, on the degree to which firms are widely held, or more
generally the degree to which they are financed externally, and thus on
overall financial sector development.
Specifically, the proposition that legal origin influences financial de-
velopment is not statistically overturned by the colonial and transplant
theories discussed above. Indeed, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine
(2000b) show that legal origin continues to be an important explana-
tory factor for various measures of financial  development in cross-coun-
try regressions. (It is the persistence of this link that allows us to the use
legal origin as an instrument to help identify the causal impact of fi-
nance on growth as discussed above.) The colonial variable also appears
to be significantly correlated with financial development—the transplant
variable less so.16
And the policy message from the econometric results systematically
point in one direction: far from impeding growth, better protection of
the property rights of outside financiers favors financial market develop-
ment and investment.17
Lest it be thought that this observation is too obvious, let it be re-
called that this perspective—attractive and conventional to providers of
The protection of property
rights favors financial
market development and
investment
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finance—is not uncontested. Indeed, there is something to be said on
theoretical grounds for the alternative view that providers of finance
should not be protected too much. After all, growth depends on entre-
preneurship, which is provided by the insider promoters of the firm;
giving them insufficient legal protection might dampen their enthusi-
asm for new ventures. From another perspective, we can see that provid-
ing too much legal protection to claims over collateral could encourage
lazy banks, which fail to exploit their skills in the social function of
project appraisal and monitoring, relying instead on taking collateral
and on its legal protection (this scenario is worked out theoretically by
Manove, Padilla, and Pagano 2000).
And one must clearly avoid elevating contract fulfillment and en-
forcement beyond its true value. As Keynes (1923) memorably remarked,
“the absolutists of contract…are the real parents of revolution.” These
and similar arguments have a degree of validity, but the net judgment
must be an empirical one, and here all the recent evidence points to the
problems being of insufficient protection of claim holders rather than
the contrary. The absence of a “credit culture,” that is, the incentive and
practice of borrowers to repay, does elicit the predictable response from
would-be lenders. Furthermore, the absence of restraints on the abuse of
insider power to tunnel out the resources of a firm out of sight of the
minority shareholders makes them reluctant to provide equity finance
in the future. Failure to establish these norms holds back the develop-
ment of financial markets, thereby limiting entrepreneurial access to an
adequate range of financial instruments at reasonable cost.
Despite the retreat of government from many spheres of economic
activity, and although over-regulation and counterproductive rules for
financial markets have often been a problem, it would be hard to deny
that government needs to have a role in this field of ensuring adequate
financial infrastructure.18 Where government has wholly absented itself
from the ultimate responsibility for licensing and prudential supervision
of banks, for regulation of the public issuance and trading of securities,
or for creating and supporting the legal system needed for conflict reso-
lution in matters of contract, the results have been bad.
Hence, the first key principle which by now is almost self-evident: in
designing and implementing policy for the financial sector, the govern-
ment must work with the market to develop the effectiveness of market
functioning, but it cannot leave these matters to individual market par-
ticipants or to the market as a whole.
Although theory shows that
too many protections to
creditors may stifle
entrepreneurship—
the evidence suggests that
the greater risk is of
insufficient protection
The government should
work with the markets to
develop a financial
infrastructure
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Yet, to supplement—or make up for the absence of—government
action, there is a clear and practical scope for market participants to
amplify regulatory structures where this is needed. Practice in some of
the more successful organized stock markets provide good examples of
such private initiatives. Indeed, most markets impose some disclosure
and corporate governance requirements over and above those provided
for in general company law, the better to give confidence to market par-
ticipants. They also create special rules for trading procedures in the
market, including the prohibition of insider trading, front-running, and
various forms of collusive practice among market specialists.
An instructive recent example, with evident potential application in
developing countries, is the way in which the German stock market—
the privately owned Deutsche Börse—reacted to a perception that dis-
closure requirements for listed companies were too weak to generate a
high level of shareholder confidence. Accordingly, there were few new
listings. The problem could be traced to the traditional approach of
German accounting, which imposes a requirement of reporting pru-
dence that, while protecting the interests of creditors (whose main re-
quirement is to have early warning of solvency problems), has the effect
of concealing the actual financial strength of a firm, exactly the informa-
tion needed by a would-be shareholder. A general reform of accounting
standards to approximate the International Accounting Standard (IAS)
is envisaged for Germany, as for many other countries, and should help
solve this problem. Meanwhile, the stock market, though obliged to ad-
mit any company that satisfies statutory listing requirements, decided to
create a new high-profile segment of the market with greater disclosure
requirements. Admission to this new segment, the Neuer Markt, requires
quarterly reporting to IAS standards. Since its establishment in 1996, it
has been associated with an explosion of new issues attributable to in-
creased shareholder confidence.19
Like all self-regulatory organizations, the Deutsche Börse cannot dis-
pense altogether with the courts: although a company listed in the new
segment has voluntarily accepted the tougher rules and could be removed
from the Neuer Markt list in case of violation, there could be future dis-
agreements over compliance that might have to be resolved in the courts.
If they are to be effective, attempts to augment the law with the private
contracts of a self-regulatory organization need to be designed in such a
way that recourse to the courts is unlikely, for example by making the rules
themselves as transparent as possible. The term self-regulatory organization
There is clear scope for
market participants to
enhance regulatory
structures—
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(SRO) is, of course, problematic, because most such organizations in fi-
nancial markets will need some degree of outside regulation if only to
limit abuses of the market power that such organizations can wield.20
In attending to the design of laws and market regulations, however,
we must not lose sight of the evident importance, already alluded to, of
legality, and in particular that existing rules should be enforced. Several
of the cross-country econometric studies to which reference has been
made also show that survey-based assessments of the rule of law and
quality of government also matter for financial development.
At the simplest level, taking a real estate collateral for a loan is of
limited use if attaching or repossessing the collateral is known to be
difficult in practice (even though, for example, the borrower’s willing-
ness and ability to provide such collateral may suggest that they are
likely to be committed to the neighborhood, and that protecting their
local reputation may be of some importance to them). Likewise if bank-
ruptcy law and procedures are ineffective, unsecured lending by out-
siders to a firm becomes highly risky. Indeed there is good evidence
that firms borrow less where bankruptcy proceedings are less widely
observed (Klapper 2000).
Correcting deficiencies at the level of the courts is a task that goes
beyond the scope of this review. Pending wholesale legal reforms, how-
ever, progress can sometimes be made by market participants exercising
such sanctions as are available to them. For example, in the case of abuses
by corporate insiders, delisting by the exchange may be an effective sanc-
tion even if the efficient and fair courts are not available. Securing a
secondary listing on a foreign market, or of a depositary receipt, can also
export the problem, a point to which we return in chapter 4.
Another example of how market regulations—in this case deficient
ones—can matter as much as substantive corporate law is the notorious
case of the investment companies that acquired ownership over large swaths
of the Czech corporate sector following the mass privatizations there by
offering their shares for the mass privatization vouchers. Although there
were rules governing the conduct and transparency of licensed investment
companies, they did not protect the outside shareholders—those who had
exchanged their vouchers for investment company shares—from seeing
investment company licenses surrendered and the entity converted into a
largely unregulated holding company (Coffee 1999). Many of the largest
funds were so converted, facilitating the effective looting or “tunneling” of
much of the fund’s assets to insiders to the detriment of the outsiders who
—but they must be
enforced
Experience illustrates the
hazards of an inadequate
infrastructure
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had sold their vouchers for fund shares. Another type of problem in the
Czech case related to the deficiency of rules for trading, as distinct from
corporate governance and transparency. It was permissible to trade in listed
shares without reporting the amounts and prices to the exchange: in prac-
tice, deals on the exchange became the exception and were often con-
cluded at false prices; the true market-clearing prices became opaque.
Investment companies and mutual funds illustrate in a dramatic form
the need for careful protection of outside shareholders. The design of
regulation for this sector, which can greatly strengthen the demand side
of the equity market, as well as widening the range of savings media
available to persons of moderate wealth and providing competition for
bank deposits, is something that needs attention in many countries.
Actually, the development and strengthening of the stock market
and of managed funds often go hand in hand.21 Managed funds, par-
ticularly private pension funds and other contractual savings funds—
with their appetite for longer-term investments, often (though not al-
ways) including market-traded equities—can be a significant driver of
stock market development.22 It is as a block of significant investors—
with the muscle to require rules and legislation to improve market
integrity, efficiency of trading mechanisms, and corporate governance
(including better disclosure to, and protection of, minority sharehold-
ers)—that pension funds and other institutional fund managers can
make their largest contribution to improving the stock market. This
will not happen until their equity holdings have reached a critical mass
of, say, 20 percent of the market, a figure that may take some time to
be achieved: in particular, the accumulation of pension funds is a gradual
process. It will also not happen where the strategy of the funds is to
take majority shares in affiliated nonfinancial firms, as is the case for
the main pension funds in some countries.
And it is not just the stock market that benefits from the emergence of
pension funds, life insurance companies, and other contractual savings in-
stitutions. In mature and emerging markets, they have been central in sup-
porting numerous market-based financial innovations, such as asset-backed
securities, the use of structured finance and derivative products, including
index-tracking funds and synthetic products that protect investors from
market declines. Catastrophic risk bonds placed by insurance companies
are yet another example of the financial innovations emerging from this
segment, and the process is likely to continue, with an apparent market gap
in longevity-based derivatives. The associated learning and human capital
Contractual savings and
the stock market: a
symbiotic development
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formation, as fund managers tool up to employ such techniques, helps to
enhance the quality of risk management throughout the economy.
Building up these funds can also ensure enhanced and stable funding
for key niche segments of the financial market, such as factoring, leas-
ing, and venture capital companies. These in turn are a key to ensuring
that smaller-scale firms can get access to financing at reasonable cost, a
point to which we return below. They also generate a demand for long-
term investments (required by life insurance providers and firms selling
annuities if they are to match their obligations with assets of comparable
maturity), thereby providing a market-based solution to a perceived gap
that many governments have tried to fill over the years with costly and
distorting administered solutions. Thus, contractual savings institutions
expand the range and depth of financial services provided not only to
their own policyholders and plan participants, but to a much wider range
of financial sector actors.
While the emergence of private pension funds is neither necessary
nor sufficient for a well-functioning stock market, it is thus well worth
ensuring that the preconditions for contractual savings development are
in place. This is true, not only for the longer-term benefits that will
accrue to pensioners, policyholders, and other customers, but also for
the spillover effects that can result for financial sector development if the
pension fund industry is competitive and innovative.
Indeed, public policy design in relation to pension funds needs to go
a lot further than is the case for most other parts of the financial sector.
The reason is that the development of private pension funds is every-
where strongly influenced, if not wholly driven, by tax concessions de-
signed to encourage saving for old age, or by government mandates that
make such saving compulsory. The so-called second pillar of pension
provision relates to privately managed funds established in response to
official mandate (the first pillar is tax-financed; the third is voluntary
saving, but may be tax-advantaged). In making pension saving compul-
sory, the government is inevitably drawn in to defining what is to qualify
as pension saving and approving the financial firms that will manage
pension schemes. The same applies, though to a lesser extent, for tax-
advantaged saving media. This implies that the government must also
take some responsibility not only for prudential issues, but also to en-
sure that its interventions do not distort market incentives, resulting in,
for example, a cartelized pension industry mis-selling at exorbitant prices
to a largely underinformed customer base.23
Special issues for pension
fund policy
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Many pension fund system policy design issues remain unresolved in
the literature, and there is a wide dispersion of practice internationally
on matters such as the following:
• If pension saving is to be mandatory, should the mandate apply to
the individual or to the employer? (There are cost savings to hav-
ing the employer arrange for the funds to be set aside, but there is
also a loss of transparency and perhaps of the incentive to ensure
that the funds are well invested.)
• What is the allowable fee structure to be charged by funds? (Should
fees be paid up-front or made proportional to investment return?
Should funds be constrained, in the interest of transparency and fair-
ness, to charging all participants the same price, or does such price-
fixing lead to worse distortions in terms, say, of marketing expenses?)
• Should pensioners be allowed to divide their savings into more
than one fund? (The preferred mix of asset types may vary, espe-
cially with age, but where switching between accounts is allowed,
costly and probably wasteful marketing expenses tend to mush-
room.)
• Should fund managers be obliged to offer a minimum return guar-
antee? (Guarantees may encourage herding of investment strate-
gies, though there is evidence to suggest that this happens even in
the absence of guarantees.)
• What types of annuity contract or other drawdown arrangement
should be allowed? (Compulsory annuitization eliminates longev-
ity risk, but introduces counterparty risk; variable annuities allow
the pensioner to participate in market returns—and risks—during
the drawdown period.)
Resolving these matters shades into complementary public policy is-
sues that go well beyond the scope of this report, such as the nature of
government-provided pension schemes and the portability of accumu-
lated benefits in employer-provided plans and other aspects of income
redistribution policy.
If a consensus has emerged, it is around the principle that the rigid
investment rules that often channeled much of pension savings to poorly
remunerated government-sponsored assets should become a thing of the
past. To be sure, conditions in many countries, especially where the pen-
sion industry is embryonic, where customer sophistication or access to
information is limited, or regulatory capacity is weak, dictate that conduct
There are many unresolved
issues in policy design for
pension funds
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in the pension industry should still need to be constrained by explicit
quantitative rules, especially against concentrations of risk, going beyond
a general requirement of prudence. The trend, however, should be toward
relaxation of arbitrary quantitative investment rules as soon as conditions
permit, so that pension funds can play their full and potentially substan-
tial part in the provision of essential financial services.24
Access
M EASURES THAT SUCCEED IN DEEPENING FINANCIALmarkets and limiting the distorting exercise of marketpower result in more firms and individuals securing access
to credit at acceptable cost. But what of the poor and of the small or
microenterprise borrower?
Access issues are important for at least two distinct reasons. First, they
directly address the empowerment aspect of poverty. Limited access to
finance is a contributor to persistent poverty in that it severely limits the
potential for poor households to exercise their own entrepreneurial abili-
ties to escape poverty. Second, there are externalities in finance for small
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). One way of thinking of this is to
recognize that each would-be small entrepreneur begins with an idea:
small firm creation is often the only way to embody these ideas, and
they will not be brought to realization without the necessary access to
finance. Many of the ideas will be bad ones, but some will prove to be of
enormous social benefit as contributors to the growth process. Which is
which will not easily be determinable unless they are exposed to the
marketplace. Without detracting from the growth-contribution of larger
firms, a financial system so structured as to give access only to those who
are already established and prosperous fails to deliver in this dimension.
Much-discussed as the two key obstacles to access are (a) the fact that
the poor and start-up companies alike have a lack of collateral and (b)
fixed costs, including those of information acquisition, monitoring, col-
lection, and enforcement that can be prohibitive for small financial con-
tracts and transactions. With limited access to the conventional formal
financial sector, small-scale, poor, or isolated firms or individuals have had
recourse to a huge variety of informal or quasi-formal financial arrange-
ments. They also employ a range of nonfinancial approaches to securing
needed services that the formal financial system fails to offer them.
Greater access to finance
can help households
escape poverty and tap the
talents of the less
privileged
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Informal finance is very important in many regions and for certain
groups in almost all regions of the developing world.25 It comes in differ-
ent forms, ranging from susu  men—providing a haven for the savings of
market women, secure as much from thriftless and importunate family
members as from theft—to rotating savings and credit associations (roscas )
which, by pooling regular savings and lending the pooled sum out in
turn to the members, can reduce the average time taken for a member to
access a target investable sum. Everywhere there is the traditional mon-
eylender, the pawnbroker, and trade-related and tied credit, but prob-
ably the largest part consists of nonintermediated bilateral financial ar-
rangements between friends or relatives, whether of loan or equity type,
or a mixture.26
In the absence of collateral or of functioning or practical legal en-
forcement mechanisms, informal finance substitutes a range of alterna-
tive incentive and information devices, including social enforcement of
penalties for willful default, social collateral, and pledging, where pos-
session and use of the asset offered as collateral is transferred to the lender.27
The indications are that the scale of informal finance is inversely re-
lated to formal financial depth, but, extensive and rich though it is, in-
formal finance hardly provides a perfect substitute for well-functioning
formal finance with its ability to mobilize funds on a large scale and pool
risks over extensive areas. The comparative advantage perceived for in-
formal finance in solving enforcement and information problems is rel-
evant mainly to small-scale and isolated customers. For example, an ex-
tensive empirical literature on the effectiveness of informal financial
systems in pooling risk in villages concludes that, though many such
institutions exist, and often operate at a relatively substantial scale, the
volatility of individual household consumption is still far from being
fully insulated from idiosyncratic household risk.
Informal finance aside, households with inadequate access to formal
finance fall back ex ante on self-insurance through such means as choice
of low-risk (and potentially low average yield) production processes, and
on choice of nonfinancial assets with good risk-reduction characteristics
(such as the purchase of cattle), or on marriage and migration strategies
(marrying into a family in a remote village can help spread consumption
risk); and ex post on a variety of coping strategies, including mobilizing
additional household labor resources.
If there is to be improved access to formal finance, this must be
achieved by addressing the two fundamental problems of information
Extensive informal
financial networks exist in
most countries—
but these are poor
substitutes for more formal
means of intermediation
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and the relatively high, fixed costs of small-scale lending. Recent re-
search focusing on technological and policy advances points to how
these barriers can be lowered. Much attention has focused in recent
years on a range of innovative, specialized microfinance institutions,
mostly subsidized and often targeted at lending to the poor, which
have become established with remarkable success. The features that
have been emphasized in studies of these microfinance institutions
include (a) the rather low rates of loan delinquency—far lower than in
the previous generation of subsidized lending programs that had oper-
ated in many developing countries, and (b) the reach of the institu-
tions in terms of sheer numbers, as well as to previously grossly ne-
glected groups, such as women. These elements of success have certainly
been remarkable. This success has been attributed in part to reliance
on innovation inspired by informal finance, for example:28,29
• The use of group lending contracts exploiting the potentialities of
social capital and peer pressure to reduce willful delinquency.
• Dynamic incentives using regular repayment schedules and follow-
up loans or “progressive lending.”
• Lighter distributed management structures that reduce costs and
enable lenders to keep loan rates down to reasonable levels.
These innovations, developed from the “bottom up” in poor coun-
tries such as Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Indonesia, now begin to be im-
ported into advanced countries whose poor continue to be relatively
badly served by the formal financial system.30
Though small in terms of dollars lent, these programs are important
in terms of the number of beneficiary households, and further rapid
growth is envisaged. Hence, it will be of some importance to target the
resources where they have the greatest social impact, and to avoid swamp-
ing fragile social structures by imposing too many demands on them.
However, even these programs have not been very successful in directly
reaching the poorest of the poor.
Their interaction with the remainder of the financial system is likely
not decisive for the continued success and evolution of microfinance
programs. One illustration of the lack of interaction is the fact that loan
performance of BRI in Indonesia was almost unaffected by the 1997–98
crisis that almost swept away the main banking system. To be sure, as
some unsubsidized banks learn the value of the techniques, they might
become competitors able to cherry-pick some of the subsidized sector’s
Microfinance can reduce
the problems of
information and costs for
small-scale lending—
but they often cannot help
the poorest of the poor
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borrowers, but this need not be much of a threat to the continuing so-
cial effectiveness of the specialized microfinance entities directed to the
poor. It may, however, be necessary for them to become part of the for-
mal credit information system, discussed below, to protect themselves
from exposure to borrowers who have, unknown to them, accessed other
sources of finance.
While the revolution in microfinance has thus been associated with
lending techniques that can and have resulted in profitable banking, it
would be a mistake to think that this does away with any scope for
subsidized lending programs targeted at the poor. Four facts highlight
the distinctions that need to be made:
• Many of the largest and most prominent of the microfinance in-
termediaries require ongoing subsidies.
• Microenterprises are not necessarily operated by poor people.
• Most microfinance programs typically do not directly provide credit
to the poorest of the poor.
• Operating expenses mean that real interest rates on microloans
tend to be very high: affordable if applied to some forms of eco-
nomic activity (for example, very short-term loans for merchan-
dising), but implying a cost of capital far in excess of wholesale
money market rates.
These considerations point to a double conclusion. First, unsubsidized
microcredit can be an important element of the financial system, drawing
not only on techniques exploiting the concept of social capital, but also on
improvements in information technology for credit appraisal, as discussed
below. Second, potential economic benefits can also be obtained from
subsidized microfinance targeted at the poor. It may not be realistic to
assume that the need for such subsidies will be eliminated over time.
Detailed research evaluating the social rate of return of subsidized
microcredit programs has become an active area. Some types of lending
seem more effective than others: lending to women in particular seems to
convey higher social returns on average. It is of some importance to target
available subsidies where they have the greatest social impact. As an aspect
of applied public finance, a full discussion of subsidized microfinance lies
outside the scope of this report, but the sorry history of early generation
of dysfunctional subsidized credit programs has taught many lessons that
remain valid and that must continue to be applied in subsidized microcredit
programs of the new style targeted at the poor (Adams, Graham, and von
The lessons from earlier
subsidized credit programs
remain valid for
microfinance
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Pischke 1984). Among those lessons are the need to enforce hard budget
constraints, to avoid loan interest charges so low that they allow round-
tripping, to choose carefully and adhere rigorously to the target group,
and so on. Furthermore, the high visibility and popularity of these pro-
grams among donors itself presents risks: it is crucial to avoid swamping
the often-fragile social structures that sustain these institutions by impos-
ing too many demands upon them. (To take just one example: when
funding from donors ramps up the supply of credit, how easy is it for each
institution to verify that the loan it is now making is not just going to
repay another falling due to a different microlender?)
As far as unsubsidized microcredit is concerned, new attention to
improving the information infrastructure promises to yield benefits.
The collection, processing, and use of borrowing history and other
information relevant to household and small business lending has been
a rapidly growing activity in both the public and private sectors (see
Miller (forthcoming) for a review of the recent worldwide expansion of
credit registries). Computer technology has greatly reduced the unit costs
here and improved the sophistication with which the data can be em-
ployed to give an assessment of creditworthiness. While the impact of
having this information available alters incentives and market power in
subtle—and not always favorable—ways, the consensus of recent research
is that the growth of access to credit information improves loan avail-
ability and lowers intermediation costs. Comparing data from 43 coun-
tries, Jappelli and Pagano (1999) found the volume of bank credit to be
significantly higher in countries with more information sharing, even
after controlling for the effects of different degrees of legal protection for
creditors. It is not hard to see why. For one thing, better information
allows banks to offer better rates to more creditworthy customers, thereby
allowing the market to escape at least partly, from the adverse selection
trap that Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) showed can lead to credit rationing.
Knowing that your credit performance will be accessed by future lenders
also reduces moral hazard by stiffening the costs of delinquency. Fur-
thermore, sharing information they have gathered can also mean that
lenders lose some of the market power that goes with that information.
We cannot assume that these technologies can fully overcome the
greater underlying information deficiencies encountered in many devel-
oping countries, but they can help.
There are drawbacks, of course, and they pose interesting policy chal-
lenges. To avail themselves of the benefits, borrowers must tolerate some
Improving the information
infrastructure and
technology can lower
intermediation costs—
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invasion of privacy. Since discrimination between the creditworthy and
others is the purpose of credit appraisal, statistical credit-scoring models
that make use of personal information other than credit history may
have the socially undesirable effect of reinforcing pockets of disadvan-
tage, whether geographical, ethnic, or other. Credit discrimination on
specified grounds is outlawed in some countries, and even if enforce-
ment is difficult, there is a need to guard against socially damaging ef-
fects of this type: this is clearly a potential downside of credit informa-
tion systems. Also, the information-gathering industry has a natural
tendency toward concentration or even monopoly (90 percent of credit
information for the small business sector in the United States is pro-
vided by the market leader, Dun and Bradstreet).
The issue of privacy is of considerable practical importance. Barron
and Staten (2001) show how much of the predictive value of credit in-
formation is lost when even modest privacy requirements are imposed.
Specifically, the law in several countries precludes the sharing of positive
information on credit history (that is, only defaults can be reported).
Without this, though, it seems that a lender with a target default rate of
no more than 3 percent would have to reject three in every five appli-
cants, more than twice as many as if the full range of credit information
were available (cf. table 1.1).31 Of course the issue of privacy protection
is a much wider and rapidly evolving one, but this evidence on how
—outweighing potential
drawbacks in the forms of
lost privacy and credit
discrimination
Table 1.1 Effects on credit availability of adopting a negative-only credit scoring model for various
default rates
Percent of consumers who
obtain a loan Percent decrease in consumers
Negative-only who obtain a loan with
Target default rate (percent) Full model model negative-only model
3 74.8 39.8 46.8
4 83.2 73.7 11.4
5 88.9 84.6 4.8
6 93.1 90.8 2.5
7 95.5 95.0 0.5
Note: The full model predicts creditworthiness using both positive and negative information about borrowers credit history; cut-off credit
quality is adjusted to reach target default rate. The negative-only model does the same, but ignores any positive information.
Source: Calculated by Barron and Staten (2001), based on a large sample of credit histories from the U.S. credit information firm
Experian.
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valuable—to most borrowers as well as to lenders—is the sharing of
objective information on credit history suggests that countries with tight
privacy laws should consider whether they can be relaxed to allow for
such sharing to a lender from whom the borrower has sought credit.
The establishment of public, or government-controlled, credit regis-
tries in some countries has incidentally finessed the issue of monopoly.
Long established in certain European countries, partly as a side effect of
central bank requirements for preapproved private paper as collateral against
money market support, a large number of such registries have recently
been established, especially in Latin America. The recent surge is an un-
derstandable response to concerns about aggregate loan performance in
the countries concerned, and about the quality of information on which
bank lending decisions were being made. Countries that already had a
private credit registry were much less likely to establish a public one. How-
ever, while the public registries represent a step forward, they are unlikely
to remain the dominant force in credit information relevant to small-scale
lending. Only information on the large exposures is likely to be of much
direct value to the prudential regulators, whereas it is at the small end of
the scale of loans that the information sharing aspect comes to the fore.
Indeed, the establishment of public registries has not precluded the subse-
quent creation of private registries. Given the increasing volume of cross-
border lending, it is likely that communicating networks of private regis-
tries will increasingly tend to acquire the comparative advantage here. The
appropriate policy stance should be to facilitate this development, for ex-
ample by ensuring that the threshold loan size for compulsory reporting
to the public registry is not unduly low.
Conclusions
R ECENT RESEARCH FINDINGS PROVIDE CLEAR GENERALpointers for the design of government financial sectorpolicy. They confirm that financial development does matter,
it is pro-poor and it reduces aggregate volatility as well, contributing to
growth. Even if the results do not express a preference as between bank-
led or stock market-led structural approaches, they do provide plenty of
indications of what needs to be protected through infrastructural
measures. Both lenders and would-be borrowers benefit from improved
protection of the rights of creditors, minority shareholders benefit from
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protection from concealment of information and other abuses by firm
insiders, and financial development is enhanced when exercise of market
power by banks and others is restrained. Improved information
infrastructure has been shown to help improve access for small borrowers,
as have the innovative management and operational techniques of
specialized microcredit institutions.
There are indications, too, of where government subsidy is and is not
helpful. Although attempting to subsidize interest rates is likely to be
counterproductive, there may be a case for carefully designed subsidiza-
tion of private information infrastructures to overcome problems of fixed
cost and to release the externalities that can be triggered by greater access
on the part of small firms to formal finance. Public money may also be
fruitful in strengthening judicial and accounting infrastructures, as well,
of course, as in prudential supervision and regulation, even though some
cost recovery may here be possible.
Thus the landscape of a smoothly performing and progressive finan-
cial system is sketched, but how to avoid the pitfalls of crisis, insolvency,
and collapse? That is the topic to which we now turn in chapter 2.
Notes
1. Organized finance covers formal
 
 financial inter-
mediaries and markets, as well as entities such as rotating
savings and credit associations (roscas
 
) which, though spe-
cially organized for finance, are informal in the sense of
not having a legal existence or falling within the scope of
government regulation. Note that it has been important
in many developing countries to distinguish between these
and the emergence of unregulated financial intermediar-
ies offering securities to, or taking deposits from, the gen-
eral public (see chapter 2). Almost all the data employed
in this study refer only to the formal financial sector.
2. Goldsmith (1969) may be said to be the pioneer,
and among the first to develop this cross-country empiri-
cal initiative were Gelb (1989), King and Levine (1993a
and b), and Gertler and Rose (1994). Levine (1997) pro-
vides an authoritative review of the theoretical and em-
pirical literature.
3. Among the statistical hurdles passed by these le-
gal origin variables is Hansen’s test for instrument
overidentification. In addition to using the legal origin
instrument, Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) also em-
ploy a dynamic panel instrumental variable technique with
essentially the same conclusions. Contrasting time series
methodologies are also employed with similar conclusions
by Neusser and Kugler (1998) and by Rousseau and
Wachtel (1998), though their data are limited to
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries.
4. Replacing the average ratio of private credit to GDP
of Congo (Kinshasa) with that of Malaysia or Thailand
predicts an increase in Congo’s average growth rate of more
than 6 percent per annum, not far off the actual difference
of about 7 percent between the growth rates of Congo and
either of the other two. Of course, such calculations need
to be made with care, as indicated in box 1.1.
5. There is an interesting discussion of the demand
for risk reduction in de Ferranti and others (2000).
6. The multiple problems of the highly monetized
centrally planned economies following liberalization
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may be cited as an example here; likewise the inappro-
priate use of derivatives in Mexico, 1994, described in
chapter 4.
7. Levine and Zervos (1998a and b), Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine (1999), Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine (2000a), Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2000a),
Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (2000).
8. For example, the mean debt-to-equity ratio for
listed firms plotted for 30 countries in figure 1.7 is only
loosely correlated (R = –0.40) with the markets vs. banks
structure index devised by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine
(2001).
9. We use the term to include managers, directors,
and dominant shareholders of a firm.
10. A further explanation could lie in a link between
higher funding interest rates and the higher riskiness of
lending (cf. Agénor, Aizenman, and Hoffmaister 1999).
11. Baskin and Miranti (1997) document the use of
common stocks in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
12. Cf. La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(1999a) for the advanced countries. A study by Khanna
and Palepu (1999) of the monitoring of Indian industrial
groups also emphasizes the chilling effect on opaqueness
on outsider investment. Note, however, that some coun-
tries heavily reliant on family ownership, according to fig-
ure 1.10, have experienced strong and resilient economic
performance.
13. The term “financial infrastructure” is intended to
capture the framework of rules and systems within which
firms and households plan, negotiate, and perform finan-
cial transactions. As such, it would include legal and regu-
latory structures (including rule and contract enforcement
mechanisms); supervisory resources and practices; infor-
mation provision (for example, accounting and auditing
rules and practices, credit bureaus, rating agencies, pub-
lic registries); liquidity facilities; payments and securities
settlement systems; and exchange systems (for example,
trading and listing services, trading rules, communica-
tion and information platforms).
14. Openness as an approach limiting market power
in banking is discussed in chapter 4.
15. Indeed, English common law sees directors as fi-
duciaries of the shareholders with a duty of loyalty to them
(Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 1999).
16. Surprisingly, a variety of political structure variables
fail to perform well in predicting financial development in
this study; we return to political factors in chapter 3.
17. In extreme cases, even a liquid financial sector will-
ing to lend may find no takers if property rights are insuf-
ficiently protected. Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff
(1999) provide some interesting survey-based evidence
from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (coun-
tries that, incidentally, are not included in the legal sample
of La Porta and others) showing that, in 1997, it was dif-
ferences in firms’ perceptions of the security of their prop-
erty rights that determined their willingness to invest, and
not any question of access to outside finance.
18. Though, for the case against government regula-
tion of finance, see Easterbrook and Fischel (1991).
19. A good account of this process in Johnson
(2000), which also shows that the listing boom is not
an “Internet effect.”
20. For a discussion of the actual and potential role
of SROs in finance, see Bossone and Promisel (2000).
21. The following paragraphs draw freely on Vittas
(2000).
22. Indeed, statistical causality analysis favors the hy-
pothesis that short-term fluctuations in stock market capi-
talization follow changes in the asset size of the contractual
savings industry (Catalan, Impavido, and Musalem 2000).
23. Measures, parallel to those employed for banks
and discussed in chapter 2, need to be designed to ensure
that approved pension funds are prudently managed by
experienced professionals, that they are secure against loot-
ing (for example through adequate auditing, and segre-
gation of assets to be held by an external custodian), that
they retain an adequate solvency reserve and that there is
adequate transparency of their operations (cf. Rocha,
Hinz, and Gutierrez 1999).
24. For further discussion of current issues in pen-
sion fund regulation, see James, Smalhout, and Vittas
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(1999); James and Vittas (2000); Srinivas, Whitehouse,
and Yermo (2000); Vittas (1998, 2000).
25. Besley (1995) provides a wide-ranging survey of
the literature on informal finance.
26. Cf. the interesting insurance-cum-equity features
of local lending uncovered by Udry (1994) in Northern
Nigeria.
27. This method has been used, for example, to fi-
nance temporary emigration.
28. Success has also required attention to more mun-
dane aspects neglected by an earlier generation of subsi-
dized microfinance institutions, such as a realistic interest
rate structure, a well-trained and incentivized staff, and good
management information systems.
29. For the performance of these institutions, see
Morduch (1999) and Sebsted and Cohen (2000).
30. The recent success stories of microfinance based
on group lending has somewhat overshadowed the steady
effectiveness of credit cooperatives and credit unions,
which have long functioned as quasi-formal but decen-
tralized institutions in many countries, employing some
of the techniques discussed above, but usually relying for
the bulk of their resources on member savings.
31. The specific comparison is with more restrictive
law in Australia compared with what is allowed in the
United States (itself closely defined).
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C H A P T E R  T W O
“Any sudden event which creates a great demand for actual cash may
cause, and will tend to cause, a panic in a country where cash is much
economized, and where debts payable on demand are large.”
Walter Bagehot (1873)
W
HEN MAJOR FINANCIAL CRISES OCCUR, ALL
who depend on financial services suffer.
Depositors can lose their funds or have
their accounts frozen and value eroded by
inflation. Good borrowers get cut off from
credit. Issuers of debt and equity finance find
that markets have dried up. Pensioners may find their living standards
diminished. Holders of insurance policies may find their counterparty
bankrupt. And taxpayers often foot a bill that otherwise could have
permitted much-needed expenditures on other items. Even those so poor
that they do not use the financial services of the formal sector may find
their incomes slashed in the resulting recession, and informal financial
funds may dry up as well (box 2.1).
Recent decades have seen a record wave of crises: by millennium-end,
there had been 112 episodes of systemic banking crises in 93 countries
since the late 1970s—and 51 borderline crises were recorded in 46 coun-
tries. These crises both were more numerous and expensive, compared
with those earlier in history, and their costs often devastating in develop-
ing countries.
This chapter first examines why finance is so fragile—especially in
developing countries, and all the more so in banking—and it discusses
the costs of financial and banking crises, and their causes. Banking crises
Preventing and Minimizing
Crises
Recent financial crises
have been more numerous
and expensive than in the
past
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are the main focus, and although currency misalignment is a common
element of a banking crisis, so-called twin (banking cum currency) cri-
ses are deferred until chapter 4.
How can society be provided with financial services without incurring
the costs of these crashes? The incentive structure, the product of market
forces interacting with the regulatory environment, is undoubtedly the
key factor in the stability and functioning of the financial sector, so the
second section of the chapter, Regulating Banks: Harnessing the Market,
turns to reform in this area. Just as liberalization of private initiative in the
financial sector and real and financial technological developments have
been part of the story in the increased vulnerability of finance in recent
decades, so creative initiatives to harness the private sector and technology
are key to bringing the social risks of finance back under control.
WHEN CRISES OCCUR AND LENDERS BECOME MORE
risk averse, small firms are the first to be rationed
from access to credit, which is an important reason
why small business failure rates soar during financial
crises. Not surprisingly, then, poverty can rise sharply
and remain high for some time following a crisis.
Number of people living in poverty
Republic
Year Indonesia of Korea Thailand
1990 80.9 14.7 18.4
a
1996 50.6 4.7 7.5
1998 — 9.1 7.6
1999 76.3 — 9.7
2000 70.3 6.0 8.7
— Not available.
Note: Figures for 2000 are estimates.
a. 1988 data.
Source: World Bank.
Even with the recovery and projected decline in
poverty rates in 2001, the number of poor people is
expected to return to precrisis levels only in Thai-
land, and remain high in Indonesia and the Repub-
lic of Korea. As serious as this impact is, the poor get
hit again when the bill comes due, as loan losses
sooner or later have to be covered (figure 2.1). Fiscal
costs of bank insolvency, which represent injections
of government funds, must be covered by tax in-
creases, expenditure reductions, or inflation, all of
which hit low-income households hard. Even if au-
thorities attempt to put on controls to prevent capi-
tal flight, experience shows that wealthy households
are best able to avoid them; middle- and low-income
families’ funds are then left to bear the burden of
higher taxes, so income distributions usually dete-
riorate for at least several years after a crisis. Subse-
quent growth “…tends not to eliminate the higher
level of inequality generated during a severe economic
downturn” (Lustig 1999). Consequently, preventing
financial crises is an important and potentially effec-
tive instrument to sustain growth and avoid poverty.
Box 2.1 Poverty and crises
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A key facet of the incentive environment is the safety net provided for
banks. The 20th century was marked by the rise of safety nets for the
banking sector, the main components of which are the lender of last resort
facility and deposit insurance. Although much has been written on the
former, research on deposit insurance has been mostly theoretical and lim-
ited to the United States until recently. Given the recent expansion of
explicit deposit insurance systems around the world, we then focus in the
third section, Financial Sector Safety Nets, on when and how they can
best be designed. An excessively generous safety net for banks—or state
ownership, discussed in chapter 3—can be a key factor behind the bank
dominance and the fragility in many emerging markets.
Finance is anything but static: once a set of rules is promulgated, the
nature of finance makes it especially easy for participants to move their
business into different forms or jurisdictions that can nullify the goals of
reforms. This regulatory arbitrage will vary directly with the extent to
which regulations neglect the optimizing behavior of participants. Fi-
nancial systems in which incentives encourage prudent risk-taking will,
other things equal, be more resilient, less a source of shocks, and there-
fore better able to assist in risk mitigation. And as incentive-compatible
regulation is combined with an infrastructure that encourages efficient
market functioning, economic growth will be stimulated by intermedi-
aries with the incentives and wherewithal to engage in prudent risk-
taking. This does not mean relying naïvely on markets to do the job, but
rather shaping incentives of private agents and regularly revisiting the
effects of various changes on them, what might be termed dynamic regu-
lation. To understand better the consequences of the current regulatory
environment, as well as the advantages and disadvantages of any reforms,
authorities must focus on the underlying incentives.
It may be necessary to go further than setting out a program of regu-
latory reform and safety net issues in this area. We have to ask whether
there are deeper reasons why such reform has not long since been put in
place in most countries. Is it really a failure of regulatory design, or could
it also reflect weakness in the political institutions? Is it in the interest of
some interest groups and their political sponsors that a lax regulatory
environment and a safety net with perverse incentive effects be main-
tained even though they increase the risk of socially costly bank failure?
That issue goes beyond the scope of this chapter, and indeed beyond
much research, though we return to related matters in chapter 3.
The incentive structure is
key to the stability and
functioning of the financial
system
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Why Finance Has Been So Fragile...and Remains
That Way
All people are most credulous when they are most happy; and when
much money has just been made, when some people are really making
it, when most people think they are making it, there is a happy oppor-
tunity for ingenious mendacity. Almost everything will be believed for
a little while, and long before discovery the worst and most adroit
deceivers are geographically or legally beyond the reach of punishment.
But the harm they have done diffuses harm, for it weakens credit still
further.
Walter Bagehot (1873, p. 151)
IN PERFORMING ITS ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS, FINANCE REGULARLYinvolves the exchange of money today for the promise of moneyin the future, usually with some form of return. This intertemporal
nature, combined with well-known information problems that admit
adverse selection and moral hazard behavior, is at the heart of the fragility
of finance. Each party to this trade enters into the contract with expectations
about a host of variables that will affect the likelihood of repayment.
Expectations change, perhaps quickly, and lead to swings in asset prices,
which in turn may be exacerbated by the possibility of crowd behavior.
To be sure, there is some truth in the idea that financial markets
normally make a reasonably efficient use of information in the sense
that it is hard for an investor consistently to earn excess returns—at
least on a risk-adjusted basis—using publicly available information.
Indeed, even information that is not widely available can quickly be-
come embodied in market prices as long as there are enough well-
financed, informed investors.
Although the “efficient markets” hypothesis is a useful benchmark
for describing the evolution of market prices in normal times, it is
hard-pressed to explain the scale of price movements in turbulent con-
ditions. Although itself more than a fad, stock in the efficient markets
hypothesis “...crashed along with the rest of the market on October
19, 1987. Its recovery has been less dramatic than that of the rest of
the market” (Shleifer and Summers 1990, p. 19). Indeed, there are
sound theoretical reasons why financial markets cannot be efficient
and fully arbitraged if information is less than perfect and contracting
is costly (Grossman and Stiglitz 1980). Substantial and even growing
The efficient market
hypothesis can not explain
speculative booms and
busts
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deviations from equilibrium prices are possible, manifesting themselves
as bubbles, or speculative booms and busts. And bubbles are more
likely when, as is found in experiments, individuals are not fully ratio-
nal in assessing risk; excessively weight recent experience (display myo-
pia); trade on noise rather than on fundamentals; or exhibit positive
feedback (or momentum) by buying because prices are rising.1
The “behavioral finance” view that asset markets are prone to bubbles
finds confirming evidence in countless episodes of sudden asset price
collapses, with greater or less involvement by the banking sector. An
augmented and updated version of Kindleberger’s (1978) list (table 2.1)
shows the regularity of major incidents since the 15th century, as well
as the diversity of the objects of speculation. Real estate, a common
stumbling block for banks in the latter half of the 20th century, has
earlier antecedents in the list, but there are also many other targets from
commodities—mineral, such as copper, silver, and gold, or even veg-
etable; to mines; all sorts of company shares, financial and nonfinancial,
notably utilities such as canals and railroads; and latterly paper money
and financial derivatives.
Ponzi, or pyramid, schemes, in which investors are gulled into giving
funds to nefarious characters who promise impossibly high rates of re-
turn (typically rationalized through complex, apparently “fail safe” means)
also illustrate the characteristic fragility of finance.2 These schemes gain
credibility by actually paying the promised returns to early investors out
of the cash generated from later investors. Although it is doubtful that
there is a country that has not seen these schemes, their occurrence in so
many transition economies in the 1990s testifies to their link to opaque
environments and times of structural change. In some cases, such as the
Romanian pyramid of the mid-1990s, railroad traffic even in other coun-
tries was said to be affected by the rush to get to the town of Cluj, where
investors could get into a scheme promising to repay 8-fold in 100 days—
an annual rate of return of 250,000 percent. The scheme collapsed shortly
before threatening to overtake Romanian GDP, notwithstanding the fact,
relatively unique for these schemes, that there was not even a clear story
of how the funds were to be invested.3 Shortly thereafter, Albania saw a
series of schemes the aggregate size of whose liabilities rose to an esti-
mated 50 percent of GDP and whose collapse led to widespread street
violence and 2,000 casualties.
If finance is fragile, banking is its most fragile part, for it adds the
complications, not only of maturity transformation, but of demandable
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Table 2.1 Selected financial crashes (grouped by the object of speculation)
Year Commodities Companies Real Estate Banks Financial Assets
1400 Bardi & Peruzzi
(Florence), 1348
1500 Gold (New World), Medici (Florence), Bourse loans
1550s 1492 (Antwerp), 1557
1600 Coins in Spain, 1618 Dutch East India Canals, elegant Fugger (Augsburg),
Co., 1636–40 houses (Holland) 1596
1636–40
Tulips, 1640
1700 South Seas Sword Blade
(London), Companie (London), Banques
d’Occident Generale & Royale
(Paris), 1720 (Paris), 1720
British country British gilts in
banks, 1750s Amsterdam 1763
British and Dutch
East India Co.,
1772
Dutch East India
Co., 1783
Sugar, coffee, 1799 French canals, 1793 British country Assignats
banks, 1793 (France), 1795
1800 Exports, 1810 and Biens Nationaux
1816 (France), 1825
British, French Chicago, 1830–42  British country Foreign bonds,
canals, 1820s banks, 1824 foreign mines,
new companies,
Britain, 1825
Cotton in Britain, British railroads, Chicago, 1843–62
France; exports in 1836
Britain 1836
Sugar, coffee in British and French Chicago, U.S. Germany, 1850 Foreign mines,
Hamburg, wheat, railroads, 1847 public land, Britain, France 1850
1857 1853–77
Cotton, 1861 French and U.S. Overend Gurney
railroads, 1857 (London), 1866;
Gold (New York), Credit Mobilier
1869 (Paris), 1867
Petroleum (U.S.), U.S. railroads, Chicago, Berlin, Germany 1870s
1871 1873 Vienna, 1878–98
Copper (France), Panama Canal Argentine public Union Generale Foreign bonds,
1888; Petroleum Company, France, lands; Chicago, (Paris), 1882 France; British
(Russia), 1890s 1888 1890s discount houses, 1888
U.S. railroads, Barings (London),
1893 1890
(table continues on following page)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Year Commodities Companies Real Estate Banks Financial Assets
1900 Copper, U.S., 1907 Knickerbocker
Trust (New York),
1907
International Bills of Exchange,
Mercantile London, 1914
Marine, 1914
General Motors, U.S. farmland, Creditanstalt 1920s: German
1920 1918–21 (Austria), 1931 reichsmark,
French franc
Florida, 1920s 500 U.S. banks, Mergers, U.K.;
1932–33 foreign bonds, new
shares, N.Y.
Penn Central FDI, U.S.
Railroad, 1970 conglomerates,
sterling, 1960s
Oil tankers, 1974 Burmah Oil, 1974; U.S. farmland U.S. dollar, 1973
Pertamina 1970s
(Indonesia), 1975
Gold, 1978–82 Chrysler Auto, U.S. Southwest, Banco Ambrosiano LDC debt
1979 California (Italy), 1982
1970s–80s
Silver, 1980 U.S. S &Ls, 1980s U.S. dollar (1985)
Argentina, FDI in U.S., 1980s
1980–89
Chile 1981 Junk bonds (U.S.),
1989–90
Coffee, cocoa etc., U.S. REITs, offices, Japan, U.S. Japanese shares,
 
1980s;
1986 malls, hotels; Japan, 1980s–92 Vietnamese credit
Sweden 1980s cooperatives
Sweden 1990 Korean mergers,
1990s
PanAmerican BCCI, 1991 Emerging market
Airways, 1991 shares, 1990s
Guinness Peat Romanian, Albanian
Aviation, 1992 Ponzi Schemes
Mexico 1994
Copper, Japan 1996 Barings Derivatives (Orange
(Singapore), 1995 County;
Metallgesellschaft,
Ashanti Gold Mines),
forex futures, options
Korean Chaebols; Thailand, Indonesia, Republic Russian bonds, long
Thailand 1997 1996–97 of Korea, Malaysia, term capital
Thailand 1997–98 management, 1998
High tech stocks,
U.S. dollar 1997–??
Note: Items in italics indicate government support and items in bold indicate a major crash.
Source: Kindleberger (1998); Caprio and Klingebiel (1999); authors.
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debt, that is, offering debt finance backed by par value liabilities in the
form of bank deposits. This particularly fragile structure of its liabilities
may be needed to keep the bankers on their toes and to give large de-
positors the comfort that they can withdraw as soon as they suspect
problems. Banks arose precisely to finance relatively illiquid investments
with mostly short-term liabilities (and the fragility of their liability struc-
ture has been seen by some scholars as an essential part of their make-
up—without which paradoxically they might not be able to function at
all. Cf. Diamond and Rajan 2000; Calomiris and Kahn 1991).4 It also,
however, makes banks—and even the whole banking system—suscep-
tible to a sudden withdrawal of deposits. Although all outsiders will have
difficulty in monitoring banks, depositors—other than the largest—are
likely to be weak at monitoring and also will have an incentive to “free
ride” on the monitoring efforts of others. Even if insolvent banks are the
first to see a withdrawal of deposits, the contraction of lending by some
banks can produce legitimate solvency concerns about others to the ex-
tent that aggregate credit shrinks. Indeed, even when banks seem to be-
have prudently, the bursting of asset bubbles can impair the ability of
debtors to repay and induce doubts about banks’ health.
Thus, banking may be characterized by the possibility of contagious
runs, in which a run on one bank leads to runs on other, possibly healthy,
banks. In contrast, equity mutual funds, which invest in stocks and pay
a return that varies with the return on their portfolio, may suffer from
sharp swings in prices, but not from the possibility of contagious runs.
However, contagious runs, in the sense that healthy banks are brought
down by failures at weak banks, in fact are difficult to find, at least in
industrial economies. Even during the U.S. Depression, Calomiris and
Mason (2000) find that individual fundamentals explain the runs of
1930 and 1931, but not the 1933 episode, which they link to a general-
ized run from dollars because of the expectation of a devaluation. The
fear of contagious runs may be more marked in emerging markets, be-
cause of greater information problems, but emerging markets also may
face a greater tendency toward generalized runs, since shocks sufficiently
large to change macropolicies or affect the solvency of the banking sys-
tem are more common (below). And as noted below, the cost of crisis
also involves the ensuing credit crunch, all the more so in economies
without alternative channels of finance.
The particular fragility of finance, and within it of banking, is true
for all countries regardless of their income level, as attested to by the
Banking is the most fragile
part of a financial
system—
and a limited crisis may
affect the whole banking
network through contagion
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occurrence of banking crises in several industrial economies in the 1980s
and 1990s. Banking outside the industrial world, however, is more dan-
gerous still, where crises have been enormously costly (figure 2.1).
The cumulative losses of the failed banks are only one aspect of the
cost of a banking crisis. In attempting to arrive at an estimate of the
total true economic cost it is necessary to distinguish between three
key components:
• The stock component is the accumulated waste of economic re-
sources that is revealed by the insolvency. At least part of the capi-
tal deficiency of the failed banks represents depositors’ funds that
have been wasted in unrecoverable loans that were applied to un-
productive purposes, such as empty offices and closed factories.
Figure 2.1 Total fiscal costs (increases in the stock of public debt)
relative to GDP in the year of crisis
Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2000); Caprio and Klingebiel (1999).
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Banking crises have been costly.
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• The public finance component of the true economic costs arises
because of the way in which the fiscal authorities tend to assume a
large part of the net capital deficiency of the banks, in order to bail
out the depositors and others directly affected by the crash. From
an economic cost calculation, this cash “fiscal cost” is merely a
transfer to depositors, but it also entails a deadweight economic
cost that could represent a sizable fraction of the amount trans-
ferred where the marginal cost of social funds is high. The point is
that the expenditure cuts, additional tax revenue that will be re-
quired to finance them, and/or the inflation tax have distorting
effects in themselves, especially in developing countries with weak
revenue-raising systems. Thus, for example, “merely” servicing the
debt incurred as a result of the Indonesian banking crisis means
spending sums that could have doubled health and  education
spending. Moreover, in many emerging markets, the fiscal costs
are sufficiently large to derail macroeconomic stabilization pro-
grams, with costly consequences.
• The flow component of the economic cost arises from the output
slumps with which banking crises are almost always associated.
This clearly represents an economic cost inasmuch as resources are
underemployed until the economy picks up again. Channels
through which this disruption can occur include a collapse of in-
vestment and other spending either because of a general loss of
confidence, or through a restriction of access to credit (reflecting
would-be borrowers being strapped for collateral; lenders’ reaction
to the crisis by raising creditworthiness standards or attempts to
remain liquid; or the loss of information capital, essential for mak-
ing loans).5 Payments system failure, though rare, can be another
channel for triggering recession. As well as a transitory dip in out-
put below full employment levels, these channels can result in fur-
ther loss of trend output if the lack of intermediated credit de-
presses long-term productivity growth.
The larger the initial capital deficiency of the failed banks, the larger
the cash fiscal cost and the larger each of the components of the true
economic cost is likely to be. Estimates, of varying reliability, of the cash
fiscal cost have been made for many crises. Total fiscal costs in developing
country crises during the 1980s and 1990s breached the $1 trillion dollar
level by 1999. These fiscal costs likely overstate the fiscal component of
Banking crises have real
costs
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true economic costs, but may be used as a general indication of the relative
and absolute magnitudes of total economic costs.
Alternatively, attempts have also been made to capture a rough esti-
mate of the additional flow economic costs, typically by comparing ac-
tual output with some hypothetical “no crisis” output path. It is very
hard, though, to guess what part of an output slump is caused by the
banking crisis—often a latent banking crash only becomes evident when
it is triggered by an exogenous economic shock that also directly con-
tributed to recession. The measured output dip likely overstates the true
flow economic costs, but it is correlated with measured fiscal costs, and
intriguingly is of the same order of magnitude (figure 2.2).6 As Boyd
and Smith (2000) observe, many crises, though serious at the time, have
a small fiscal cost and a relatively low output cost. In figure 2.2, how-
ever, about one crisis in three has a cumulative GDP cost of 20 percent
or more, and given the uncertainty in times of crises, authorities cannot
know whether they will have a small or a large crisis. Given the depth of
the recessions, the proverb that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound
of cure seems applicable.
Developing countries suffer several additional sources of fragility. First,
information problems in general are more pronounced, as noted in the
Fiscal and output costs
generally go hand in hand.
Figure 2.2 Estimates of fiscal cost of and output dip for 39 banking crises
Note: The chart shows that the fiscal cost of crises is correlated with the subsequent output dip
(measured as the total output loss—relative to trend—over the period during which growth re-
mained below precrisis rates).
Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2000).
0 20
Fiscal cost (percent of GDP)
Output dip: cumulative percent of GDP
40 60
60
40
20
0
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
86
discussion in chapter 1 on the accounting and legal systems. This infor-
mation problem has to be addressed in any recommendations on lessen-
ing vulnerability. Poor information makes it easier for banks not just to
take risks unwisely, but also to engage in deliberate related lending, which
according to both anecdotal evidence and now empirical research (La
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa 2000) is characterized by much
higher nonrepayment rates.
Second, developing economies are smaller and more concentrated in
certain economic sectors or reliant on particular export products, and
accordingly, they are less able to absorb or pool isolated shocks. This in
part explains the greater macroeconomic volatility displayed by devel-
oping economies in different parts of the world in comparison with the
industrial countries (figure 2.3).
Since the portfolios of most financial intermediaries in emerging
markets are overwhelmingly concentrated in domestic assets, shocks to
the local economy would be more destabilizing even with the best regu-
lation and supervision (chapter 4 will delve into possibilities of import-
ing financial services as a way to lessen this vulnerability). As suggested
below, regulation and supervision, with some notable exceptions, are
not the strongest there.
Structural issues can
make emerging markets
more vulnerable to
financial crises—
Figure 2.3 Volatility by region, 1970–99
Note: The median of the historical standard deviations of GDP growth and inflation for each
group of countries is expressed as a multiple of that for industrialized countries.
Source: Caprio and Honohan (1999); International Financial Statistics.
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Not surprisingly, greater economic volatility translates into financial
markets. Although based on just a few cases with a long availability of
data, figure 2.4 shows not only that equities enjoy a far higher return than
either bills or even bonds in emerging markets relative to that in high-
income countries, but the differences in volatility are even more dramatic.
Given their greater volatility, then, even if local banks diversified in emerging
markets, or were equally well regulated, they would enjoy much less stabil-
ity than banks in the safer haven of most high-income countries. Exchange
rate volatility also has had marked consequences in developing economies
Figure 2.4 Volatility in asset markets
Source: International Financial Statistics ; IFC Emerging Markets database; available data, 1975–99.
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because they largely have had to borrow in foreign exchange. Thus, in-
creases in dollar interest rates often induce a larger increase in domestic
lending rates, to the extent that the currency risk premium rises. This
additional volatility affects firms and their financiers. Chapter 4 will re-
turn to this theme of volatility and small financial systems.
Third, emerging financial markets are dominated by banks (figure 3
in the overview), meaning more demandable debt, higher debt-to-
equity ratios, possibly inducing greater fragility. If a firm is 100 percent
financed by debt, then even a small shock that reduces its projected
revenues or raises its interest cost can result in the firm’s becoming insol-
vent. Equity acts like a buffer, providing the firm with greater flexibility
in comparison with the need to service fixed debt repayments. High
debt-to-equity ratios were found to be a factor in the East Asian crises;
although these ratios did not in general increase in the immediate run-
up to the crisis, their high level meant that the firms and the economy
were highly fragile (Claessens, Djankov, and Xu 2000).
Similarly, if firms can only obtain financing that has to be renewed
frequently—every 90 days or more often—they are in a less flexible po-
sition to deal with unanticipated shocks, compared to those with a higher
mix of long-term debt. Thus, the relative underdevelopment of non-
bank finance and capital markets means that when developing country
banks get into difficulty, the impact on the entire financial sector and
the economy is greater than in industrial countries, where nonbank in-
termediaries and markets are generally better developed. More financ-
ing through equity-type instruments transfers the risk to those more
willing and able to accept it. Availability of equity finance thus repre-
sents an important potential buffer for the finance of firms, and indi-
rectly for their bankers. The equity market can be seen as a spare tire for
finance (Greenspan 1999). Collapses in equity prices are not innocuous,
but are clearly less disruptive than bank failures—which is why this chap-
ter focuses on the latter.
Unbalanced financial systems with bank dominance are in part a re-
sponse to the greater information problems in developing markets—
hence the importance of improving this part of the sector’s infrastruc-
ture (chapter 1)—but also likely reflect excessive “subsidization” of
banking through the safety net (described below) or state ownership,
which provides an implicit safety net for all bank creditors. State owner-
ship itself appears linked to fragility (chapter 3).
—including the domination
of banks in the financial
systems—
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Fourth, in addition to short-term volatility, there have been a succes-
sion of regime shifts altering the risk profile of the operating environ-
ment in hard-to-evaluate ways, including most prominently financial
deregulation. In line with prevailing intellectual trends and following
the example of industrial countries, emerging market authorities removed
or eased administrative controls on interest rates, bank-by-bank credit
ceilings, rules for the allocation of credit to preferred sectors or borrow-
ers, limits on new entry, and even opening the capital account. Disman-
tling many old controls would ultimately have become inevitable, but
academics, advisers, and policy officials alike failed to realize the com-
plexity of the task they had undertaken.
The enthusiasm with which liberalization was adopted in some coun-
tries in the absence of necessary institutional underpinnings left finan-
cial systems facing largely uncharted territory. New owners and inexpe-
rienced bank supervisors tried to feel their way to an assessment of what
safe-and-sound banking would mean in practice. At a minimum, this
situation suggests a fifth factor behind emerging market crises, namely a
regulatory and incentive environment ill prepared for a market-based
financial system, and in particular one that encouraged or condoned
excessive risk-taking.
Poor sequencing of financial liberalization in a poorly prepared envi-
ronment has undoubtedly contributed to bank insolvency. Countries
abandoned controls on bank liabilities—notably interest rates—but the
time to create and implement oversight of assets was greatly underesti-
mated. Only if institutional underpinnings are strong is financial liber-
alization unlikely to add to the risk of systemic bank failures (Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache 1999). It would be misleading, however, to
conclude that greater reliance on market forces was always the underly-
ing source of bank failure. In many cases, financial liberalization has
revealed a long-standing underlying insolvency of the banking system,
which became unavoidably clear as the banks emerged from the shel-
tered environment that allowed or required them to cross-subsidize loss-
making lines of business.
Authorities did not liberalize finance in a vacuum, but rather as part of
a general move away from heavier government intervention. The struc-
tural economic transformation in many transitional and developing coun-
tries created a new economic and political landscape and placed bankers
in a brave new world with a shortage of skills and experience for judging
—and the poor sequencing
of financial liberalization
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the level of risk. With all these changes, in addition to those entailed by
the revolution in technology, communications, and financial engineering,
plus the seemingly fickle behavior of international investors, it is hard for
bankers, governments, and regulators to judge what sources of volatility
are likely to be important, and thus what constitutes sound banking.
These factors behind emerging market crises suggest first that, while
moving in the direction of the market-based regulatory framework may
help, the special factors that characterize these economies necessitate even
more robust measures.
Regulating Banks: Harnessing the Market
FOR AS LONG AS THERE HAVE BEEN BANKS, THERE ALSO HAVEbeen governments setting a number of rules for them, such asmaintaining the purity of coinage and regulating exchange at
medieval fairs, holding high, even 100 percent reserves (in 16th century
Europe and later in U.S. banks), maintaining interest rates below usurious
levels, and providing credit to the ruler, especially in times of war. Modern
financial regulation includes an array of instruments designed to improve
the informational efficiency of financial markets, protect consumers
against fraud and malfeasance, and preserve systemic stability.7 Prudential
regulation promotes systemic stability. Whether or not there is a deposit
insurance scheme, the official prudential supervisors in effect act as
delegated monitors for depositors, exploiting economies of scale to
overcome information problems that would be beyond the resources of
small depositors.
Many proposed rules for reducing banking risk look promising at
first sight, but prove to have serious drawbacks and can only be recom-
mended, if at all, where all else has failed. One recurring example is
the idea of narrow banking, a proposal with a lengthy history (box
2.2). It amounts to saying that, given the particular fragility of the
liability structure of banking, why not make banks safe by forcing them
to hold safe assets? As with many recommendations for finance, so-
called narrow banking plans may fit some countries, such as those that,
following a crisis, have banks with balance sheets dominated by gov-
ernment paper. Although these plans in general have merit, they do
not address the need for intermediaries to intermediate risk, the act of
which can create a problem when it goes wrong, but which can be an
enormous benefit to growth when done well. If narrow banks hold
Prudential regulation
promotes systemic stability
Narrow banking could
throw the baby
(intermediation) out with
the bathwater (crisis)
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safe assets, but other intermediaries finance risky investment, the lat-
ter will pay higher interest rates, and if the history of finance is any
guide, almost certainly attract many depositors, eventually make losses,
and eventually mount lobbies for government protection.
BANKS THAT TAKE DEPOSITS AND DO NOT MAKE
loans are not new, (and) with the original
goldsmiths—those who guarded depositors’ gold—
being the earliest example of “100 percent reserve”
banks. As bankers learned that not all depositors
wanted their funds returned simultaneously, they
began to lend out part, embarking on fractional
reserve banking, but a number of countries had or
still have banks that mainly hold safe instruments.
In 1864 the U.S. National Bank Act required note-
issuing banks to hold $111.11 in government bonds
for every $100 of notes issued, and this system
remained in force until the 1930s. Similarly, postal
savings banks in many now industrial economies
and some ordinary saving institutions (such as in
France and the United Kingdom) required that
deposits be invested in government paper. In these
cases, however, 100 percent reserve banks were only
part of the banking sector, and other banks would
take deposits and make loans.
The Depression in the United States and in par-
ticular the extreme panic in early 1933, culminating
in the banking holiday of March 1933, led to pro-
posals by Henry Simons and a number of other pres-
tigious economists for a 100 percent reserve bank-
ing plan as the model for the country. Banking
problems regularly unearth new interest in this pro-
posal, as seen during the U.S. Savings and Loan cri-
sis and in Argentina in the 1995 crisis.
The basic plan is simple: if all banks hold only de-
posits backed by high-grade instruments, such as short-
term treasury bills, perhaps even quite high-grade com-
mercial paper, the payments mechanism will be
protected (except from a run on the currency, which
can be averted only if sufficient reserves are denomi-
nated in foreign currency). As is the case with U.S.
money market mutual funds, failure can only occur
because of fraud, which is relatively unlikely in this
context. Other financial intermediaries, or the non-
bank subsidiary of a financial conglomerate, accord-
ing to these plans, would be allowed to lend, but they
could not call themselves banks, and they would not
be eligible for any deposit insurance. Thus, the goal is
to attempt to convince depositors that if they want a
guaranteed return, it will be a low one, and that funds
placed in risky investments can be lost.
The history of finance suggests that plans would
be evaded. Thus, the U.S. National Bank Act was
made less effective as banks began to issue liabilities
that were not reservable, and therefore yielded pro-
ceeds that could be lent out profitably. Also, plans to
encourage excessively easy financing of government
deficits could encourage excessive borrowing, in par-
ticular in countries with inadequate fiscal controls
and established checks and balances in government.
Transition to narrow banking could be tricky and, as
noted in the text, the fundamental problem of inter-
mediation would remain.
Still, narrow banking might be suitable for some
countries as part of crisis response. For example, in
countries where all or most of the banks have had
large parts of their assets replaced with government
funds, these banks already are virtually narrow banks,
and a separate institution could be licensed to make
loans. Some regulations would be needed to encour-
age transparency of the nonbanks, and an education
campaign would be required to ensure that deposi-
tors were aware of their exposures.
Box 2.2 Narrow banking
Source: Phillips (1995).
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Thus, for most countries, it seems safe to assume that narrow bank-
ing will not solve the fragility problem. Moreover, there may well be a
tradeoff between stability and efficiency. If the formation of narrow banks
did not lead to a large migration of assets to nonbank intermediaries, the
allocation of resources to efficient investments might be seriously im-
peded. Although banking has declined some in relative importance in
advanced countries, it remains significant and in developing countries is
the dominant portion of the financial sector.
Although small investors can suffer losses in nonbank finance, too,
(and official safety nets are sometimes provided to consumers in seg-
ments of the insurance and pension fund industries), failures and losses
in financial markets that do not extend to the banking system are much
less likely to have catastrophic systemic effects on the payments and credit
system.8 For this reason, nonbank financial intermediaries and markets
are also objects of generally lighter government regulation—from the
greater oversight in pensions and insurance to less oversight in stocks,
futures, and derivatives markets.
Financial sector regulation and supervision—the rules of the game in
the financial sector and the way they are enforced—are essential to limit
moral hazard, as well as to ensure that intermediaries have the incentive to
allocate resources and perform their other functions prudently. In the 1980s
and 1990s, many developing countries began making the transition away
from supervisory systems aimed at ensuring compliance with government
directives, such as directed credit guidelines and other portfolio require-
ments and toward what might be called the basic Basel standard, which is
one of supervised capital adequacy. As noted earlier, this transition has not
gone smoothly, and evidence suggests that liberalization, at least as con-
ducted, even contributed to the recent spate of banking crises.9
In response to these crises, there has been a boom in the creation of
detailed standards that are being promulgated in banking (and other
areas of the financial sector). These standards may ultimately induce
improvements in the regulatory environment, but the absence of a clear
sense of their relative importance or how they function in the disparate
institutional contexts found in emerging markets reduces their impact.
The outcome of research on financial systems, on the other hand, sug-
gests that, rather than a large number of standards, authorities in emerg-
ing markets should focus on using incentives to harness market forces
that favor effective and efficient financial markets, and employ indi-
vidual standards in so far as they contribute to this purpose. To some
extent, this means imposing tough rules—not only requiring minimum
The transition to modern
prudential regulation is
difficult
Authorities should use
incentives to harness
market forces
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capital ratios, but perhaps more robust restraints, such as minimum di-
versification guidelines (or tailoring capital requirements to the concen-
tration in banks’ portfolios) or requiring a certain proportion of the bank’s
liabilities to be in the form of uninsured subordinated bonds. The de-
gree to which the authorities can use such rules to exploit market infor-
mation and market discipline depends to some extent on the level of
overall financial market development.10 This section examines the ex-
tent of regulatory convergence between developed and emerging mar-
kets, including the problems of applying regulatory choices in the former
to the latter, and then focuses on how the market can best be harnessed
to help produce safe and sound finance.
Although there has been a remarkable convergence on paper in re-
cent years, stark differences remain in the regulatory environments around
the world. Thus, at the time of the 1988 Basel Accord, which recom-
mended a minimum risk weighted capital adequacy ratio of 8 percent,
some developing countries did not even have capital requirements, and
many that did had low ratios (2–5 percent not being uncommon) and
did not engage in prudential supervision to verify them. By 1998–99, of
103 countries reporting, only 7 had minimum capital ratios under 8
percent, and 29 had minimum capital ratios of 10 percent or more, only
one of which was from the OECD region. And more than 93 percent of
all countries (88 percent in emerging markets) claim to adjust capital
ratios for risk in line with Basel guidelines.
It is easier, however, to adopt “headline” regulations, such as capital
adequacy ratios, but more difficult to implement the underlying proce-
dures and to acquire the necessary supervisory skills to give teeth to these
rules. Unfortunately, capital by itself is an inadequate indicator of the
health of a bank. The true net worth of a bank depends on the quality of
its portfolio which, for many banks, is dominated by illiquid loans that
cannot easily be valued or “marked to market.” This problem is all the
more real in developing countries, where volatile prices and thin or non-
existent markets render such estimates hazardous. All too often a bank is
truly insolvent long before its accounts tell us so. If capital is actually
negative, risk adjustment is irrelevant.
What matters for true net worth is capital net of provisions for loan
losses, but accounting rules in many countries permit bankers to be
optimistic and underprovision. If the bank has reached a reasonable
measured capital adequacy ratio only because it made no provisions
against loan loss (P = 0 in Table 2.2), we can safely say that its true
capital is below standard. Even an insolvent bank (with a true P of 10
A convergence of headline
regulations—
notably the accounting for
loan loss provisions
but wide disparities in their
effective enforcement—
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or more) can remain in business for months or even years, provided it
does not run out of cash. As long as the net inflow of deposits and the
interest received on performing loans are sufficient to pay operating
expenses and interest on deposits, closure can be deferred. Depositors
and supervisors may be lulled into a false sense of security if account-
ing rules are flouted. Accounting rules in some countries still have
some way to catch up.
Rather than rely on historic values, bank supervisors classify loans
into forward-looking categories, such as “normal,” “specially mentioned,”
“substandard,” “doubtful,” and “loss,” and regulations implicitly attach
loss probabilities to each of the last three categories by requiring a cer-
tain percentage (typically 20, 50, and 100, respectively) of the value of
loans to be provisioned in the bank’s accounts (usually in addition to
some general loan-loss provision of 1 or 2 percent of the entire portfo-
lio). Indeed, here too our survey shows that requirements are on average
slightly tougher on paper in low-income countries. What is important
here, though, is that the provisioning requirements should actually cor-
respond to subsequent loan-loss experience.11
Unfortunately, ensuring adequate, forward-looking classification of
loans is not straightforward. Especially when economic conditions move
out of the normal, or for the large or unusual loans that are often the
weak point of a reckless bank, experience may be a poor guide, even to
the banker. The high-risk environment and rapidly evolving economic
structure of most developing countries obviously exacerbate the severity
of this problem. Realistically, in the face of resistant bank management,
given the inherent difficulty in understanding the true risks, supervisors
often can do little more than rely on a backward-looking measure: in-
sisting on provisions being made when the loan goes into arrears. In this
Table 2.2 Typical balance sheet
Assets Liabilities
Cash 10 Demand deposits 100
Liquid investments 20 Other debt 30
Loans at historical value 100
Less provision for loan losses –P
Property 10 Capital 10–P
95
P R E V E N T I N G  A N D  M I N I M I Z I N G  C R I S E S
respect, the accounting rules or standards vary widely. In particular, low-
income countries typically are more lenient than the upper-middle-in-
come group (figure 2.5). Also telling is that one in three low-income
countries allow banks to treat interest that is in arrears as earned income,
at least for a time. In Thailand interest accrual on nonperforming loans
was allowed for up to 360 days in 1997 and for 180 days in many Afri-
can countries. In most countries it is still more difficult to prevent a
bank from concealing a nonperforming loan simply by “evergreening,”
that is, by making a new loan to cover the repayment. Most tellingly,
Cavallo and Majnoni (2001) show that whereas industrial countries build
up provisions in good times and draw them down as the business cycle
weakens, there was no such variation in the developing countries in their
sample, again suggestive that convergence to industrial country norms is
more superficial than real.
In sum, measuring the size of the buffer is a challenge that is far from
being under control. Although not published, the Basel Core Principle
assessments are understood to be revealing that developing countries are
considerably further from full compliance than their industrial country
counterparts. Headline regulations are promulgated without having the
information needed for verification or without putting in place the in-
centives that might help reveal it.
Figure 2.5 Classification of substandard loans, 1997
Source: Barth, Caprio, and Levine database.
Number of days till a loan in arrears is substandard Number of days till a loan in arrears is doubtful
120
80
40
0
250
200
150
100
50
0
Low
income
countries
Low
middle
income
countries
Upper
middle
income
countries
Low
income
countries
Low
middle
income
countries
Upper
middle
income
countries
Less rigorous loan classification
standards apply in lower income
countries.
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
96
One should not be dismissive of the ability of official supervisors to
uncover problems. Empirical evidence exists that they can and do pro-
vide independent information. For example, Jordan, Peek, and Rosengren
(1999) found for the United States that the release of adverse supervi-
sory information resulted on average in a 5 percent decrease in the bank’s
stock price, suggesting that the release did contain news. Not surpris-
ingly, there was some variation. Banks that had already disclosed bad
news saw little effect, and there was little evidence of contagion, in the
sense of other banks’ stock prices reacting when another bank disclosed
information, except in the case of a common, regional shock for banks
in the same region.
This evidence shows not only that good supervision can have an ef-
fect in that it does reveal additional information and can lead to the
issuance of supervisory actions designed to stop imprudent behavior. It
also points to the advantages of greater disclosure in that markets can
pressure banks to adjust as soon as possible and before a crisis results.
How does one get good supervision? The Basel Committee guide-
lines provide supervisors’ views on this, and there is little doubt that
factors such as the independence of the supervisory agency are key to
good supervision.12 Here we note the issues related to the incentives that
supervisors face.
It must be recognized that the environment in which prudential regu-
lation and supervision is being conducted differs markedly between in-
dustrial and developing countries. In addition to the greater volatility of
emerging markets, income and wealth tend to be much more highly
concentrated than in industrial countries, and recent evidence shows
that this holds for the ownership of corporations as well (figure 1.10). It
is not hard to see that this adds to the challenges faced by supervisors, by
increasing the likelihood that the financial firms under their supervision
are controlled by extremely powerful individuals.
The result can be a skewing of the “balance of terror”—the risks and
rewards faced by official supervisors in many countries. First, supervi-
sors generally are paid less well relative to salaries in private banks, and
in many developing countries turnover is becoming even more of a
problem than in industrial countries. Second, deferred income—a po-
tential bonus, in effect—can result from lax supervision, since only a
few countries, regardless of income level, have prohibitions on
supervisors moving to work for banks. Third, there is no deferred pen-
alty—neither through a loss of bonuses, which generally are not of-
fered—nor by a forfeiting of pensions. And last, in several countries
Good supervision can
improve the health of the
financial system—
but incentive structures
often make this difficult
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well into the middle-income range, such as Argentina and the Philip-
pines, supervisors can be sued for their actions and be held personally
liable, so they face a very real penalty now for vigorous action.
This is precisely the opposite of the optimal compensation struc-
ture for those charged with enforcing laws and regulations that has
long been recommended for eliminating malfeasance even when it is
difficult to detect bad conduct.13 So, a priority for securing better su-
pervision is to pay bank supervisors well, even by reference to other
public servants: the probability of detection of malfeasance is low and,
as seen in figure 2.1 above, the cost of laxity on their part is high.
Given that it may take some time for supervisory laxity to be evinced,
deferred compensation would be the best way to motivate supervisors.
Thus, providing them with a generous pension as a deferred bonus,
and then removing or reducing that pension for violations of good
supervisory practice will help improve incentives. In addition to the
common view that supervisory agencies require a high degree of inde-
pendence to reduce political interference, if supervisors were simulta-
neously protected against private actions taken against them person-
ally (as in many industrial countries), more countries would be able to
benefit from more vigorous enforcement.
Transparency and accountability alone are not sufficient for better
supervision. This approach may be sufficient, for example, to ensure
that central bank governors behave responsibly in setting monetary policy,
because exchange rate and/or bond markets provide a ready assessment
of their actions. Also, most central bank governors do not face lawsuits
for tightening policy, nor are they rewarded in the future for lax policy.
Although the reaction to the U.S. savings and loan problems was to
reduce supervisory discretion—through mandatory, prompt, corrective
actions—the growing difficulty because of the plethora of financial in-
struments in observing the risk position of banks is leading to more
discretion for supervisors, for example, by having them agree with banks
on how they model risk and then penalizing them for violating the model.
This is not an easy area to monitor. To the extent that developing coun-
try supervisors move in the same direction, it will be particularly impor-
tant that greater discretion is accompanied by greater oversight and a
corrected balance of terror.
Although it is necessary in many countries to improve supervisory
compensation, it is both unlikely and costly to pay supervisors salaries
that are equivalent to senior bank officers. Forcing greater revelation of
information is the standard way to limit the required increase in the
Correct the “balance of
terror”—
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efficiency wage, so something like the above subordinated debt proposal
is especially important to force greater disclosure of market information
and sentiment.
Although the financial conditions of banks are difficult to assess
even in industrial countries, the above suggests that it is especially risky
in emerging markets to put excessive reliance on official supervision.
The recurrence of fraud, defalcations, and crises demonstrates that the
information and incentive problems that dominate finance are not easily
eliminated. Moreover, differences in institutional development and eco-
nomic volatility, combined with the ability of financial market partici-
pants to adjust to regulation, mean that rather than precise forms or
rules, authorities need a strategy for approaching financial sector regu-
lation, and the strategy has to go considerably beyond convergence to
industrial country norms.
With greater income and ownership concentration, it is more diffi-
cult to maintain adequate independence of supervisory agencies. Also,
the information environment, the degree of public oversight of supervi-
sors (not just disclosure, but the degree of sophistication of the press on
financial matters), and the basic incentives that supervisors confront all
will operate to yield less effective supervision. Political interference in
bank supervision has happened even with good checks and balances,
such as in the United States as savings and loans had members of Con-
gress lobby for lighter regulation and reduce regulatory capital require-
ments. These potential problems are likely to be more pronounced where
ownership concentration is greater (for example, the República
Bolivariana de Venezuela in the early 1990s, in which a senior central
bank official owned shares in a bank).
Besides, just as authorities in developing countries were making the
transition to supervised capital adequacy, the goal posts were moving.
First, the complexity of modern finance has amplified the difficulty of
supervising on a transaction-by-transaction basis. In part, with the
growth of derivative instruments, banks can now shift their exposure
within minutes, so that reviews of their current exposures convey less
information as to their health than they would have previously. As
already mentioned, this has led middle- and upper-income countries,
where such instruments are more prevalent, to shift the focus of super-
vision to the bank’s risk management systems, though experience with
this approach is still limited.
Second, as noted above, banks are adept at adjusting to a set of rules.
The arbitrary risk weights of the 1988 Basel Accord were easy to evade,
—and supplement official
supervision with market-
based monitors
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and indeed sparked a decade of financial innovation at least in part with
this purpose in mind.
The answer from recent and historical research on financial systems is
remarkably clear, though as just seen, not always as simple as it appears:
use incentives and information to maximize the number of well-informed,
well-motivated monitors of financial intermediaries.
Understandably, diversity in the set of monitors for banks is desirable
not only because of possible differences in the information they may
possess, but also reflecting the varying and possibly opaque incentives
they face. Who else, though, apart from official supervisors, can moni-
tor banks? Three classes of monitors should be considered:
• Insiders, including the owners, the board, and senior management
of a bank, whose net worth should, in an ideal world, depend on
the prudent performance of the institution.
• Rating agencies.
• Markets, meaning all nonofficial outside creditors and
counterparties.
Owners earn returns on the capital they have invested. These re-
wards will be based on current and expected future profits, or the so-
called franchise value. Profits in turn will derive from the regulatory
framework that constrains banks to various activities and ways of do-
ing business. If the profits from prudent banking are high, and if the
threat that banks could lose their bank license (and thus their equity
and the related rewards) is real, owners will be motivated to preserve
their franchise value. Majority owners and senior managers may be in
the best position to surmount information problems, but as numerous
bank failures show, such as the famous 1995 Barings episode, owners
of large, complicated intermediaries still face these problems. Minor-
ity owners do not necessarily have any better information than the
general public.
Bank directors have the responsibility of representing all owners, and of
disclosing accurate and timely information on their institution. Better and
more timely information will improve the ability of all outsiders to moni-
tor them. Most countries in theory make bank directors responsible for
accurate disclosure, but only a third (most of which are in high-income
economies) have enforced penalties. Enforcement is critical. Stiff penalties
for inadequate disclosure, and more generally for excessive risk-taking, is a
way of increasing the liability of owners beyond just the capital they have
invested for the performance of the bank.
Use the private sector to
extend the reach of the
regulator
Banks often reward risk-
taking
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If bank directors and majority owners were highly motivated to en-
gage only in safe and sound banking, they would likely endeavor to
effect a compensation system for senior bank management that would
reward prudence. However, the fallout from the Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) fiasco revealed that senior executives of a few large
international banks were forced out—the good news—for making simi-
lar bets as LTCM, but—the bad news—they were able to take
multimillion-dollar bonuses with them. In all likelihood, this reflects
the predominance of banks that are willing to gamble and hence offer
compensation packages that attract risk takers.14 Authorities could try to
correct for this market failure by making capital ratios or deposit insur-
ance premia a function of the compensation structure for senior man-
agement. Supervisors in many advanced economies do look at risk man-
agement systems that banks have and grade them on this effort. The
suggestion here is that the source of the risk management system, execu-
tive compensation, rather than its advertised manifestation, be factored
in to regulation. The compensation structure also should be disclosed—
not just the raw salary, but how bonuses and other forms of compensa-
tion are determined (John, Saunders, and Senbet 2000).
One recent proposal for bringing the views of private market partici-
pants on bank risk to bear was advanced in 1999 and 2001 Basel Commit-
tee discussion papers seeking to reduce the arbitrariness of the risk weights
attached to bank capital requirements by proposing that the weights in-
stead be derived from ratings publicized by approved external credit asses-
sors (for example, rating agencies). Although this proposal would appear to
be an attempt to “harness the market,” it is instructive to consider several
problems facing implementation of this proposal, especially in developing
countries. Among the better known difficulties are the following:
• It is unclear how reliable rating agencies would be where informa-
tion costs are high, the ratings industry is at best nascent, and where
banks often pay for their own ratings.
• Ratings are based on expected default rates, but capital is intended
for unexpected losses.
In addition, however, are a number of less-recognized points that are
highlighted by a focus on incentives (Honohan 2001b). First, the usual
moral hazard problem will be exacerbated. If it is announced that banks
will have to hold capital in accordance with the riskiness of their portfo-
lio, each borrower will have the incentive to secure a favorable rating,
even though it continues to place the bank—and the deposit insurance
The problems with rating
agencies
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fund, if one exists—at risk. Bankers, assuming that they have decided to
make the loan, will be motivated to collude or go along with a favorable
depiction of their borrowers, because it will give them greater freedom
in making capital decisions.
Second, raters may release less information about borrowers so as not
to lose business. And most serious of all, rating agencies are not paid to
anticipate the risk of correlated, systemic shocks, so even if the average
rating of a borrower is accurate for normal times, it will not be for a
crisis. This problem is especially serious as developing country authorities
may believe that by using (“market based”) ratings, they are protected against
crises, when in fact they are not . Even though rating agencies in the United
States do a fair job on individual firm ratings, their ratings perform less
well on emerging market paper precisely because it is difficult to esti-
mate systemic shocks in small, volatile economies.
Thus, it is important for authorities to use market forces, but this dis-
cussion illustrates that it is equally important to understand what the in-
centives are and how they operate. Also, rather than worry about how to
motivate rating agencies to take proper account of correlated factors, au-
thorities should focus on banks, which can and should be looking at their
entire portfolio and how it varies or is exposed to different risks. Compel-
ling banks to disclose certain information can be part of this process so
that agents external to the bank who have the right incentives  will put this
information to good use. Relying on rating agencies puts excessive burden
on entities that may not have as much to lose as bank creditors do.
Given the incentive that equity holders and other insiders may have
to increase risk, and the uncertainties of relying on rating agencies, it is
all the more important to consider how the incentives of other bank
creditors can be aligned with the social goal of limiting bank risk. Al-
though small depositors may choose to “free ride” on other claimants,
large creditors, if they have no expectation that they will be compensated
for their losses , have clear incentives to monitor banks. Recent proposals
attempt to capitalize on this incentive by forcing banks to issue subor-
dinated debt, that is, a fixed claim that is only senior to equity. Not
enjoying the upside gains of equity holders, but holding almost as much
of the downside risk, subordinated debt holders would be highly moti-
vated to police banks for excessive risk-taking. Also, they would not
bother with a “loan-by-loan” analysis that is part of the current Basel
Committee process, but rather be concerned with the overall risk that
banks face. Other large creditors—such as other banks in interbank
markets—would also be motivated to monitor banks as well, as long as
Outside creditors can act
as monitors—
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they were not under the presumption that they might be “bailed out” if
the bank got into difficulties.
Subordinated debt is not new—as of 2000, 92 of 106 countries re-
sponding note that they allow subordinated debt to fulfill some part of
their capital requirement. However, those countries in compliance with
the Basel Committee guidelines in effect regard it as cheap equity, and
to that extent only make eligible long-term debt, and then limit the use
of such debt. This, however, ensures that rollovers of the debt will be
relatively rare. Also, the fact that it is not required to be issued and is not
policed then leads to its issuance to firms that are not at arm’s length. Yet
regular issuance, tradability, and arm’s-length issuance all are needed to
ensure better monitoring. To prevent this debt from becoming a kind of
“junk bond,” it will be necessary to put some cap on the interest rate
that can be paid. If these features are present, subordinated debt holders
will be even more concerned to avoid a bank that is taking imprudent
risks than at present. Far from being cheap equity, this kind of subordi-
nated debt can be a valuable discipline. There is much to be said for
requiring its issuance, especially for larger banks in each country. To
provide reliable monitoring, subordinated debt holders would become
an important lobby group to press for a number of the improvements to
infrastructure and information noted earlier, particularly related to the
disclosure of information.
To be sure, subordinated debt proposals (box 2.3) can be quite difficult
to implement. Capital markets in developing countries are thin, though a
requirement that banks issue this debt would deepen them somewhat.
Most importantly, a key to its success is to ensure that the issuers are truly
at arm’s length from the holders of the debt, meaning that they neither
should be related parties, nor should the issuer be allowed to provide com-
fort or guarantees to the holders. Ensuring this is not a trivial concern, and
is an excellent reason for not relying exclusively on subordinated debt hold-
ers to ensure safety and soundness. Greater reliance on subordinated debt
and on other uninsured creditors’ monitoring, however, seems to be a
worthwhile initiative in middle-income countries.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of ensuring arm’s length between banks
and the holders of subordinated debt, early results from Argentina are
promising. Even though subordinated debt only began to be required
there in 1998, and though its implementation was delayed by the East
Asian crisis, banks that were largely compliant saw lower deposit rates,
—and a subordinated debt
requirement is a
promising, but not fool-
proof, way to improve
market monitoring
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SUBORDINATED DEBT CAN SERVE AS A BUFFER TO
absorb losses, but probably its most valuable
contribution is by the signal it can provide as to bank
riskiness. This signal both will serve as a discipline in
the market, as banks find it harder to renew their
subordinated debt or find the interest rate thereon rising
as risk increases, but also by the indirect signal it provides
to others, including bank supervisors. The latter benefit
could be great. One problem with so-called prompt,
corrective action proposals is that the criteria for
intervention still leave significant responsibility to
supervisors, which may be particularly difficult in
countries in which the institutional independence of
the supervisory agency is in doubt. A recent study of
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(1999) noted that one difficulty for official
supervisors—the burden to prove that banks may be
taking excessive risks—does not hold for subordinated
debt holders, who instead get to place the burden of
proof on bank managers who need funding. Supervisors
could use either the interest rates or ability to issue
subordinated debt as a signal to increase monitoring of
risky banks or to take mandated actions, or both.
How should it be issued? A requirement that
banks issue this debt regularly in ‘lumpy’ and rela-
tively homogeneous forms would produce a well-
informed monitoring system for banks; the regular
issuance would continually “refresh” market infor-
mation, in that banks would presumably find it ad-
vantageous, and markets likely require, current in-
formation at the time of issuance. If the subordinated
debt instrument is relatively homogeneous, then the
rate at which it trades could be more easily com-
pared across banks, thereby facilitating monitoring.
In addition to tradability, maturity matters, and
the balance of opinion appears to be weighted to the
medium term of 2–5 years. While Federal Reserve
System interviews with U.S. market participants sug-
gested that market depth would be greater with 3–5
year maturity, Calomiris has proposed for emerging
markets as well that banks be required to issue 2 per-
cent of their nonreserve assets (or 2 percent of risk-
weighted assets) on a monthly basis with 2-year ma-
turity, so that every month they would have to
refinance 1/24th of this debt. Calomiris (1999) also
notes that banks in trouble could pay higher interest
rates, but he would limit this by imposing an inter-
est rate cap. That would mean that highly risky banks
would be forced to shrink the asset side of their bal-
ance sheet and eventually close or otherwise restruc-
ture their operations when they could not comply
with the subordinated debt requirement
Whereas regular issuance would impose discipline
on issuers, there is a tradeoff between this gain and
the cost to banks—and their customers—from more
frequent and smaller issues, because of transaction
costs. Indeed, very small banks in emerging markets
likely could not pay these costs, so Calomiris has rec-
ommended that small banks be allowed to satisfy a
subordinated debt requirement by “issuing” large de-
posits to a qualified institution. Because it is the larger
banks whose stability is essential for the health of the
overall system, and for which early intervention is
important, this limitation is not likely to be severe.
Last, to increase the likelihood that subordinate debt
holders will be at arm’s length from the issuing banks,
it may be necessary to put restrictions in place that
could limit the attractiveness of this paper.
Box 2.3 Subordinated debt proposals
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999); Calomiris (1999); Evanoff and Wall (2000).
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
104
faster growth in deposits, a lower capital ratio, and a substantially lower
ratio of nonperforming loans compared with noncompliant banks (fig-
ure 2.6). More formal econometric analysis confirms that the subordi-
nated debt requirement there has encouraged better monitoring and
greater prudence in risk management (Calomiris and Powell 2000). Even
if only good banks were able to issue subordinated debt there, this fact
of itself conveys important information to supervisors. The above evi-
dence that credibly uninsured creditors are more likely to provide moni-
toring of banks strengthens the promise of subordinated debt in im-
proving the market monitoring of banks (Evanoff and Wall 2000). Again,
however, it is important to stress that subordinated debt should not be
thought of as a single cure for unsafe banking, but rather as a potential
tool in the regulatory arsenal.
Financial Sector Safety Nets
I N THE FACE OF BANKING FRAGILITY, IT IS NATURAL FORdepositors to hope for redress from government when things gowrong, but this expectation in itself can contribute to the fragility.
Although governments have a variety of mechanisms, such as the
central bank discount window and other lender-of-last-resort (LOLR)
facilities, which can be employed as part of a safety net for banks,
explicit deposit insurance schemes are increasingly becoming a key
Banks that complied with
subordinated debt requirements
paid lower deposit rates but
enjoyed faster deposit growth, a
lower capital ratio, and a lower
rate of nonperforming loans.
Figure 2.6 Subordinated debt in Argentina, 1996–99
Source: Calomiris and Powell (2000).
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component, have an important impact on overall incentives, and
therefore are the focus of this section. Governments typically remain
more ambiguous about their LOLR function, which has been the
subject of an enormous literature.
Not surprisingly, deposit insurance arose where banking was most
fragile—U.S. states in which banking was conducted in unit banks (banks
that were not permitted to branch) beginning with the N.Y. Safety Fund
in 1829. Some 14 states (all with unit banks) adopted deposit insurance;
some failed shortly after their establishment, while others lasted until
being done in during the agricultural collapse of the 1920s. Only three
systems—those that harnessed market forces—were judged successful.
Still, by the late 1920s, the much better survival rate of branching
banks appeared to have “won the day” for branching vs. unit banks (with
or without deposit insurance) until the political realignment on this is-
sue during the Depression. After the adoption of a national deposit in-
surance system in the United States in 1934, the number of explicit
systems in other countries grew slowly for the first 30 years, with only 6
being established, and then took off (figure 2.7).
Most deposit insurance systems are set up with either or both of the
stated objectives of protecting the overall stability of the banking system,
and protecting individual, especially small, depositors. In the pioneering
U.S. case, although political debate may cloud the true underlying pur-
pose, scholars accept that it was systemic stability rather than small de-
positor protection that was the key factor (Golembe 1960; see box 2.4).
—with the goals of
protecting the stability of
the banking system, and
the savings of small
depositors
Figure 2.7 Explicit deposit insurance systems: the rise of deposit insurance around the world, 1934–99
Source: Kane (2000).
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Other means of protecting small depositors were recognized, such as the
savings banks in Europe, which largely invested in safe instruments. The
U.S. deposit insurance legislation was passed by Congress in the midst of
the banking crisis, though the run on banks—which was linked to fears of
Deposit insurance was not a novel idea; it was
not untried; protection of the small depositor,
while important, was not its primary purpose;
and, finally, it was the only important piece of
legislation during the New Deal’s famous “one
hundred days” which was neither requested nor
supported by the new administration. (Golembe
1960, pp. 181–82)
FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE N.Y.
Safety Fund (1829–66), Vermont (1831–58) and
Michigan (1836–42) established similar schemes. All
experienced severe losses in the panic of 1837, New
York then allowed free banking, and its safety fund
was done in as better banks switched to become free
banks and thereby avoid the losses associated with
poor (public sector) supervision and limited premia.
Vermont and Michigan also saw failures in the panics
of 1857 and 1837, respectively, also because of
adverse selection and poor supervision. Indiana
(1834–65), Ohio (1845–55) and Iowa (1858–66)
established more incentive-compatible systems:
restricted membership, unlimited mutual liability, all
privately administered, and with powers to restrict
dividends and impose other restrictions and penalties
on member banks.
These cases could not have differed more from
the first three systems, in that there were few failures
and, like the states with branching (but without de-
posit insurance), they weathered common shocks
quite well. Interestingly, coverage was broad, but with
unlimited mutual liability, the greater the coverage,
the greater the liability and thus the stronger the in-
centives to police one another. The systems ended
with the taxation imposed by the National Banking
System, and not because of crisis.
The post-Civil War period saw eight other states
adopt deposit insurance, and all perished with the
agricultural crisis the 1920s, with the exception of
Mississippi and South Dakota, whose schemes made
it until 1930 and 1931, respectively. So those
schemes with mutual liability and private adminis-
tration saw few failures, little or no evidence of
fraud, did not perish in crisis, and avoided suspen-
sion during panics.
Rather than continuing to pay for the failures by
themselves, unit banking states regularly sought the
protection of the federal government, as 150 bills
for a federal deposit insurance system were introduced
unsuccessfully between 1886 and 1933. Representa-
tives from branching states continually opposed the
attempt to make their voters pay for the fragility of
unit banking. The successful legislation was passed
in 1933 after the bank run was ended by a bank holi-
day and reopening of far fewer banks, but without
including any ex post compensation for depositors
and with a low initial ceiling. Political compromise
appears to have been key: Carter Glass, chairman of
the Senate Banking Committee and a long-time foe
of deposit insurance, acceded to it as part of a deal
with Representative Henry Steagall to win passage
of Glass’ plan for the eponymous banking act that
separated commercial and investment banks. Glass
later said that the compromise was a mistake.
Box 2.4 The rise of deposit insurance?
Sources: Calomiris (1992), White (1997), and Golembe (1960).
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devaluation and other measures that might be adopted by the new admin-
istration—had stopped before it went into effect.
More recently, some countries have adopted or expanded deposit in-
surance during crises. For example, after two crises in the 1980s, Argen-
tina abandoned deposit insurance in 1992, only to adopt a system of
limited coverage in 1995 in response to the Tequila crisis. Thailand moved
to blanket insurance in 1997, including coverage of deposits at finance
companies. Mexico is the first developing country recently to have put
in place plans to reduce blanket coverage, following its experience with
the 1994 crisis, so experience with this transition is necessarily limited
among emerging markets. The sharp increase in the 1990s resulted in
part from the spread of deposit insurance to transitional countries, and
to some African states, perhaps reflecting the prevailing wisdom that
deposit insurance would lead to a safer financial system.15
The systems that countries adopted differed dramatically. As men-
tioned, some countries cover all deposits—including interbank and
foreign currency deposits—and are even generous in extending the
coverage to a broad array of institutions. However, most deny—at least
in principle—coverage for interbank funds, so as to induce banks, which
are large and supposed to be sophisticated relative to many others, to
monitor one another.16
Figure 2.8 shows the dramatic dispersion in the stated coverage of de-
posit insurance relative to per capita GDP, for those countries with limits
on coverage.17 Compared to the relatively modest protection in high-
income countries, some of the poorest countries offer the most generous
protection, going well beyond the scale of the deposits of the poor—though
the extremely low level of average income in countries like Chad needs to
be kept in mind to put their coverage in perspective.18
Some deposit insurance schemes are funded or administered by the
private sector, or both. And whereas many deposit insurance systems are
prefunded, some 10 systems—mostly in Europe—as of 1999 were un-
funded, with the power to make assessments on individual banks when
needed. Most deposit insurance systems feature a flat premium, but about
a quarter feature some differential pricing, in effect an attempt to vary
the premium with the riskiness of the individual bank, though the dif-
ferential itself is small and not always collected.19
It is not hard to see why explicit deposit insurance systems have be-
come increasingly popular. The political calculus is in their favor. For
one thing, they can appear to be a direct and seemingly costless solution
Deposit insurance schemes
are politically popular—
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Deposit insurance coverage is
relatively generous in low-
income countries.
Figure 2.8 Deposit insurance coverage
Note: For Germany only compulsory coverage is shown; the private voluntary systems have higher
limits, with each depositor protected up to about 30 percent of bank capital.
Source: Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000).
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to the problem of bank panics and runs. Protection of small depositors
is also politically attractive. There are other political forces favoring the
introduction of deposit insurance, too. For example, a deposit insurance
scheme can help small local banks in emerging markets acquire or retain
their market share of deposits that might, in the absence of insurance,
migrate to large and especially to foreign-owned banks.
Last, by providing a deposit insurance scheme, the government may
feel that, in political terms, it is also buying the right to step in with
regulatory intervention, as necessary, including the right to close un-
sound or insolvent banks. This argument, however—that deposit in-
surance is a necessary quid pro quo for the authority to close banks—
goes too far. Almost everywhere in the past century, banking has not
been a right, but a privilege, regulated by the state—and for good rea-
son. Banking law properly requires licenses to be granted only to “fit
and proper” individuals, and with the possibility that the license can
be revoked for improper actions, which should be defined as any that
violate banking regulations.
The logic underlying the more persuasive political considerations is
not without merit. Credible deposit guarantees undoubtedly do forestall
runs. Prompt repayment of their deposits is clearly a valuable protection
for small depositors at failed banks, especially protecting them from infla-
tionary erosion (though, as noted, there are other ways of offering safe
savings media to low-income households, including postal savings banks—
or even mutual funds restricted to secure money market assets). And ex-
plicit deposit insurance does favor small banks, although if it comes at a
high cost, governments would need to consider the tradeoffs carefully.
Less evident in the political arena, but long recognized by specialists, is
the fact that deposit insurance has the potential to induce greater risk-
taking, or so-called moral hazard behavior. Limited liability allows bank
owners to walk away from their losses—giving them the option to put the
losses to depositors or other parties. However, by reducing the incentive of
insured depositors to monitor banks, deposit insurance can greatly ac-
commodate risk-taking if accompanied by lax regulation and supervision.
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of an explicit deposit
insurance scheme is the thought that it can represent a limit to the
government’s commitment to depositors. Absence of an explicit system
may really represent unlimited implicit coverage. By placing a modest
limit on the amount of deposit coverage, can the government effectively
signal that it is not likely to indemnify depositors beyond this limit?
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Clearly, the net impact of adopting an explicit system and (if so) of
implementing various design features are empirical issues, and turn chiefly
on the tradeoff between the gains from protecting depositors and the
losses from reduced market monitoring. Until recently, virtually no sys-
tematic empirical research used data on emerging markets to address
these questions. A recent World Bank research project (led by Demirgüç-
Kunt), however, furnished both a database for researchers worldwide
and the answers to several key questions on the impact of adopting ex-
plicit deposit insurance on financial sector stability, the ability for mar-
kets to exert discipline on banks, and the development of the overall
financial system. In the process, conclusions on key design issues for
authorities are emerging.
The weight of evidence from this research is surprisingly clear cut, sug-
gesting that in practice, rather than lowering the likelihood of a crisis, the
adoption of explicit deposit insurance has been associated on average  with
less banking sector stability, and this result does not appear to be driven by
reverse causation. Here the qualification “on average” is key: deposit insur-
ance shows no significant destabilizing effect in countries with strong
institutions; only where the institutional environment is weak do prob-
lems arise. The natural interpretation of this result is that banks, exploit-
ing the availability of insured deposits, take greater risks. The presence of
explicit insurance reduces depositor monitoring, and this matters if offi-
cial supervision is insufficient, as where institutions are weak. The role of
good institutions—as measured in this research by indicators of the rule of
law, good governance (a proxy for effective regulation and supervision),
and low corruption—thus seems crucial in reducing the opportunities for
risk-taking (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 2000).
That explicit deposit insurance could be positively correlated with
banking crises should not be considered too surprising, because when it
is credible , it facilitates deposit gathering by banks regardless of the risks
they undertake.20
Even without explicit insurance, depositors could infer an implicit
government protection. At lower levels of institutional development,
however, confidence in such implicit insurance may be low. There is no
certainty at all that the government will, in the event of a failure, be able
or willing to pay out even to small depositors, let alone large depositors
and shareholders. This uncertainty keeps depositors motivated to moni-
tor banks (to the extent that they can), especially given that they cannot
rely on strong official supervision of the banks in an environment of
—but may cause economic
damage—
by encouraging risk-taking
in institutionally weak
settings
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poor skills, a weak information and regulatory base, and often political
interference. In contrast, the announcement of an explicit scheme acts
like a signal that bailout funds will be easier to get, even from a govern-
ment operating in a weak institutional setting.21,22
Although these remarkable econometric findings have not, of course,
gone unchallenged, it has so far proved impossible to dismiss them. True,
in a recent working paper Eichengreen and Arteta (2000, pp. 44–45) con-
tend that there is “at least as much evidence that deposit insurance…
provides protection from depositor panics…as that it destabilizes banking
systems.” In arriving at this conclusion, however, they focus on a more
limited sample of countries and crises. In particular, omitting countries
with better institutions makes it hard for them to detect the importance
of institutional quality in determining the overall effectiveness of deposit
insurance, as well as of different design features.
Confirmation of the adverse impact of explicit deposit insurance on
market discipline can be seen in the price that banks have to pay for
their deposits. Examination of individual bank accounts shows that il-
liquid banks tend to pay more for their funds, partly reflecting deposi-
tors’ concern to ensure their own liquidity, but the premium on interest
expense for illiquid banks is less if a generous deposit protection system
is in place. Interestingly, these findings come from a different cross-coun-
try database than that used in assessing the link with crises and, as such,
provide important additional evidence. Inasmuch as they draw on indi-
vidual balance sheet and income statement data from some 2,500 banks
in up to 43 countries, this may be more telling direct evidence of the
way in which deposit insurance can affect incentives (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Huizinga 2000b). Although deposit insurance weakens market dis-
cipline even in advanced countries, the effects seem to be offset by better
official oversight and still more effective market monitoring.
Martinez-Peria and Schmukler (2001) also found similar evidence in
Argentina (in the early days after adopting explicit insurance), Chile,
and Mexico of the market disciplining risky banks by demanding higher
interest rates. Interestingly, though, in this case even insured depositors
displayed some disciplining effect, which may represent a lack of cred-
ibility toward the insurer’s commitment to or speed in paying out.23
Still, where deposit insurance appeared most credible (in Chile), unin-
sured depositors appeared to be more effective monitors of bank risk.
The lower interest rates point to the advantages gained by bank
shareholders from the existence of deposit insurance, a gain that, in
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aggregate, is rarely paid for through insurance premia. “Correct” pric-
ing would remove this subsidy, but it appears that it is easier to adopt
deposit insurance than to price it correctly—and correct pricing is dif-
ficult in many emerging markets. If the value of bank equities as quoted
on an efficient stock market truly reflects the risks and returns facing
the bank’s shareholders, it is possible to infer the ex ante value of the
deposit insurance scheme to each bank by examining the leverage of
the bank and the variance of its stock price (box 2.5). The calculated
values can be substantial, and this tool could be used by supervisors to
predict bank failure, as Kaplan (1999) showed for Thailand.
A BANK WHOSE DEPOSITS ARE INSURED CAN ACCESS
such deposits at close to the market price for risk-
free deposits regardless of the risk it is taking on the
asset side of its portfolio. Some of the risk, however,
is passed through to shareholders, and in an efficient
equity market, the price of a risky bank’s equity will
be lower on average and more volatile. Employing
standard arguments from the theory of option pricing,
it is possible to infer from the volatility and level of
the equity price, the market’s beliefs about the
probability of the bank failing and of the insurer
having to pay out.
Using these probabilities, we can calculate the an-
nual implicit subsidy—or expected insurance payout—
for each bank. Although the formula is complex, only
three variables are needed for this calculation, the eq-
uity volatility, the ratio of equity to deposits, and the
dividend yield. The following table presents a ready-
reckoner allowing the implicit annual subsidy value to
the shareholders of deposit insurance for any bank given
only the equity volatility and the ratio of equity to
deposits. (The table assumes zero dividend yield.) Risky
banks—those with relatively little equity and volatile
earnings—enjoy a large subsidy.
Box 2.5 Implicit value of deposit insurance to the bank’s shareholders
Annual implicit safety net subsidies as a percentage of the market value of equity
E/D
σE
50 60 70 80 90 100
1 0.5 1.6 4.1 8.5 16.6 29.1
2 0.5 1.6 4.0 8.4 15.6 27.9
5 0.4 1.4 3.4 7.4 13.3 24.7
10 0.4 1.3 3.0 6.5 12.2 20.6
20 0.3 1.0 2.4 5.0 9.5 15.7
50 0.1 0.5 1.2 2.7 5.0 8.5
Note: σE is percentage annual volatility (standard deviation) of equity returns, E/D is the market value of the bank’s equity as a
percentage of the value of the bank’s deposits. The dividend yield is assumed to be zero.
Source: Laeven (2000).
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Contrary to a popular view that deposit insurance might be needed in
poor countries to give the confidence to allow the financial deepening
that is needed (cf. chapter 1) to support growth, the data suggest that, in
institutionally weak environments, having explicit deposit insurance leads
to less  financial sector development (Cull, Senbet, and Sorge 2000). Al-
though it may be paradoxical that the provision of insurance could lead
to less of an activity, it may be that when taxpayers in institutionally weak
countries see their authorities providing explicit guarantees, they under-
stand that the environment is not conducive to restraining the cost of
these guarantees. The result, then, might be that the real insurers, the
taxpayers themselves, choose to hide their assets outside the banking sys-
tem, and perhaps outside the country, to avoid being taxed for coverage.
When an explicit insurance system is adopted, the government takes
over some of the monitoring function of banks. This requires both trans-
parency—the ability to detect as well as possible the risks that bankers
are taking—and deterrence—the ability to convince bankers that rules
will be enforced. Deterrence in turn depends on the accountability of
government officials, in particular those in the deposit insurance and
related regulatory agencies (Kane 2000). Better levels of institutional
development—in the legal systems, accounting and auditing standards,
and the political environment or quality of government—will make it
more difficult for bankers to gamble with insured deposits, or for gov-
ernment officials to refrain from disciplining them.
So if we combine these three features—transparency, accountability,
and deterrence—into the overall “institutional environment,” the argu-
ment can be summarized in figure 2.9. Deposit insurance—whether
explicit or implicit—provides the social benefit of protecting insured
depositors, but at the expense of socially costly moral hazard behavior.
We can picture the level of depositor protection provided by a function-
ing explicit system (the top panel) as being a given, independent of the
remainder of the institutional environment. With an implicit one, some
level of social protection usually will be provided, depending on what
the government wants and is able to provide ex post. This may, however,
as pictured in figure 2.9, be somewhat larger in countries that have
achieved a higher overall institutional quality, if only because the better-
developed tax systems there will permit greater coverage.
At low levels of institutional development, moral hazard behavior (the
middle panel) can run rampant with an explicit system—bankers will
Deposit insurance schemes
may inhibit financial sector
development where
institutions are weak
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When institutions are weak, the
costs of explicit deposit
insurance outweigh the benefits.
Figure 2.9 Deposit insurance: net benefits
Source: See text.
Institutional environment
Social protection benefits
Implicit insurance
Explicit insurance
Institutional environment
Moral hazard costs
Implicit insurance
Explicit insurance
Institutional environment
Balance of advantage: explicit over implicit insurance
Deposit insurance schemes
balance the social benefits of
security...
 ...against the social costs of
moral hazard.
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have access to deposits, thanks to the insurance, but with weaker over-
sight. This opportunistic behavior, however, will tend to be reduced with
a better institutional environment. In contrast, when the environment
is weak, there likely is little moral hazard with an implicit system, as
depositors will expect little protection—indeed, they may keep their
wealth outside the banking system and even outside the country.
The bottom panel sums up the net benefits, with the key message
that adequate infrastructure for enforcing contracts is of paramount
importance for ensuring net gains from explicit deposit insurance. Al-
though it is not evident at what cutoff point explicit deposit insurance
might yield a net gain to a country, the need to do an “audit” of the
state of transparency, deterrence, and accountability prior to its adop-
tion is clear. Governments at the low end of this spectrum that want to
institute an explicit system should first focus on improving the related
institutions—including the regulatory environment (discussed below)
in order to reduce the likelihood of excessive risk-taking. Importantly,
no evidence exists that there is any cost to waiting to adopt deposit
insurance. In addition to the evidence noted here, that deposit insur-
ance in weak environments tends to lower financial development (and
thus growth), all high-income countries reached that stage without ex-
plicit deposit insurance .
When authorities determine that their system is appropriate for ex-
plicit deposit insurance, certain design features should be kept in mind.
One way to determine design is to look just at industrial countries and
follow what they do, or otherwise try to infer best practice from first
principles (Garcia 1999). Moreover, the Financial Stability Forum’s
Working Group on Deposit Insurance has been asked to develop guid-
ance on deposit insurance to assist countries that are adopting or signifi-
cantly reforming a deposit insurance system, and a report is expected in
the fall of 2001. Wide differences, however, exist in the design of indus-
trial country systems. More important, success may depend on replicat-
ing other institutional features of advanced countries as well.
Another method to complement this approach would be to look at
lessons derived from cross-country experience. The econometric findings
of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (2000b), already discussed above, and based on data from a wide
range of countries, also point to several features of explicit schemes that
can influence the degree to which they weaken market discipline or in-
crease the risk of crisis, in particular, coverage, governance, and funding.
Don’t just copy a deposit
insurance scheme from
another country
Limit coverage—
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Coverage: The results suggest keeping coverage as low as is consistent
with the perceived need to protect small depositors.
There is room for disagreement on what the ceiling should be, but a
rule of thumb suggests a figure of one to two times annual per capita GDP
as sufficiently generous to protect small depositors while still maintaining
significant market discipline. Interbank deposits should be excluded.
Governance: Involving the private sector in the management and ad-
ministration of the fund can help limit the reduction in market disci-
pline and the impact on systemic risk, but is no cure-all.
This issue of governance has received less attention recently, but the key
role of private involvement in mutual bank guarantees was at the heart of
successful deposit protection systems in the early days. Mutual guarantees
are to be found, for example, in such successful mid-19th century U.S.
state-based systems as in Indiana, Iowa, and Ohio (all of which featured
unlimited mutual liability and were relatively successful—White 1997),
and in the clearinghouse associations in the 19th and early 20th century. It
is also a feature of several current deposit insurance systems, most notably
that of Germany. Private sector involvement and even responsibility for
deposit insurance illustrates the principle of the government harnessing the
private sector to achieve its ends. Purely public schemes are more prone to
crisis, and they reduce market discipline, but private sector deposit schemes
at times have failed, and they can run out of funds in a systemic crisis.24
Importantly, it is easier to achieve private sector involvement in name,
but without the exceptional oversight that characterizes some cases, such
as the German system. Thus, private systems appear to work best in the
presence of mutual liability and are best conceived of as a first round of
defense against all but systemic crises, at which point the government
can step in—much as the risk against catastrophic loss against earth-
quakes or hurricanes is handled.
The second potential drawback is that private schemes are based on
peer monitoring, which (as observed by Calomiris 1992) is more likely to
work when the coalition is relatively limited in numbers. Beyond some
point, members may be tempted to “free ride” on the monitoring of oth-
ers. In the German system this problem is addressed by the existence of
several deposit insurance systems for different groups of banks. Smaller
numbers of banks may also promote safety by boosting their franchise
value and accordingly providing bankers with greater incentives to behave
prudently. Still, private coalitions could be used to stifle competition, and
—involve the private
sector in sharing the
risk—
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governments may have to make a decision on where to draw the line be-
tween competition and stability. The high costs of banking crises in devel-
oping countries suggests giving greater weight to stability. Moreover, many
developing countries, in particular the smaller ones, already have a rela-
tively small number of banks, compared with those in their industrial
counterparts. Also, as is suggested in chapter 4, firms and households are
rapidly gaining access to financial services from abroad, so that finance is
becoming more competitive even in small countries.
Finally, deposit protection systems like those in Germany may be suc-
cessful because of the institutional and regulatory environment in which
they reside. The strong antibankruptcy bias of German law and the effec-
tive regulatory and supervisory system likely are important as well.25 Inter-
estingly, applying the methodology of box 2.2 to a sample of 12 countries,
Laeven (2000) concludes that German banks take the very low risks, and
have the lowest gross subsidy from deposit insurance. Private management,
mutual liability, and the antibankruptcy bias likely explain this result.
Funding: The regression results introduce the possibility that keeping
the scheme unfunded, though with access to funds, may help protect market
discipline. Funding likely increases confidence that payout will be prompt.
The case against funding, though, is controversial and not conclusive. The
U.S. savings and loan crisis showed that unfunded (or underfunded)
schemes could result in greater forbearance and higher-cost resolutions as
the insurer struggled to protect depositors of weak banks. In addition, it is
sometimes argued that the decision to fund deposit insurance may be
accompanied by better oversight. Nevertheless, the cross-country econo-
metrics points to the fact that funds can be abused more easily in weak
institutional environments, and it seems far easier to set up a fund than to
protect it from looting. These findings should be borne in mind by au-
thorities considering whether or not to fund. Leaving the scheme unfunded,
but with the ability to access funds from the government, should allow a
quick response while permitting oversight to minimize abuse. Ex ante fund-
ing should only be considered when legal and regulatory institutions are
developed sufficiently to prevent looting.
In sum, authorities considering the adoption of deposit insurance can
benefit from these lessons. Some may interpret the evidence to mean
that if countries adopt a “good” deposit insurance system, they will be
better insulated against crisis. The difficulty, however, is that the adop-
tion of deposit insurance per se is a “stroke-of-the-pen reform,” and the
—and keep schemes
unfunded, or with much
oversight, in a weak
institutional environment
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institutional building to ensure that the system is “good” takes consider-
able time. Without adequate institutional development, the risk that
deposit insurance could lead to crises, less financial sector development,
more poorly functioning financial markets, and ultimately slower growth
and higher poverty levels is real. Thus, authorities considering deposit
insurance should make an audit of their institutional framework the first
step in the decisionmaking process. Countries that do decide to estab-
lish an explicit deposit insurance system should draw on these results of
experience, which utilize known market forces to ensure prudence.
Conclusions
THE CONSISTENT MESSAGE OF THIS CHAPTER IS THUS THATbank owners and other market participants should be viewedas necessary complements to official supervisors in monitoring
banks. Whatever the prudential regulations that are put in place—and
it may be that more is needed than simply focusing on capital adequacy
(cf. Honohan and Stiglitz 2001)—ensuring compliance is the major
stumbling block. Given information problems and the difficulty in
understanding well how incentives are functioning, excessive weight
on one group as the principle monitor is akin to excessive concentration
in a bank’s portfolio. It may appear to pay off nicely until failing
miserably. The strategic approach for authorities is to use incentives
wherever they can be applied to maximize the number of motivated,
watchful eyes.
Easy access to an implicit or explicit safety net confers a subsidy on
banks, which encourages excessively bank-dependent—and debt-
intensive—economies. Putting in place the recommendations of this chap-
ter and effectively eliminating or greatly reducing this subsidy will remove
this distortion and encourage the nonbank financial sector to develop. To
be sure, there are some risks here, to the extent that it is near-bank activity
just outside the scope of the regulations that occurs, and regulatory design
needs to be adaptive to avoid such arbitrage opportunities. To the extent,
however, that it allows the emergence of nonbank types of finance, includ-
ing market-traded equity and bonds, and the associated collective savings
institutions and other financial services activities, this will help the alloca-
tion of risks and lower the cost of risk capital. Risk and fraud are present in
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nonbank finance, too, but the existence of risk is known to all participants
and is rewarded by higher expected returns. Fraud needs to be dealt with
through responsible disclosure standards and stiff penalties, as well as some
consumer-oriented regulations. With a safer banking system in place, au-
thorities will be better able to avoid going down the dangerous road of
extending the safety net beyond banking.
There is no doubt that concentration of ownership and control, noted in
chapter 1, can limit the efficacy of nonbank financial institutions and mar-
kets in providing independent sources of finance and independent checks
on the powers of powerful interests. Along with increasing access to foreign
financial services (chapter 4), however, broadening capital markets over time
promises to provide greater diversity and stability to the financial sector.
Improvements to basic financial infrastructure—enhancing disclosure and
improving the protection of shareholders and creditors, as noted in chapter
1—will be instrumental in this task. To be sure, these recommendations
may be difficult to implement, because politicians will need all their skills in
combating powerful interests. Developing an awareness in society of the
costs that many, including the poor, must pay for a weak incentive environ-
ment should help bolster support for improvements in the framework. The
forces of globalization (chapter 4) may help in this effort.
Notes
1. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) Prospect Theory
holds that individuals’ assessments of gains and losses can
vary depending on their initial situation and specifically
may be averse to losses or loss realization, such as not
selling stock whose prices fall.
2. As Kindleberger (1996, p. 66) notes, “...the pro-
pensities to swindle and be swindled run parallel to the
propensity to speculate during a boom...And the signal
for panic is often the revelation of some swindle, theft,
embezzlement, or fraud.”
3. Bagehot (1873, p. 131) reminds that during the
South Sea Bubble, one of the companies whose shares were
quoted was a bit peculiar. “But the most strange of all, per-
haps, was ‘For an Undertaking which shall in due time be
revealed.’ Each subscriber was to pay down two guineas,
and hereafter to receive a share of one hundred, with a
disclosure of the object; and so tempting was the offer, that
1,000 of these subscriptions were paid the same morning,
with which the projector went off in the afternoon.”
4. As Levine (1997) notes, Hicks (1969) concluded
that although the products in the early stages of the indus-
trial revolution were invented several decades earlier, their
large-scale manufacture had to await the financial revolu-
tion that permitted the financing of illiquid investments.
5. Bernanke (1983) documented the credit channel
for the Great Depression of the 1930s.The role of a sup-
ply-driven “credit crunch” in exacerbating the East Asia
crisis has been extensively debated (a representative collec-
tion of the research literature is in Domaç, Ferri, and Kawai
forthcoming). To the extent that a summary conclusion
can be drawn, it appears that, while an acute credit squeeze
affected firms, especially SMEs in the early stage of the
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crisis, the economic downturn soon meant that demand
for credit also declined, and relaunching credit supply no
longer seemed to be the most pressing issue—though schol-
ars will remain divided on the degree to which it did re-
main a problem. For the future, the priority will be to en-
sure that both macropolicy stability and the regulatory en-
vironment will be sufficiently secure to make discussion of
forbearance and subsidies unnecessary.
6. If three outliers are discarded, the correlation is
0.7 and a regression line implies an approximate one-to-
one relationship between flow output costs and fiscal costs.
This finding could be interpreted as suggesting that the
different elements of cost are all correlated, and as sup-
porting the use of fiscal cost as a general-purpose approxi-
mation to the unobserved total economic cost.
7. Other goals, such as antidiscrimination and pro-
motion of home ownership and of exports, continue to be
pursued through detailed measures of financial policy in
some countries, but these will not be discussed here. There
has been a decline in the perceived effectiveness of policy
measures that seek to direct the flow of finance to specific
economic goals (Caprio, Hanson, and Honohan 2001).
8. Official action to help prevent the outright fail-
ure of the highly leveraged hedge fund LTCM in 1998
was substantially driven by knowledge of the potential
impact of such a failure on the stability of the banking
system.
9. The ending of liquidity requirements in develop-
ing countries came about in emulation of the new, best
practice in the OECD area, and lower liquidity require-
ments did alleviate somewhat the taxation of the finan-
cial sector. Although liquidity ratios—holdings of central
bank reserves, cash, and government paper—were not
needed for prudential purposes in high-income countries,
developing countries have not been able to upgrade bank
supervision and regulation sufficiently to offset the loss
of this buffer, cf. Caprio and Honohan (2001).
10. Overly simple or inflexible rules can have unfor-
tunate side effects. In a downturn, for instance, rigid bank
capital requirements can accentuate the recession by con-
straining credit growth, especially if banks have to provi-
sion more against loan losses (Chiuri, Ferri, and Majnoni
2000). However, the theoretical solution of making the
capital requirements explicitly cycle-dependent
(Dewatripont and Tirole 1993) may, in practice be hard
to implement credibly or without risking a degree of for-
bearance that could altogether undermine the incentive
effect of having capital requirements.
11. It is not only emerging economies that
underprovision. A recent Bank of Japan study (1998)
found that 75.3 percent of loans classified in 1993–94 as
doubtful at a sample of 18 banks became write-offs over
the following three years—but required provisioning for
such loans is only 52 percent; and that 16.7 percent of
“category 2” loans, for which only a 2 percent provision
is required, were written off.
12. The integration of financial sector supervision has
received much attention, but is beyond the scope of this
study. As integrated agencies are relatively recent, no for-
mal quantitative research of their relative merits has been
performed, and only anecdotal information (such as the
continued difficulty in getting effective cooperation be-
tween separate departments in a single agency) is avail-
able. Still, as Goodhart (2000) argues, for emerging mar-
kets this issue is premature and likely of second order rela-
tive to fixing the overall incentive environment.
13. As Becker and Stigler (1974) note, “The appro-
priate pay structure has three components: an ‘entrance
fee,’ equal to the temptation of malfeasance, a salary pre-
mium in each year of employment approximately equal
to the income yielded by the ‘entrance fee,’ and a pension
with a capital value approximately equal also to the temp-
tation of malfeasance. As it were, enforcers post a bond
equal to the temptation of malfeasance, receive the in-
come on the bond as long as they are employed, and have
the bond returned if they behave themselves until retire-
ment. Put differently, they forfeit their bond if they are
fired for malfeasance.”
14. On the other hand, it is recently reported that
senior executives of Daiwa Bank have been held person-
ally liable for losses caused by an inadequately supervised
trader (Economist, November 16, 2000).
15. In some transitional cases, authorities may have
been partly motivated by the possibility of European
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Union (EU) accession and the agreed model for deposit
insurance there.
16. Of course, since “big money” also is “smart
money,” it may run first, and to the extent that authori-
ties are concerned about a potential “systemic” crisis, they
may elect to cover uninsured and large depositors, even
including interbank claims, either through the deposit
insurance fund or some other facility. Thus during the
Continental Illinois difficulties in the United States, de-
posit insurance was extended to all creditors.
17. At times, governments have exceeded their own
coverage limits, but the empirical findings recounted
below show that having lower ceilings does seem to
matter.
18. The requirement in EU law for member states to
cover a common euro amount of deposits has placed up-
ward pressure on coverage levels in countries aspiring to
EU membership.
19. In the United States, as in some countries, there
is a limit on the total amount of funds in the deposit
insurance fund. Once that limit is reached, banks are
no longer assessed until funds drop below the ceiling.
In this situation, banks face a zero premium, and clearly
no risk differentiation.
20. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1999) found—
although in a small sample of 24 countries—that the cost
of crises also was higher with deposit insurance and weak
institutional environments.
21. Similar arguments have been made in regard to
foreign exchange reserves.
22. Any message that the coverage will be limited
seems to be discounted in such institutional settings.
23. The latter can be significant in emerging mar-
kets, where it has taken from months to as long as eight
years for depositors to be paid in accordance with deposit
insurance statutes.
24. Neither private nor public systems, however, were
designed for systemic crises, but rather to prevent epi-
sodes of individual bank failure from mushrooming into
a systemic problem.
25. According to the La Porta and others (1997) data-
base, Germany ranks among the highest in the protection
of creditors’ rights. Also, as Beck (2000) reports, although
only fraudulent bankruptcy is subject to prosecution, in
Germany fraud can include violating “orderly business prac-
tice,” which can be broadly interpreted. Hans Gerling, a
principal of Herstatt Bank, contributed about 150 million
DM to creditors to avoid legal entanglements after that
bank failed. Moreover, the German Banking Act prohibits
any manager involved in fraudulent bankruptcy from ever
holding a managerial post in banking—as determined by
regulatory officials rather than criminal prosecution.
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INCE THE ADVENT OF BANKING, BOTH IN NORMAL TIMES
and in times of crises, governments have taken ownership
positions in banking either deliberately or indirectly as a
result of a banking crisis. Instances of failed state owner-
ship of banks, privatization followed by crises, and at best
limited success in bank restructuring have occurred with
sufficient frequency that a reconsideration of government’s role in these
related areas is overdue. Although many governments have retreated
somewhat in their ownership stake in the banking sector in recent decades,
government bureaucrats remain active in banking, and in the wake of
crises regularly increase their involvement significantly, often for lengthy
periods. Yet new research shows that, whatever its original objectives,
state ownership tends to stunt financial sector development, thereby
contributing to slower growth.
The stable and efficient provision of financial services—regardless of
who owns the financial firms providing them—is a realistic goal for all
countries, the achievement of which necessitates that governments focus
on what they do best. The previous two chapters set out an ambitious
agenda for government’s role in laying the foundation and creating the
regulatory superstructure for sound finance for development. This agenda
will be difficult to achieve if the authorities’ attention is absorbed by
tasks in which they do not have an advantage, notably permanent or
temporary ownership of banks, especially when the latter role conflicts
with their position as regulator.
Whereas the previous chapter treated how governments should respond
to handle market  failures, this chapter reviews the evidence and makes
recommendations on government’s  failures in owning and restructuring
banks. Government failure as owner is attributed to the incentives
imposed on it by the political process. The few cases of more successful
Government Failure in
Finance
Government ownership of
banks tends to stunt
financial sector
development—
as the political process
distorts incentives
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state banks appears to be linked to a stronger institutional environment
and dispersed political powers. Without these advantages, authorities in
developing countries generally need to reduce their ownership role, con-
sider creative ways to use the private sector during crises, and focus on
their agenda as provider of infrastructure and as regulator. Paradoxically,
just as it may take a crisis to induce governments that are already in the
sector as owner to get out of it, so too can crisis bring in—as temporary
owners—governments that previously retreated or were not active in bank-
ing. When large systemic crises do occur and the government acquires an
ownership stake, or otherwise takes control, strategies to secure its prompt
and early exit should be part of the initial intervention design.
This chapter first reviews the arguments and evidence on state own-
ership of banks, combining both cross-country evidence with that of
some individual country cases. It then turns briefly to a discussion of
and evidence on the sequencing of bank privatization. Privatization with-
out the necessary institutional framework has led to crisis and fiscal costs
and thus should be tailored to country circumstances. A credible  policy
of preparing some banks for sale, coupled with new entry, including by
foreign private banks, while improving this framework, appears to be
sensible in weak institutional settings.
This chapter then turns to governmental failures as temporary owner
during restructuring. Not surprisingly, some of the same principles ad-
duced to the state’s behavior as a long-term owner of banks also are
applicable to this issue. Indeed, in times of crisis, bank restructuring is
an opportunity for significant injections of fiscal resources, and it is im-
portant not only to limit the cost to taxpayers and the economy from
the injections themselves, but to avoid reliance on bureaucrats to iden-
tify ‘winners and losers.’ Working with the market again emerges as a
key consideration for a strategic crafting of government’s response.
Bureaucrats as Bankers?
DESPITE MUCH DISCUSSION AND SOME HIGHLY PUBLICIZEDincreases in private sector activity in most countries’ bankingsystems, more than 40 percent of the world’s population lives
in countries in which the majority of bank assets are in majority-owned
state banks (figure 3.1). A glance at the map suggests that government
ownership tends to be greater in poorer countries, as confirmed in figure
5 of the Overview.
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The incidence of state ownership has declined since 1970 (figure 3.2),
but with the largest decreases in high-income countries. Over 30 devel-
oping countries, as of the late 1990s, continued to have over half  their
banking system assets in majority state-owned banks. Given that control
is possible even with a lower share of ownership, these figures necessarily
represent a lower bound on state control.
State ownership in banking continues to be popular in many coun-
tries for several reasons. First, proponents of state control argue that the
government can better allocate capital to highly productive investments.
Gerschenkron (1962) was among the first to make the case that in a
weak institutional environment, private banks would not be able to over-
come the deficiencies in information and contracting, or that it would
take too long to do so. In the 1950s and 1960s, when many were look-
ing for ways to have developing countries “take off” into self-sustaining
Figure 3.1 State ownership in banking, 1998–99
Note: The map shows the percentage of assets in state-owned banks; most of the observations are from 1998–99 (the World Bank Survey of
Prudential Regulation and Supervision) and, where that data was not available, from La Porta, Lópes-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000). Thus, some
very recent ownership changes, notably in Latin America, are not taken into account.
Source: World Bank survey on Prudential Regulation and Supervision, and other World Bank sources.
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growth, state ownership of the banking sector appeared to be the way to
do it, a view that some may continue to hold. State ownership also makes
appropriation of the surplus from finance (financial sector taxation) and
directing credit much easier.
Second, there is the concern that, with private ownership, excessive
concentration in banking may lead to limited access to credit by many
parts of society. Indeed, one argument often heard in developing coun-
tries is that governments are reluctant to privatize because it would lead
to a concentration of credit at the expense of many groups in their coun-
try. Third, a related popular sentiment—reinforced by abuses at and
governance problems of private banks in many countries—is that pri-
vate banking is more crisis prone. Rather than allocating resources wisely,
such failures as Barings Bank and Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM—a hedge fund whose risky strategy was funded and mimicked
by banks) suggest to some that private banks will be more concerned
with gambling, a belief reinforced by postprivatization crises in coun-
tries such as Chile (in the early 1980s) and Mexico (in 1994).
A return to the focus of the previous chapter on incentives, however,
makes the first point debatable, because bureaucrats do not face incen-
tives designed to reward efficient resource allocation. Elected officials
tend to be motivated by securing their political base and rewarding sup-
porters, a role that could conflict with that of resource allocation. And
all three arguments are very much empirical propositions.
State ownership of banking still
is important in developing
countries.
Figure 3.2 Government ownership of bank assets
Source: La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000).
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Until recently, the primary evidence on this issue has been anecdotal.
Although poorly regulated private banks have incurred large losses that
are passed on to depositors or, more frequently, to taxpayers, some of the
largest losses in history have been incurred by state banks. Two famous
and long-established banks, Credit Lyonnais (nationalized by the French
government in 1945 and privatized in 1999) and Banespa (purchased in
2000 by the Spanish bank BSCH, but previously owned by the State of
São Paulo in Brazil), for example, each ran up losses estimated in the
range of $22–28 billion under government ownership. It is now pos-
sible, however, to go beyond isolated case studies. Systematic analysis of
available cross-country data indicates that state ownership, especially in
low-income countries, is bad for financial sector development and sta-
bility, as well as for economic growth.
The key study, that of La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000),
uses data from private industry sources covering the 10 largest commer-
cial and development banks for each of 92 countries for 1970 and 1995,
and finds that greater state ownership of banks in 1970 is associated
with less financial sector development, lower growth, and lower produc-
tivity, and that these effects are larger at lower levels of income, with less
financial sector development, and with weaker property rights protec-
tion.1 Since they are using state ownership in 1970 to explain subse-
quent financial sector development and growth, there is no possibility
that the latter is causing the former. Also, in explaining growth, they
control for a wide array of institutional variables.2 La Porta, López-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer find that the channel from state ownership to lower
growth is through the impact on productivity. State banks do not gener-
ally allocate capital to its highest use. Based on earlier research (chapter
1), through this channel, growth must be reduced as well, and they find
no offsetting influence of state ownership on capital accumulation.
La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer show that the effects of in-
creasing private ownership are not only statistically significant, but eco-
nomically meaningful as well. For example, the fitted regression line
suggests that, had the share of government ownership in Bangladesh
been at the sample mean (57 percent) throughout the period from 1970
instead of at 100 percent, annual average growth would have risen by
about 1.4 percent, cumulating to a standard of living more than 50 per-
cent higher than it is today. Although this projection holds other mea-
sured variables equal, applying the guidance of box 1.1, it needs to be
noted that the implied privatization would also have had to be
The data are convincing:
bureaucrats generally are
bad bankers—
particularly in less
developed economies
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supported by the necessary institutional underpinnings emphasized be-
low, a significant omitted variable in their approach.
Using a different data source, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001a,c)
show that greater state ownership of banks tends to be associated with
higher interest rate spreads, less private credit, less activity on the stock
exchange, and less nonbank credit, even after taking account other fac-
tors that could influence financial development.3 Thus greater state own-
ership tends to be anticompetitive, reducing competition both from other
banks and from nonbanks. Barth, Caprio, and Levine also note that
where state ownership is greater, the number of applications for bank
licenses that are rejected tends to be higher and there are fewer foreign
banks. With less competition, it would be surprising if greater state own-
ership led to a wider availability of credit, and La Porta, López-de-Silanes,
and Shleifer instead find that the greater the state ownership, the larger
is the share of credit going to the top 20 firms.4
Last, state ownership appears to heighten the risk of crises. Admittedly,
though Barth, Caprio, and Levine identified a positive impact of state
ownership on the probability of a banking crisis, this impact was not sta-
tistically significant with their data. 5 But La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and
Shleifer found that greater state ownership is correlated with various mea-
sures of financial instability. And, applying a logit model to the La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 64-country data set, Caprio and Martinez-
Peria (2000) are able to show that greater state ownership at the start of the
1980–97 period was associated with a greater probability of a banking
crises and (with far fewer observations) higher fiscal costs.
The above evidence is consistent with the theme of the last chapter
on incentives. Rather than responding to principles of profit maximiza-
tion, governments tend to be responsive to various interests, and espe-
cially to bolstering their support (box 3.1). Indeed, even within the gamut
of state ownership, there is some evidence that form matters: Cull and
Xu (2000) find that in the 1980s—when direct government financing
was more available—Chinese state bank bureaucrats did a superior job
allocating credit compared with government agency employees, that is,
bank finance was allocated more in line with firm productivity than
were direct transfers. One possible reason: these state bankers were paid
bonuses related to the profitability of the bank. A contributing factor
may have been the availability of direct budgetary funds to meet govern-
ment agencies’ needs, implying less pressure on state banks to engage in
State ownership tends to
reduce competition—
limit access to credit—
and may heighten the risk
of crisis
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MOST PRESCRIPTIONS FOR FINANCIAL SECTOR
policy implicitly envisage a government that seeks to
achieve the common good, but this picture neglects
both the incentives facing political actors and the
political structures within which they operate. Even
if they are not motivated by personal financial
objectives, these actors are everywhere concerned with
their political futures, and are therefore often
beholden to sectoral interests. The extent to which
sectoral interests hold sway over the decisions of
political actors depends, in turn, on the political rules
within which they operate, and perhaps also on social
norms (cf. North 1999).
The nexus between the political arena and special
interests in the financial sector can be especially close
if only because (to quote Willie Sutton, that notori-
ous bank robber of the 1940s) finance “is where the
money is.” All too often it has been the self-interest
of government decisionmakers that has created and
sustained the distorted incentives in the financial sec-
tor that have led to crisis, or even to the diversion of
resources of state-controlled financial institutions to
political or personal ends. What hope is there that
good financial policy will be adopted if it is against
the interest of the powers-that-be?
The persistence of a dysfunctional regulatory ap-
proach may thus be partly explained by politicians,
as well as official regulators, having been “captured”
by those they should be regulating. Regulatory policy
is then more easily seen as operating in the private
interest rather than that of the general public.1
Analyzing the role of political economy in influ-
encing the worldwide shift toward financial liberal-
ization, Kroszner (1998) has pointed out the way in
which shifting technologies that alter the relative
bargaining power of different interest groups, or the
policy preferences of existing interest groups, can be
influential in determining actual policy changes.2
Likewise, employing the same data on fiscal costs
discussed in the text below, Keefer (2000) has recently
explored the deeper political determinants, both of
the fiscal costs of banking crises and of the propensity
to exercise regulatory forbearance during crises. His
hypothesis is that socially costly government forbear-
ance action to shore up the financial system under its
current management, or to allow the pursuit of risky
behavior, may be adopted by politicians in order to
ensure financial or political support from these inter-
est groups, especially if political structures are weak.
He provides evidence suggesting that, at least in less
financially developed economies, checks and balances
(as quantified in Beck and others 2000) do help to
reduce both the fiscal costs of financial crisis and the
probability that forbearance will be exercised.
Political economy analysis of such issues is clearly
only beginning, but promises to be a fruitful area of
research whose results will help ensure that government
power is not misused in the regulation of finance.
Box 3.1 Political economy and financial policy
1. Revealing the influence of contrasting political interests in different U.S. states, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) show that legisla-
tors from states with many small banks opposed the extension of interstate banking.
2. Romer and Weingast (1991) demonstrate similar patterns of influence in the run-up to the S&L crisis.
For instance, the first entry of foreign banks into several emerging markets has often been restricted to merger and acquisition,
thereby securing the capital value of their remaining franchise—which might otherwise be competed away by the newcomers—for the
existing owners. Likewise, when securities markets were being liberalized, partly to meet the government’s need for additional loanable
funds, most emerging markets opted for the sealed-bid, first-price auctions of government paper, generally thought to be more advanta-
geous to primary dealers at the expense of the taxpayers interests.
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inefficient directed lending. Indeed as direct government financing of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) declined in the early 1990s, the linkage
between the credit decisions of state bankers and productivity faded.6 In
most settings, private banks are even more isolated from political pres-
sures, which accounts in part for their superior performance. It is im-
portant, however, to note that in transition countries, abrupt privatization
of banks is unlikely to work, as noted below, and some state ownership
may be necessary as a buffer during the transition process.
The first two chapters suggested that finance, including banking, will
lead to faster growth and fewer crises where the information and con-
tracting environment is stronger and where there are sufficient, well-
motivated monitors to oversee intermediaries. With greater state bank-
ing, there tends to be less demand for better information and other parts
of infrastructure, and weak monitoring. Barth, Caprio, and Levine find
that monitoring by the market tends to be significantly weaker with
higher state ownership. Governments are exposed to an incentive con-
flict when they have significant state ownership, as one part of govern-
ment is then charged with monitoring another, so monitoring by offi-
cial supervisors can be expected to be weaker as well.
State ownership need not always be bad for growth: La Porta, López-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer find that at higher per capita income levels, the
negative effect diminishes to become insignificant. Germany, with a
longstanding tradition of high state ownership (as of 1998, 42 percent
of commercial bank assets being in state-owned banks) is a clear outlier,
but several other high-income countries, such as France and Italy, had
periods in which state ownership was pronounced, though both have
decreased this in recent years.
Governments with greater checks and balances and better institutional
development might be expected to have more positive results from state
ownership, both by providing better official and market oversight of gov-
ernment banks. Keefer (2000) finds that better checks and balances help
to reduce both the fiscal costs of financial crises and the probability that
forbearance will be exercised.7 The quality of information, the vigor of
contract enforcement, and even the personal stigma associated with
nonrepayment of debt all can be expected to affect the costs of state bank-
ing. In developing countries, state-owned banks tended to allocate credit
to state enterprise, which may explain the above-mentioned finding of
weak productivity, as well as the outliers. Germany, for example, has had
little state ownership of the enterprise sector (outside transport and
State ownership can lead
to a conflict of incentives
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finance), which has made it easier for bureaucrats to avoid the tempta-
tion of allocating credit to government firms. Moreover, the tough penal-
ties in Germany for default and bankruptcy mentioned in chapter 2 help
to make life easy for most banks, even those that are state run.
In sum, the data show poor performance of state banks in several
dimensions. They tend to decrease financial sector development and
economic growth, to concentrate credit, and to increase the likelihood
and cost of banking crises. Although the findings do not demand elimi-
nation of all state ownership, the evidence is consistent with moving to
sell government banks in a number of countries, especially where they
dominate the sector. While it remains possible for developing countries
to find ways to limit the damage done by state ownership, limiting such
ownership itself will likely be easier to implement than the many insti-
tutional and political reforms needed to limit the abuses and inefficien-
cies of state banking.
Privatizing Banks
Evidence from countries that have made significant reductions in state
ownership of the banking sector, though limited, confirms the above pic-
ture of the costs of state ownership, reveals the difficulty of bank
privatization, and contains lessons for how it might be better conducted.
The most detailed examination is for Argentina, which has seen a signifi-
cant decline in the degree of state ownership—from about 50 percent of
banking system assets in 1990 to half that level in 2000—and is consis-
tent with the cross-country evidence. Clarke and Cull (1998) provide
simulations of the present value of savings from privatizing Argentina’s
provincial banks and found impressive gains. Even if nothing  were recov-
ered from the residual entities that took over loss-making loans at the
time of sale, and basing the simulations on the period 1991–96 (a time of
general economic expansion when the banks should have been earning
profits), the savings amounted to one-third of a typical province’s public
expenditure and could have financed its 1996 deficit for 12 years. Some-
what more realistic assumptions on recoveries put the savings at more
than half government expenditure, and this with a high discount rate.
Stated differently, the cost of retaining governmental ownership was large,
and the cost of these injections, in combination with the discipline asso-
ciated with the convertibility plan, led to privatization efforts.
The fiscal costs of state
intervention add to the
pressure to privatize
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As seen in figure 3.3, prior to privatization, Argentine provincial banks
were having serious difficulties: nonperforming loans (NPLs) were high
and increased further after the preprivatization audits (mandated for banks
accessing the Fondo Fiduciario, box 3.2). After the audits, and as a part
of the actual sale, essentially all NPLs were removed from the balance
sheet. Subsequently, the share of NPLs rose again, but only to levels
comparable to the better private banks in Argentina. Since then, the
privatized banks have remained more or less on par with other private
banks on NPLs (although NPLs in 2000 went up at all private banks
because of the general economic slowdown).
More generally, the newly privatized banks’ balance sheets and in-
come statements began to resemble more those of other private banks,
especially in terms of their administrative costs relative to their rev-
enues, and most importantly in terms of credit extended to public en-
terprises (figure 3.4, which shows the second cohort of banks that were
Figure 3.3 Nonperforming
loans, Argentina, 1991
Source: Clarke and Cull (1999).
Percent of total loans
60
40
20
0
All
provincial
banks
10 largest
private
banks
ALTHOUGH ECONOMISTS ALWAYS HOPE THAT THEIR
research changes the minds of politicians, the lags
between the establishment of new results and policy
change can be long. Why else would politicians
privatize banks? After all, state ownership frequently
provides easy financing of government deficits and
provides a source of political patronage in the form
of jobs at the state banks and access to credit.
Argentina provides interesting insights. A decade
ago, all 20 provinces owned at least one of the 27
provincial banks, which were found to have gener-
ally low portfolio quality, low efficiency, and low re-
turns. Yet these banks remained state-owned until
the Convertibility Plan ended their access to the dis-
count window and also limited central bank fund-
ing of federal deficits. Thus provincial politicians no
longer could hope for cheap financing and funding
of provincial bank losses. With the Tequila Crisis in
late 1994, the provincial banks were affected by a
depositor run, forcing a reassessment of the state
ownership decision. Given the (then) short maturity
of Argentina’s capital markets, it would have been
difficult to stretch out the financing of the bad assets
in these banks, so the World Bank and the IDB
helped create the Fondo Fiduciario, which extended
loans to help provinces stretch out the costs of
privatization, but only after newly established “good”
banks—representing the good assets of the provin-
cial banks—had been sold. As a result, about half
the provincial banks were sold by late 1997, and by
2000 this ratio rose to two-thirds.
Still, politicians have a tendency to hang on. The
weakest banks (highest NPLs) initially were the ones
most likely to be privatized, and indeed postsale audits
showed that their performance was worse than previ-
ously believed. On the other hand, large, overstaffed
banks, which provide greater patronage, were less likely
to be sold. This suggests that in countries with a few
large state banks, either politicians—or their public—
will have to be swayed by research results, or it will take
a large crisis or significant tightening of their access to
federal financing to get them to privatize.
Box 3.2 Can bank privatization be sustained?
Source: Clarke and Cull (1999).
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sold between September 1995 and March 1996). This dramatic change
in lending supports the finding from the cross-country research that
enhanced productivity follows privatization, in that SOE credit likely
represented low-productivity loans. As part of the privatization pro-
cess, the shedding of staff or their more efficient employment, though
less significant for the overall economy, works in the same direction.
Notwithstanding this evidence, it is unclear to what extent bank
privatization will continue, or how best to foster it. Argentine provinces
only began privatization in earnest when their access to cheap refinanc-
ing and covering of losses was eliminated. Even then it took a crisis to
accelerate the process (box 3.2). Other countries, such as Hungary, have
first recapitalized banks before concluding that privatization was neces-
sary to limit the cost to taxpayers.
Bank privatization is politically difficult, and if the same political forces
continue in place, it is not likely that it will be successful. Argentine and
Hungarian authorities clearly were motivated by the costs of maintain-
ing state ownership. As seen in box 3.3, countries often turn to bank
privatization only after long delays and sometimes failed restructuring.
Beyond waiting for crises, a possible way of fostering the sale of state
banks is to encourage more rigorous enforcement of prudential regula-
tion for all banks, so that the state banks’ weaker position—and hence
higher possible cost to taxpayers—will be evident, as it became in
Privatization can be
politically difficult
Figure 3.4 Lending to state-owned enterprises in Argentina
Note: The second cohort of 5 banks was the first group to be sold with assistance from Fondo
Fiduciario (see box 3.2).
Source: Clarke and Cull (1999).
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(box continues on following page)
EVEN AFTER LONG DELAYS, WHERE THE SAME
strong interests that derailed earlier reforms still
dominate a country’s politics, outcomes from bank
privatization will tend to be disappointing. This
argues for most assistance to countries in which
privatization is deemed to be politically desirable,
feasible, and credible. Most African countries opted
to create at least one large state bank after
independence to support indigenous industries and
state ventures, and to make banking services available
for the broad population, including those in rural
areas. In many countries these big state banks still
dominate the banking sector and, after decades of
politicized management and soft budget constraints,
have been difficult to restructure or privatize. The
disappointing results from restructuring and generally
on privatization can be seen from three countries that
attempted banking reform programs during the
1990s: Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda.
Ghana
Ghana started economic reforms in the early 1980s
after a politically unstable period of heavy state in-
volvement in the economy. The state owned three
commercial banks, three development banks, and the
Cooperative Bank. There were also two foreign banks
and a merchant bank.
All the state-owned banks were restructured and
recapitalized under the financial reforms that started
in 1987, with bad loans removed to an AMC. Man-
agement was improved through extensive technical
assistance.
Both before and after restructuring, the primary
function of the Ghanaian banks has been funding the
deficit of central government and public enterprises (this
averaged 73 percent of domestic credit in the 1990s).
The very high T-Bill yields received by the banks helped
offset the continued loan losses from other lending.
Bank privatization has been a stop-go process,
being held up, for example, by disagreement be-
tween the privatization agency and external esti-
mates of values on the price. With the program years
behind schedule, the government decided to sell
some shares in two state commercial banks domes-
tically even before finding a strategic investor. This
made it difficult subsequently to reduce the price
to attract a strategic investor. Eventually, in late 1996
the government dropped its requirement that the
strategic buyer should be a bank, and managed to
sell the Social Security Bank to a consortium of for-
eign investment funds. By 1998, this newly priva-
tized bank had about 13 percent of total banking
system assets.
The largest bank, Ghana Commercial Bank
(GCB), continued to have problems even after the
restructuring of the late 1980s. With the failure of a
planned sale in 1996 to a Malaysian manufacturing
firm, it remains government-controlled, with just 41
percent held by Ghanaians after the initial public
offering (IPO). In preparation for privatization in
the mid-1990s it was found that there were serious
reconciliation problems in the accounts and short-
comings in management, and some of the loss-
making branches had never been closed. In 1997 the
entire senior management of GCB had to be removed
in the wake of a check fraud scandal.
Tanzania
Tanzania was starting to liberalize after two decades
of African socialism. Twelve banks had been nation-
alized in 1967 and merged into a dominant com-
mercial bank, National Bank of Commerce (NBC),
which had a virtual monopoly for 25 years. The only
other financial institutions were a small cooperative
bank, which was also controlled by the state, and a
few specialized state banks for housing.
By the mid-1980s, the NBC was insolvent, il-
liquid, and losing money at an alarming rate.
Restructuring moved a significant portion of the
NPLs out of the bank, closed some loss-making
Box 3.3 The rise, reprieve, and fall of state banks in Africa
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Box 3.3 (continued)
branches, and retrenched staff, but operating costs
as a percentage of assets doubled and spreads be-
came negative in 1992. The bank was recapitalized
in 1992, but as the losses continued to mount, re-
structuring intensified with an “action plan” in 1994
that changed the board of directors, curtained lend-
ing and laid off further staff. However, the salaries
of the remaining staff were doubled by the new
board of directors, thus offsetting the reductions in
costs. The benefits from removing bad loans to the
AMC were short-lived. By 1994, 77 percent of the
remaining loans were nonperforming.
In 1995 another attempt to restructure failed.
Finally, National Commercial Bank (NBC) was split
in November 1997 into two banks and a holding
company. The NBC holding company took the non-
banking assets, for example, staff housing and the
training center. The business bank, NBC-1997, took
all lending and 45 percent of the deposits, and a ser-
vice bank took the remainder of the deposits. The
National Microfinance Bank was to provide basic
depository services to the general population, and
took the small deposits but no lending. The decision
to set up a microfinance bank that would keep the
rural branch network may have softened some of the
political opposition to the privatization of the busi-
ness bank. The separation proved difficult. Poor fi-
nancial and operational controls led to the need for
significant provisions on unreconciled balances, and
there was a significant delay in producing financial
statements after the split.
NBC-1997 was sold to the South African bank,
Amalgamated Banks of South Africa Group (ABSA)
in late 1999 with IFC participation. The
microfinance bank remains unsold, but is now fo-
cusing on the provision of payments and savings ser-
vices in its 95 branches.
Uganda
By the early 1990s, as Uganda was just starting to
reemerge from the economic devastation of the tur-
bulent 1980s, the government had stakes in all nine
commercial banks, and owned the largest two:
Uganda Commercial Bank (UCB), with about 50
percent of the market, and the Cooperative Bank.
As of late 1991, about one-third of the loans of UCB
were nonperforming, and the negative net worth of
the bank was estimated at $24 million.
Timid restructuring efforts started. Loss-making
branches were converted into agencies rather than
being closed. The AMC that was to take bad loans
was not created until 1996 and, even then, there
was a significant lag in transferring bad loans. There
was a performance agreement in 1994 between the
Ministry of Finance and the bank’s board of direc-
tors, but the strategy pursued was to try to reduce
the proportion of NPLs by growing the loan port-
folio. Bank supervisors did not monitor compliance.
Every improvement in profitability was temporary
and losses continued to mount. By mid-1996 the
financial position had deteriorated so that its nega-
tive net worth tripled from earlier estimates.
While the government’s intention was that the
restructuring would culminate in privatization,
management of the UCB was actively opposed to
sale. Eventually, after three years of unsuccessful
attempts to restructure the bank, it was agreed that
a reputable merchant bank be selected to imple-
ment the sale, giving the buyer greater freedom to
define which assets and branches were to be pur-
chased. Again there was a lag, and the merchant
bank was finally hired in February 1996 and, at its
request, top management was finally changed in July
1996. Losses were mounting throughout the delay,
and UCB was losing market share. Audited finan-
cial statements for 1997 showed another fall in in-
terest income, wiping out the core profits adver-
tised to investors six months earlier. With few
expressions of interest, a sale agreement was signed
in late 1997 with a Malaysian industrial and real
estate company. By December 1998, however, the
deal had unraveled amid allegations of corruption.
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Argentina during the crisis and then more clearly after the banks were
sold. Notwithstanding the political forces that may favor limited infor-
mation, the current international attention to international standards
might encourage greater transparency and thus this result. Also, manda-
tory publication of the audits of state banks, preferably by international
firms, will allow the owners—the country’s citizens—to see what they
own. Where privatization is limited by concerns about financing loan
losses prior to sale, funding from multilateral development banks can
help to stretch out the costs of privatization where longer-term markets
are not sufficiently developed. As Clarke and Cull (1999) note, however,
the fact that weaker banks are more likely to be sold suggests that
preprivatization injection of funds should be avoided, as it may decrease
the probability of sale and also can easily be squandered.
Since bank privatization can yield real benefits, and as there is consid-
erable public ownership in many countries, moving to sell banks would
appear to be an immediate imperative in many developing countries.
When it occurs, though, privatization can also be badly designed and
lead to crises. Stated differently, the above comparison on the gains from
less state ownership were for “other things equal,” such as the quality of
financial sector infrastructure and the regulatory environment, and pro-
vided no sense as to the speed and sequencing of bank privatization.
Experience is both limited and ambiguous. Chile (with bank
privatization in 1975 and a crisis in 1982) and Mexico (1992 and 1994,
respectively) both appear to have been cases with an underdeveloped
regulatory and supervisory framework, and both have made remarkable
strides since their crises. The emphasis was on speed of sale, which was
accomplished, but the costs of the subsequent banking crises (about 42
percent and 20 percent of GDP, respectively) were high.8 Although both
crises featured multiple causes, a weak regulatory environment appeared
important and is widely acknowledged to lead to fraud, looting, and
then crisis. While it is entirely possible that these problems then pro-
duce a lobby for better financial infrastructure and regulation and ulti-
mately faster growth, as arguably occurred in Mexico and Chile,
privatization in a weak framework, followed by crises, is just as likely to
provoke opposition to market-based reforms. Thus, in order to avert
postprivatization crises, authorities as soon as possible should strengthen
these elements and exercise some caution—while still moving forward—
in the privatization of the banking system. A deliberate and credible  phas-
ing out of state ownership over some period while the environment is
being improved accordingly is suggested.
Privatization should be
phased along with
improvements to the
infrastructure—
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The Argentine case noted above supports this sequencing argument.
On the eve of privatization they had a reasonably developed regulatory and
infrastructure environment for finance, and indeed by 1997 had one of the
toughest bank regulatory environments among emerging market countries
(World Bank 1998). Minimum capital ratios were 11.5 percent, with risk
weights varying as a function of credit and market risk. In addition, banks
faced stiff disclosure requirements and were compelled to issue subordi-
nated debt, and liquidity requirements were high (20 percent, with an ex-
tra 10 percent in the form of a puttable swap for dollar assets), among other
factors. Moreover, the system as a whole was anchored by the top ten banks,
nine of which by 1997 were majority foreign-owned, and the mix of public
and private oversight, recommended in chapter 2, largely was in place. The
decision to embark on a program of bank privatization in such a strong
regulatory environment can be made with greater confidence.
When the environment is weak, however, the need for care in the
privatization process has been dramatized by the experience in transi-
tion countries, where there is the risk of capture of the legal, regulatory,
and supervisory apparatus by insiders, or oligarchs (Hellman, Jones, and
Kaufmann 2000). Those who capture control of this apparatus and banks
will soon become oligarchs. Whereas bureaucrats have been shown to be
bad bankers, oligarchs may be even worse. More generally, when there is
“regulatory capture,” either through corruption or the control of bank-
ing and its regulation by the same interests, neither market nor official
regulatory forces will work to support efficient and equitable develop-
ment. The full story of the privatizations in Mexico in the early 1990s,
with the purchase price sometimes allegedly paid from insider bank loans,
and resulting in looting behavior that brought many banks down during
the Tequila crisis, is only gradually coming to light (cf. the recent analy-
sis by La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Zamarripa (2000) mentioned in
chapter 2 above). It too reinforces the need for an adequate regulatory
environment for privatization.
Still, the conundrum is that although premature privatization in weaker
environments can lead to significant problems, lagging bank privatization
can undermine real sector reforms. The costs of delay are amply demon-
strated by the Czech Republic, which tried to move fast in the privatization
of nonfinancial firms, but slowly in selling banks. Chapter 1 already touched
on aspects of the acute problems of governance associated with the Czech
experience when the assets of many privatized firms were looted during the
1993–96 period. Another aspect of this story was the way in which some of
it was facilitated by continued lending from public sector banks (box 3.4).
—and the regulatory
environment
but excessive delays will
have real costs
Rapid privatization can
come unraveled—
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Tunneling—the appropriation of the firm’s assets by insiders—can oc-
cur even with private banks, but sustained looting—defined as borrowing
with the expectation of not repaying—can only continue if the lending
banks are not particularly concerned about their bottom line or can get
compensated from government, both characteristics of public banks.
Thus maintaining the status quo with a significant share of state-run
banks can be dangerous for the economy. Moving slowly but deliber-
ately with bank privatization, while preparing state banks for sale and
addressing weaknesses in the overall incentive environment, would ap-
pear to be a preferred strategy. Preparation, in addition to improvements
in infrastructure, could include some linkage of compensation for se-
nior managers to the future postprivatization value of the bank, such as
through stock options—an approach that appears to have helped in Po-
land. To be sure, this approach can only succeed if the process is cred-
ible, otherwise the deferred compensation will be too heavily discounted
to have any value. Prolonged “contracting” of private managers likely
Privatize deliberately but
carefully
OBSERVERS CRITICIZE THE CZECH VOUCHER
privatization as having led to tunneling, according
to which dispersed ownership facilitated asset
stripping from firms that had little effective corporate
governance. Some go further and argue that tunneling
occurs in legal systems that do not protect minority
shareholders rights well (Johnson, McMillan, and
Woodruff 2000). Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2001),
however, argue that tunneling cannot be the entire
story, because once the most attractive assets were
stripped, owners would have no more incentive to
increase their equity position—precisely what
occurred. They posit instead that there was looting—
owners and managers of firms with low net worth
borrowing and then defaulting on the debt—and
control of firms a ticket into this game.
Although there should be limits to looting—banks
might only be “stung” once—the dominance of the
state as an important owner apparently allowed this
activity to continue during the period 1993–96. Ac-
cording to La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer’s
(2000) data, the government had a majority interest
in just over half the banking system and a 20 percent
stake—a level that has been found to be sufficient to
give control—in 100 percent of the banking system.
Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2001) find that joint
stock firms controlled by investment funds
underperformed all others, and their ability to take
on liabilities at a faster rate—borrow from the state
banking system—contributed significantly to this
performance.
The authors conclude that privatization design for
the corporate sector is of second order importance
compared with the need to create a competitively ori-
ented banking system that will allocate credit in line
with commercial, rather than political, practices.
Box 3.4 Looting in the Czech Republic
Source: Cull, Matesova, and Shirley (2001).
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will not work in banking, where it is too difficult to observe the out-
comes of managers’ decisions.9 And, as mentioned, preprivatization re-
capitalization appears to be unwise, because it both risks dissuading of-
ficials of the need to sell the bank and can lead to a squandering of
taxpayers’ resources. Publication of as much information as possible on
the privatization process and vigorous oversight by the media will help
limit the ability of insiders to dominate, but this itself requires that the
media be active and independent.
Countries that can attract foreign entry from good foreign names—
an ability that likely will increase as e-finance drives down the cost of
entry (chapter 4)—and from different countries are in a stronger posi-
tion. Even though the regulatory environment may not be reliable, strong
foreign banks both would bring good skills, products, and even a capac-
ity to train local bankers, and would presumably be motivated to protect
their reputations to behave in line with the highest fiduciary standards.
Where powerful domestic interests or oligarchs are a barrier to sound
banking, some reliance on foreign banking (see chapter 4 on its rise in
some countries) may be the best alternative for development, even though
it can be politically difficult to accept. Still, the possibility that foreign
banks may be engaged in risky or criminal activities suggests that au-
thorities cannot abdicate their own “due diligence.” Regulators in home
countries may be legally constrained by the information that they can
share, but they should be as proactive as possible to alert developing and
transition country authorities to concerns about their own banks—even
if it is merely helping to translate—in language and in meaning—
information that is available in their own, deeper markets.
Political factors undoubtedly will determine the speed of privatization.
The experience of several countries, including Argentina and Hungary,
suggests that where state banks are smaller, fiscal pressures greater, and
political patronage lower or more dispersed, it will be easier to privatize
(Clarke and Cull 2001).
Precisely how much needs to be done until a country can privatize
its banks and how much of its banking system it can privatize in a
given regulatory environment are decisions that necessarily have to be
made on a case-by-case basis and undoubtedly involve art as much as
science. What has been shown at this point is the direction of change
that will help increase living standards in low-income countries. To be
sure, the process of bank privatization is difficult, but the gains seem
to be substantial.
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
140
Governments as Caretakers
For more than a hundred years we have known what to do in a finan-
cial crisis: have some organization show up with a lot of money to
restore confidence, have it lend freely to fundamentally sound organi-
zations that need cash, and have it rapidly close down and liquidate
businesses that aren’t going to make it even if the crisis is successfully
resolved. This is the way to restore confidence, and to keep the finan-
cial system doing its job of channeling money from savers and investors
on the one hand to businesses that need capital on the other.
Bradford De Long (2000)
EVEN GOVERNMENTS NOT DISPOSED TO TAKE A LARGE(R)ownership position in the banking sector may find that bankowners have exercised the “put” option of handing over the bank’s
deposit liabilities with insufficient assets to repay them, especially in times
of systemic crisis. Governments often then become involved in
restructuring banks and even their assets—nonfinancial firms—in the
process. In many cases, systemic crisis has led to significant increase in
government ownership or “caretaking,” even of some banks that have
just recently been privatized (Mexico). This increase has tended to persist
(figure 3.5). Yet the aforementioned evidence on governments’ efficacy as
“permanent” owners of banks implies that they will not excel at temporary
ownership—restructuring failed or failing banks—either. In particular, if
there is a tendency for political forces to dominate the economic judgments
of bureaucrats in normal times, this tendency is even more marked during
a systemic crisis, when the injection of substantial sums is in the offing,
and the financial fate of powerful interests will be determined. This section
considers what research can tell us about general principles—strategy,
not tactics—for how governments should behave when crises raise the
issue of injecting funds into the banking system.
Systemic bank restructuring is a difficult and complex undertaking,
and typically needs to be linked to wider corporate restructuring. The
practitioners’ literature calls for a comprehensive approach. Here we will
not attempt to discuss the issues in any detail—not least because they
have not yet been subject to systematic empirical investigation.10 Some
points, however, will be made on bank restructuring, in particular to
highlight a simple though important message. Because government is
not effective as a bank owner, it must devise its approach to bank re-
structuring to ensure that it gets out of a temporary caretaker position as
Governments are often
forced to take
ownership positions
during a crisis—
but need to develop an exit
strategy from the start
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soon as possible. It must not use this position to pick the “winners and
losers” itself, but rather should rely on the private sector for this key
function. This message can be—and has been—carried over to the re-
structuring of corporates.
When a banking crisis occurs, authorities need to decide when and
how to intervene. Much has been written on the former, starting with
Bagehot (1873, to whom De Long refers above). When the problem is
not systemic, bank creditors and supervisors should be left to proceed as
usual. Indeed, well motivated subordinated debt holders and other credi-
tors will have likely signaled the problem by not renewing credits and by
pushing up the spreads at which problem banks borrow.
How should it be ascertained that a crisis is systemic, or when should
the government intervene with other assistance? Although the applica-
tion of mechanical trigger rules to this area is appealing—for example, all
banks are on their own unless output has fallen by x percent or export or
some other prices by y  percent—most indicators either are available only
with a lag (GDP), or are partial indicators of the severity of a problem
(for example, the exchange rate). Moreover, the announcement of a rule
based on specific commodity or stock prices or indices, interest rates, or
exchange rates, can induce greater risk-taking once market participants
are armed with the knowledge that some specific downside is covered. If
a government states that it is willing to coinsure against a given decline in
Figure 3.5 Government ownership of banks during the East Asia crisis
Note: Data is for year-end, except for the latest data, which is March 2000 for Thailand, and June
2000 for Indonesia and Republic of Korea.
Source: World Bank.
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Governments should only
intervene when a crisis is
systemic—
but defining a systemic
crisis is not easy
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
142
an economic indicator, it may well be expected to intervene before that
point is reached. For example, if authorities commit to intervene in crises
if GDP falls by 5 percent—aside from the problem of estimating out-
put—markets may expect support well short of that decline, to the point
that intervention even in mild recessions might become the norm.
One possibility recently advocated (Mishkin 2000) is to announce a
policy that, even in a systemic crisis, the first bank that fails will certainly
not be bailed out, in the hope that each banker’s uncertainty as to whether
they will be first will motivate them to guard against excessive risk-taking.
In this context, however, failure is usually a regulatory decision. Perhaps
because of the difficulty of defining when a bank has become insolvent,
this option has not yet been chosen in any country. Instead, many cen-
tral bankers have decided on constructive ambiguity as the main solu-
tion.11 Having chosen an approach based on discretion here, there are
implications for the choice of how to intervene, noted below.
Given that the decision to intervene has been taken, that is, the prob-
lem is judged to have become “systemic,” the government has several
goals. First is to maintain or restore a functioning financial system. This
goal is difficult to debate, though the best means of doing so are not
always clear.12 A second goal is to keep the lid on the budgetary cost of
the crisis. Far from these costs being predetermined, research suggests
that an easy or accommodating approach to intervention policy—
before and after the crisis—can result in greatly magnified costs to the
budget (and hence, as observed in chapter 2, in overall economic costs).
The third goal, linked to the second, is for the government to ensure
that their action helps decrease the likelihood of a subsequent crisis.
Fiscal Costs of Policy Choices
Does policy choice matter much in determining the fiscal cost of bank-
ing crises? Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) provide direct evidence as
they examine the impact of different forms of intervention:
• Liquidity support of 12 months or longer in excess of total bank-
ing system capital.13
• The issuance of a blanket guarantee for depositors.
• Two measures of forbearance: (a) permitting insolvent banks to
remain open, or (b) suspending or easing prudential regulations to
redefine solvency.
143
G O V E R N M E N T  F A I L U R E  I N  F I N A N C E
• Repeated recapitalizations of banks.
• The formation of centralized asset management companies (AMCs,
more on which below).
• An across-the-board public debt relief program.
Using regression analysis, they examine how much of the variation in
the fiscal cost of 38 crises in industrial and developing economies (1980–97)
can be explained using these indicators plus macro variables (the real in-
terest rate and stock prices). They find that open-ended liquidity support,
regulatory forbearance, and blanket deposit guarantees are significant con-
tributors to fiscal cost, and tellingly the signs of all these variables are posi-
tive. Strict policy—less of each of the above variables—results in lower
fiscal costs. To check for reverse causality—did big crises cause the easy
policies—the authors try an instrumental variables, two-stage least squares
approach, and find their original results confirmed.14
This lesson seems well illustrated by the experience of several African
countries (box 3.3 above), whose insolvent and illiquid state-owned banks
were given a reprieve in the mid-1990s as donor resources were mobilized
to restructure them. The results of bank restructuring efforts there, drawn
out as they were over a number of years, were disappointing. In some
cases, banks were stabilized by extremely high interest rates offered on
their holdings of government bills—in effect, an ongoing recapitalization.
As seen in table 3.1, the impact of these policies is large. Even relaxing
one policy variable while maintaining strict values for the others still results
Table 3.1 Estimated individual impact of an accommodating approach to resolution policies
Cases where it was Cost of adopting each accommodating
Type of accommodating measure used (percent)  measure (percent of GDP)
Forbearance (a) 24 6.7
Multiple recapitalization 24 6.3
Liquidity support 58 6.3
Forbearance (b) 84 4.1
Debt relief 21 3.1
Blanket guarantee 55 2.9
Note: The table shows how much each accommodating measure can add to fiscal costs. For example, permitting insolvent banks to stay
open (forbearance a—see text) pushes up predicted fiscal costs by 6.7 percent of GDP, which is double the sample mean (each calculation
uses the sample mean value of the other variables).
Source: Honohan and Klingebiel (2000).
Easy policies can raise
fiscal costs
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in a substantial increment in costs—a plausible result, as any channel for
government funding to banks in trouble can result in similar opportunities
for rent seeking. Indeed, the much larger impact of, say, liquidity support
compared with guarantees is likely a statistical artifact of the sample. Taken
to extremes, as it often has been, open-ended liquidity support (through
the lender-of-last-resort) is an alternative to announcing a blanket guaran-
tee, and might only influence which government agency provides the funds.
Many times the central bank ends up as the de facto owner of a bank to
which it has provided what had been envisaged as merely temporary liquid-
ity support. Of course, it would be disingenuous to interpret these results
to mean that governments can switch from a previous policy of ease prior
to a crisis—such as the Chilean forbearance of 1977 (box 3.5)—to a strict
policy in the midst of a crisis and enjoy such large gains.
Still, the lesson that the consequences of easier intervention policies
are significant for the fiscal position is important. Some point to the fact
that industrial countries have engaged in forbearance, leaving insolvent
banks open, as a justification for developing countries to do the same.
To be sure, authorities have a choice to make, but industrial countries
both generally have stronger regulatory and supervisory capacity, mean-
ing that they are more likely to be able to control risk-taking—the clear
threat when insolvent institutions continue in operation. Moreover, rich
countries, with higher incomes and better-developed tax regimes, can
better afford what appears to be second-best (or worse) policy. Thus,
some argue that the cost of the U.S. savings and loan crisis would have
been about one-fifth its final cost had it not been for forbearance—but
still the total bill was under 3 percent of GDP.
Last, fiscal costs and cash costs are not the same. One common trap is
for those designing restructuring plans to become preoccupied with
minimizing the up-front cash costs of recapitalization at the expense of
higher longer-term fiscal costs and neglect of the incentives that are cre-
ated for the restructured banks (Honohan 2001c). Yet the former are
small relative to the latter.
Sending the Right Signals
The third goal noted above is the need to ensure that the manner in
which authorities deal with the crisis provides signals and incentives that
help decrease, rather than increase, the likelihood of a subsequent crisis.
This may be the most difficult goal to weight appropriately in the midst
An intervention should be
designed to reduce the
likelihood of a subsequent
crisis
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of a crisis, but perhaps is the most important. While governments should
be prepared to change their role in a systemic crisis, such as by becoming
a caretaker for banks, their approach and the actions they take need to
be designed in such a way as to convince participants that this is a “one-
time” event. One way is by making sure that the consequences of exces-
sive risk-taking are borne by those who undertook them. Such a focus
on incentives will also help restrain fiscal costs. As noted in box 3.5, the
consequences of giving short shrift to this goal can be dramatic.
To see the importance of attention to incentives, consider what hap-
pens to firms outside the financial sector operating close to or actually in
a state of insolvency. Those in control of these firms get the message
FOLLOWING DECADES OF NEGATIVE REAL INTEREST
rates and state ownership, Chilean authorities
privatized banks in 1975 and in 1976–77 essentially
allowed free entry into banking and finance. By late
1976 ten finance companies became insolvent, and
then Banco Osorno. Initially the government
announced that the central bank would “back” the
bank, and then created an explicit deposit guarantee
for banks, finance companies, and savings and loan
associations, up to about $3,000—a limit it then
breached for Banco Osorno depositors. Prior to this
failure, the banks seemed to have been acting as if
they did not expect government support, and the
bankers’ association even tried to organize a pool to
cover failing banks, much like U.S. bank
clearinghouses of the 19th century. Depositors also
ran to the largest banks.
Banco Osorno clearly was gambling, but this does
not presume that the owners thought that they would
be able to put the losses to the government. Instead,
they may well have been planning to pass the losses
on to depositors, which is consistent with the preva-
lence of “self-lending,” in their portfolio. One factor
in the government’s response was that the problems
appear to have been a surprise, as they only had 10
bank inspectors for 14 banks and 26 finance compa-
nies, and these inspectors, because of the recent de-
control, could not have had significant experience
with supervision.
Although the authorities allowed the finance com-
panies to fail, and began to improve supervision, the
failure of another bank (Banco Español) in early
1980, which was first sold to another business group
(with no public or private capital injection) and then
taken over by government in late 1981 with larger
losses, signaled that government support was avail-
able. Although macroeconomic factors undoubtedly
played a major role in the 1982 crisis, lax incentives
stemming from earlier interventions appears likely.
For example, by the end of 1981, real loans were six
times the level of 1976, or an annual average growth
rate of 43 percent. Banks were doubling their real
portfolio every 18 months, not the usual behavior
for bankers that are concerned about their own capi-
tal. As de la Cuadra and Valdes suggest, this appears
to have been Ponzi finance on a large scale, and the
lack of early rescue activity, when the problem did
not appear to be systemic, shares part of the blame
for the ensuing collapse, whose ultimate fiscal cost
was more than 40 percent of GDP.
Box 3.5 Intervening sets the stage for the next crisis
Source: De la Cuadra and Valdes (1992).
Reduce the conditions for
moral hazard—
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quickly that their poor performance is going to be costly to them. They
generally find it difficult or impossible to raise new funds in any form.
This precludes acting on profitable investment opportunities and may
force the firm to sell important assets. All their creditors recognize that
insolvency may also distort the incentives of management, making them
more susceptible to fraud and moral hazard, and at the least reduces the
incentives of owner and managers to exert effort.
Yet, in a private market economy, the economic functions of major
nonfinancial firms need not cease when the firms themselves become
insolvent. To the extent that they have a profitable core group of activi-
ties and new investment opportunities, the creditors’ interests may be
best served by continuing their operations. In addition, most firms have
made large investments in fixed capital goods that are often difficult to
resell. As long as the net present value of the firm’s operating profits and
tax losses carried forward exceeds its liquidation value, it makes sense to
continue operations—albeit with minimal new investment, the divesti-
ture of noncore activities, and the installation of new management. This
is what a successful restructuring of a firm will achieve. What is relevant
is that the imbalance between assets and liabilities is dealt with not by
obtaining injections of new equity, but by marking down liabilities and
equity to conform to the new, lower value of the assets and future cash
flows. Equity holders generally see most of their claims wiped out while
debt holders often have a portion of their claim converted to equity.
New funding is provided only  after this “marking to market” takes place.
At the same time, old management is often replaced, a substantial por-
tion of the firms’ assets are sold, and workers are laid off. In other words,
this is not a mere reworking of the firm’s balance sheet, but rather very
real changes are made in the way it does business, perhaps even in the
business it does. For the economy, the happy result is that resources
continue in their best use while all parties incur some costs for the firm’s
poor performance.15
In large part the restructuring of banks should follow the same general
principles. Admittedly, banks differ from other firms in two senses: first,
as noted in chapter 2, their particular fragility, and the possibility of con-
tagion; and second, their centrality in the payments and credit mecha-
nism. Banking in many economies may only count for a few percentage
points of value added in the GDP statistics, but unlike any other sector
of similar size or greater, has major macro implications when it is in dis-
tress. Although these differences justify a different approach in banking
and get resources back in
productive use
—by imposing real costs
on all involved parties—
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compared with other financial and nonfinancial areas, they do not sug-
gest that incentives matter any less. Indeed the evidence presented above
on the links between bank ownership and financial sector development
confirms that private incentives are every bit as important in this sector.
Unfortunately, as implemented in many countries, government-funded
bank recapitalization programs—injecting capital usually in the form of
bonds into banks—either mute or totally squelch the message that poor
performance is costly, leaving out or minimizing the real restructuring.
Recapitalization to support existing liabilities by itself leaves creditors
completely protected, but forces no downsizing of the bank, no layoff of
employees, no reallocation of peripheral assets to better uses; reduces the
pressure to pursue delinquent borrowers; and even can reduce the ac-
countability of regulators to the general public. Indeed, recapitalization
without exacting some claim from the bank—and really exercising it—
amounts to a transfer from taxpayers to shareholders, which is the group
that keeps the residual value of the entity.16 Yet, even in crises that owe
their origins mainly to macro events, some banks virtually always are
discovered to have been taking on substantial risk, so it is important that
this message be sent, adjustments made, and consequences felt.
Restructuring is when the message is sent that this is the opportunity
for making changes to ensure that banks are (back) on the track to pro-
viding needed financial services and allocating credit to its best uses.
Note that many of the above messages that need to be sent are harsh
ones, such as laying off staff or informing previously and possibly well-
heeled and well-connected shareholders and senior managers that they
are, in effect, wiped out. Clearly the losers from this process are much
more narrowly concentrated than the larger society, which will reap the
gains of greater efficiency and faster growth. Governments and the po-
litical process are not well suited to this task. As seen above, the govern-
ment has no comparative advantage in banking itself, and even the basis
for determining which banks get funds is not simple and straightfor-
ward—if it were clear, that is, if information problems were easy to solve,
it would have been easy to prevent the losses in the first place. For the
harsh messages that are sent as part of restructuring, not only is this not
a clear area in which the public sector excels, but also one that is ripe for
abuse. The selection of individual winners and losers is what markets, not
governments, do best .
Nevertheless, some government involvement is required if taxpayer funds
will be injected. Again, the debate can be framed in terms of the rules vs.
The market is better able
to deliver the bad news
Many recapitalization
programs avoid real
restructuring
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discretion approach, though here the outcome is somewhat different. It is
relatively easy to observe whether the government is providing support,
and indeed most governments are eager to claim credit for such. Hence,
leaving some discretion to officials as to when to intervene does not create
significant opportunities for abuse. The size and targeting of support to
individual banks, however, is more difficult to evaluate (does the choice
make sense?) and monitor (is support being used well?), and creates a case
for a greater reliance on a rule-based approach. Governments that inject
equity will want to make sure that it is used wisely, that is to make sure
that it goes to banks that are the least insolvent, regardless of the cause of
the crisis, because there is a strong and necessary presumption that the
most insolvent banks attained that status by dint of excessive risk-taking.
If this presumption is not made, and the riskiest banks are not treated
harshly, financial history teaches that banks will assuredly embark on an
even riskier path. As agents of their country’s taxpayers, authorities will
also want to ensure that their funds are not looted. Yet they must recog-
nize that they do not function well as bank owners and therefore can only
take temporary equity positions in banks. One way to achieve both goals
is for authorities to make some amount of funding available for recapital-
ization of banks, but only to those who do the following:
• Secure matching of private sector funds in some ratio.17
• Restrict dividends that can be paid or withdrawals by private part-
ners and individual borrowers until the government is fully “bought
out.” Even the amounts and structure of compensation contracts
for senior managers, such as by granting them deferred compensa-
tion in the form of stock options tied to the bank’s equity value
several years in the future, need to be controlled.
• Adhere to stringent transparency requirements.
As long as the amount of funding is such that some banks fail, this
approach removes government from decisions as to which banks survive.
The availability of (truly) private sector funding serves to identify the can-
didates, and the restrictions on different ways to take these funds out of the
bank, combined with greater transparency, makes it more likely that the
banks will not be looted and facilitates prompt exit by the government.
Consider the three banks shown in figure 3.6. All three are affected
by a crisis, but Bank A’s capital ratio—with sound accounting practices—
is not expected to fall below the minimum 8 percent ratio assumed to
hold in regulatory guidelines. Bank C, on the other hand, is assumed to
and to use the private
sector to pick winners and
losers
Government involvement
should aim to protect the
interests of the
taxpayers—
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continue to worsen, and it is important that it be closed, downsized, or
split up, with the good bank surviving alone or merged. Banks like bank
B appear to be salvageable, and this decision should depend on the time
it would take for profits to be sufficient to rebuild capital and then earn
returns for private owners. Private buyers are getting a claim on the fran-
chise value of the bank—its future profits—and it is important that it be
their expectations of profitability and their money that identifies the
banks worth saving.18 Government officials will need to be alert to other
attempts to loot the surviving banks, and the failure of the banks engag-
ing in the most excessive risk-taking will help convince market partici-
pants that the program is credible.
These are tough criteria, and only desperate banks will agree to such
terms. That is the point: government assistance should only be injected
into banks in dire straits, yet simultaneously to those with a real chance
of survival. By openly stating the terms on which it will assist banks and
their (new) shareholders, and ensuring that those terms provide good
incentives for the restructured bank going forward, the government is
making the best use of market forces while minimizing its direct owner-
ship involvement.
This strategy is fine on paper, but will it work in practice? By and large,
it already did, as many of these features characterized the U.S. Recon-
struction Finance Corporation’s (RFC’s) program of taking temporary
preferred equity positions in banks (box 3.6). Bank failure was clearly still
Figure 3.6 Stylized evolution of three banks through a crisis: sound,
salvageable, and doomed
Source: Adapted from Ingves and Lind (1996).
B
C
A
8
0
Capital adequacy ratio (percent)
Time
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
150
allowed: several thousand fewer banks opened their doors following the
bank holiday of 1933, and failures continued for banks that did not meet
the RFC’s criteria. Selling this program to the banks was difficult—in a
crisis, bankers can get into a game of “chicken” with authorities, as the
next program may be more generous than the current offer. However, the
requirement that when the U.S. deposit insurance system opened in 1934,
only healthy banks would be allowed in, finally helped persuade banks in
trouble to issue preferred stock to the RFC. Governments already offering
THE RECONSTRUCTION FINANCE CORPORATION
(RFC), which lasted from 1932 to 1957, loaned or
invested more than $40 billion, mostly with funds
borrowed from the U.S. Treasury or the public. As
in many crises, initially it was thought that the banks
were merely illiquid, but by 1933 officials realized
that many banks had solvency problems and needed
to be closed or needed additional capital, so a
preferred stock program was established. At its peak,
the RFC had capital positions in 5,685 banks,
representing 40 percent of all insured banks in the
United States. Officials’ discretion was limited
because “once the RFC received an application for
assistance from a financial institution or commercial
and industrial enterprise the agency only had the
power to evaluate whether asset values were
sufficient to secure assistance” (Mason 2000, p. 4).
The combination of “sound asset values” with the
restriction that the RFC could not hold more than
a 49 percent stake in a bank (or firm) was intended
to ensure that RFC funds did not go to deeply
insolvent banks.
To be eligible for this program, however, banks
had to agree to limit dividends and devote earnings
to retiring the stock of the bank—essentially, buying
out the government’s position. Also, by law the iden-
tity of all recipients of any RFC assistance was made
public, reducing the chance of political favoritism.
RFC staff had clear incentives. Hiring and promo-
tions were outside the civil service framework, and
much of the staff was located in decentralized field
offices around the country that functioned relatively
autonomously provided that they showed a profit.
Intervention from Washington, including the pos-
sible replacement of field directors, occurred if the
profitability guidelines were not met.
Individual deals had different features, not sur-
prising in light of the RFC’s decentralized struc-
ture. Some were contingent upon raising funds from
the public, others upon capital infusions from man-
agement, and some of both that also relied upon
the replacement of key officers and directors with
those approved by the RFC. The consistent atten-
tion to safeguarding taxpayers’ funds and the delib-
erate harnessing of the private sector stand out in
this program.
It may be difficult to evaluate the success of ef-
forts such as the RFC, but in this case, the interven-
tion appears to have contributed to a recovery of
confidence and output (until monetary tightening
reversed both in 1937). The government recovered
its initial capital and did not keep alive nonviable
banks. In recent years, it is difficult to point to many
similar records. Interestingly, the RFC took the same
basic approach in its involvement with corporate re-
structuring, and saw similar success.
Box 3.6 Lessons from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Source: Mason (2000 and correspondence with the author).
151
G O V E R N M E N T  F A I L U R E  I N  F I N A N C E
explicit depositor protection can encourage participation by dropping cov-
erage for weak banks that do not opt in to the program.
With the increase in the sophistication of financial engineering since
the 1930s, it is not surprising to find a huge variety of innovative finan-
cial instruments being employed around the world in recent restructur-
ing plans. They represent attempts—often ingenious, but not always
successful—to tailor the government’s commitments to the particular
incentive issues involved. Careful, market-sensitive design of these in-
struments is essential if they are to be successful in achieving the desired
effects at the least fiscal cost (cf. Honohan 2001c). Sometimes the terms
have been too tough to attract new private capital. Sometimes the finan-
cial engineering has brought liabilities into the bank’s balance sheet whose
eligibility as capital could be disputed.
Once in the program, the issue for government is how to extricate
itself as quickly as possible, and how it performs while being a tempo-
rary owner of banks and even of enterprises. Each of the banks that is
saved then becomes a key player in the restructuring process for indi-
vidual firms. Like the RFC, which took temporary equity positions un-
der the same stringent terms in nonfinancial firms, restructuring agen-
cies may also become involved at the firm level. But the essence of the
approach is that it is decentralized, with firms’ creditors, among which
banks usually are key, taking the lead.
Instead, a centralized approach with banks’ nonperforming loans be-
ing hived off into an AMC rapidly has become recommended practice
in recent years, in part because of the apparent success of this approach
in Spain in the early 1980s. Their success can be assessed in different
dimensions. Klingebiel (2000) proposes the following:
• Did the AMC achieve their narrow objectives for which they were
set up? (For those charged with rapid asset disposition, did they
dispose of assets within a 5-year period? For restructuring agen-
cies, did they sell off 50 percent or more of the assets under man-
agement within 5 years?)
• More broadly, did the banking system return to solvency, without
problems reappearing, and was credit growth resumed? That is,
did the banking system experience repeated financial distress, and
did real credit to the private sector resume?
Unfortunately, it appears from Klingebiel’s study that Spain was the
sole clear case of success, in satisfying all these criteria, of seven countries
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that included Finland, Ghana, Mexico, and the Philippines. The remain-
ing cases, Sweden (1992) and the United States (1989), met the narrow
criteria, but not the broader ones within a two-year window, although
they did so quite well subsequently with clear recoveries, and should be
classified as relative successes. Only Sweden’s agency was charged with
restructuring (box 3.7) and, like Spain and the United States, had the
clear advantage that real estate and consumer loans dominated their
portfolio, which can be bundled together and sold off in deep capital
markets. In contrast, emerging markets have seen a greater prevalence of
crises entailing significant effects on the corporate sector—with such
loans being more difficult to restructure—and they lack the deep capital
markets for asset sales.
Shallow capital markets
make restructuring harder
in emerging markets
SWEDEN, WHICH EXPERIENCED A BANKING CRISIS
in the early 1990s (and then a currency crisis with
the realignment in Europe), often is held up as a
model for developing countries to emulate in bank
restructuring. With the onset of the crisis in late
1992—although problems were visible in the
previous year—the government stepped in with a
blanket guarantee covering all forms of bank debt.
Securum, a “bad bank,” was established to take over
nonperforming loans, and later a Bank Support
Agency was created. It gave out at least one
guarantee—a promise to inject equity should a bank’s
net capital fall below 9 percent—which was not
utilized. Securum moved quickly to dispose of assets,
repackaging them and selling them relatively
quickly—on the stock exchange and through other
channels—and was completed by 1997. The net cost
of the operation was estimated to be 2.1 percent of
GDP, well below earlier fears.
Although these achievements were substantial rela-
tive to the potential size of the problem, Sweden en-
joyed a number of advantages that many developing
countries do not have. First, as noted in the text, many
of the assets were real estate, which in contrast to
corporations are not that demanding in reorganization
skills. Moreover, when developing countries find that
many of their large enterprises are in need of restruc-
turing, the political difficulty rises significantly. Sec-
ond, a relatively homogeneous population and well-
developed democratic institutions were an
incomparable advantage in dealing with the disposi-
tion of assets. Thus, for example, the political opposi-
tion was represented on the Bank Support Agency, and
there was a high degree of transparency for both agen-
cies. Third, the legal framework was highly favorable
to enforcement of bankruptcy. As Klingebiel notes, they
score higher than the United States in enforcing credi-
tors’ rights, meaning that officials had a credible threat
to speed up efforts. And funding and skills were not a
constraint in the restructuring process.
Developing countries can aspire to these advan-
tages, but they can also aspire to having a Saab in
every garage. Without these advantages, it is not clear
that the model as a whole is exportable. Some fea-
tures, such as the lack of government interference
with the private management of the banks, as in the
RFC case (box 3.6) may be the most relevant parts
of this lesson.
Box 3.7 The Swedish experience: a Saab in every garage?
Sources: Englund (1999), Ingves and Lind (1996), and Klingebiel (2000).
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Applying the same criteria to the Republic of Korea, Indonesia, and
Thailand does not add to the clear success list, because there has been a
marked tendency for the AMCs to hold on to assets. Because it has not yet
been five years since they were established, Klingebiel’s criteria could still
be met. Still, the record with centralized AMCs in emerging markets is
that they have a tendency to become long-term dumps, rather than active
warehouses, for nonperforming loans. Although this result can be partly
related to some characteristics of emerging markets—shallow capital mar-
kets and a dearth of restructuring skills—the record is also consistent with
the failure to use the private sector in a transparent manner to identify
those fit to survive. Interestingly, Mexico recently adopted a forced auc-
tioning of assets if mediator-led reorganization efforts fail, which appears
to be jump-starting a stalled process, and illustrates the promise of arm’s-
length rules and quick exit as a cornerstone for government’s approach.
Greater concentration of firm ownership and wealth in recent crisis
countries suggests a greater scope for abuses with the centralized AMC
approach, and yet simultaneously greater difficulty in using the private
sector. One remaining option is to use foreign entities, either to assist in
managing the process or to buy and restructure problem assets, with the
clear difficulty being that many societies are not prepared to have “na-
tional assets” pass from their hands. Otherwise, in line with the Becker-
Stigler criteria, it will be important to ensure a great degree of transpar-
ency for the process, and high-efficiency wages to those involved in it
(recalling the discussion of an appropriate balance of terror in chapter 2)
can help reduce the likelihood of abuses. A serious threat that wrongdo-
ing by public officials will at least result in their loss of a (sizable) pen-
sion may be the best tool to induce honest conduct. Successful resolu-
tion of banking crises will require a change of mindset and will win the
confidence of domestic residents and foreigners alike. The outright fail-
ing of some banks at the start of the process, and convincing all that
remaining banks are fit to survive, is the key to success, and using the
private sector to identify the latter is the best practice available.
Conclusions
INCREASED POLITICIZATION OF BANKING DECISIONS WHEN THEgovernment is involved means that the incentives for efficientand sound intermediation are impaired with state ownership, whether
it is longstanding or temporary. Governments that attempt to be both
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owner and regulator likely will achieve success at neither. Cross-country
and limited case study evidence shows that state ownership of banking
leads to less development, less access to credit outside the largest firms,
and a higher risk of crisis. Country authorities necessarily have to balance
the hazards of privatization with the losses from state banking. A gradual
program of credible privatization, preparing banks for sale and developing
the regulatory infrastructure for participation by more private banks, appears
to be a sensible path to navigate the dangers of action and inaction.
This evidence also suggests that authorities need to be planning for
their own exit whenever they take a temporary stake in banking as part
of systemic restructuring. As in earlier chapters, working with the mar-
ket has been argued to be the preferred course for government, espe-
cially in letting market forces pick winners and losers. Foreign banks can
play an important role in taking over from the state, all the more so if
there is genuine concern about a few insiders dominating both banks
and the bank regulatory apparatus.
1. The La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2000) data could be limited by the focus on the top 10
banks, but as they note in virtually all countries this cap-
tures a large percentage of the banking system, which they
have defined it to include development banks. However,
the Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001b) data, which are
based on a survey of regulators, provides estimates of the
percentage of assets in majority-owned state banks, and
their data are highly correlated with that of La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer for the 1990s.
2. In their growth regressions, these variables include:
years of schooling, initial level of financial and economic
development, inflation, the black market premium, an
index of government intervention, tax and subsidy rates,
and latitude.
3. Specifically, real GDP per capita, corruption, ex-
propriation risk, bureaucratic efficiency, and the law and
order tradition of the country. This study, as with most of
the data underlying figure 3.1, is based on the World Bank
Survey of Prudential Regulation and Supervision, and re-
fers to the percent of the entire commercial banking sec-
tor assets in majority-owned state banks, as of 1997–98.
4. Additionally, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), who
find some positive effects of greater bank concentration
in promoting the growth of industrial sectors in need of
external finance, report that this gain is negated by greater
state ownership.
5. Although the original Barth, Caprio, and Levine
(2001a) paper with about 60 countries found only an
insignificant link between state ownership and crises, their
forthcoming study, based on 105 countries, finds a sig-
nificant link.
6. State bank lending to SOEs reportedly declined
again in the late 1990s.
7. For countries with deep financial systems, the
conclusion is reversed, which may also be rationalized by
a political-economy argument, though less crisply. Prox-
imity to the next election also appears to deter socially
Notes
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costly policy reactions to crisis, reinforcing the message
that political constraints are important. The variables em-
ployed by Keefer to indicate the level of public informa-
tion available do not perform as strongly in the regres-
sions, but are not inconsistent with the theory.
8. Postprivatization losses also can rightly be blamed,
at least in part, on preexisting losses and weak initial con-
ditions. Although many transitional economies experi-
enced bank failures in the immediate years after transi-
tion started, often these problems occurred in state banks,
represented the manifestation of losses in the prereform
era, or were inevitable given the real sector turbulence,
and virtually always were associated with a weak regula-
tory framework.
9. Governments could even consider retaining own-
ership and contracting out the management of banks to
private parties, but perhaps fortunately have not done so,
as management contracts have been found to work only
in industries in which quality is easily verified and repu-
tation is paramount (World Bank 1995). Thus hotels are
an example satisfying both criteria for management con-
tracts: output quality can be monitored by anyone (it is
easy to see if the towels are clean) and quality matters
(hotels with dirty towels lose business). However, it is dif-
ficult for depositors, creditors, supervisors, and even man-
agement to evaluate the health of bank portfolios, that is
to tell if their portfolio is clean. And since the impor-
tance of reputation—once paramount in banking—in
most countries is diminished by the presence of implicit
or explicit deposit insurance, banking is not well suited
to management contracts. Perhaps in recognition of this
fact, there has been little experimentation with contract-
ing out in banking.
10. A partial list would include Claessens, Djankov,
and Klingebiel (1999), Dziobek (1998), Garcia (1999),
and Lindgren and others (2000), and sources cited therein.
11. It may appear to be inconsistent for the authori-
ties to maintain a constructive ambiguity about their
policy stance, while insisting on transparency from oth-
ers. There is clearly a tension between policy certainty
and the strategic advantage to be gained from discretion.
But, provided the government is seeking the common
good, there seems no reason to refrain from using strate-
gic tools denied to private agents.
12. The common view, one that authorities have dif-
ficulty resisting, is that they must be proactive in rescu-
ing depositors in a crisis, yet Baer and Klingebiel (1995)
showed that in 5 crises in which depositors were allowed
to take losses, there was a prompt recovery of output.
13. Many central banks limit liquidity support from
the discount window to a short period, from 7 days to
several months. Normally banks coming in for repeated
liquidity support are subject to increased supervisory at-
tention and indeed forced to seek other sources of funds,
including where it exists the deposit insurance facility.
14. The instruments they employ—a measure of gov-
ernment corruption and the law and order tradition—
rank high in terms of exogeneity. Also, they check a re-
gression of the residuals on these instruments, and find
no significance.
15. Actually, the same is true for banks: Bartholomew
and Gup (1999) show that in non-U.S. G-10 countries,
banks in most cases are rarely closed, and usually any liq-
uidation involves a transfer of part of the bank’s opera-
tions to other, presumably viable, banks.
16. State banks often are recapitalized—even though
it is not clear how capital on their balance sheet differs
from the contingent claims they hold on their govern-
ments—without sacking managers or other adverse con-
sequences.
17. When banks are sold, the identity of the buyer
matters—both Uganda and Ghana (box 3.1) had costly
‘failed’ privatizations to foreign manufacturing compa-
nies, which demonstrates the importance of finding ‘fit
and proper’ buyers. Consistent with the message of this
section, relatively clear definitions should be set out elabo-
rating these criteria.
18. Since profits will depend on entry into the bank-
ing sector, authorities likely will have to agree to some
limits on bank entry, otherwise prospective returns will
be insufficient to attract responsible investors.
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“Actually, every society that is based on an ancient structure and opens
its doors to money sooner or later loses its acquired equilibria and liber-
ates forces thenceforth inadequately controlled. The new form of inter-
change jumbles things up, favours a few rare individuals and rejects the
others. Every society has to turn over a new leaf under the impact.”
Fernand Braudel, Capitalism and Material Life, 1400–1800
I
N COMPARISON WITH THE SCALE OF GLOBAL FINANCE,
financial systems in individual developing countries are
exceedingly small. China aside, only Brazil has a financial system
as big as 1 percent of the world total. This chapter begins
by explaining how small financial systems fall short of
minimum efficient scale and that they have much to gain by
sourcing some financial services from abroad.
Along with the rapid—albeit uneven—expansion of international debt
and equity flows, including foreign direct investment (FDI), there has
also been a sharp recent increase in the provision of financial services in
many developing countries by foreign-owned financial firms. In these
three main dimensions, debt, equity, and services, financial globaliza-
tion enlarges the scope for obtaining growth and other benefits from
finance, but it also increases the risks. How far will this process go? In
what respects should it be limited? In other words, what part of finance
should remain domestic, and what should be provided from abroad?
This chapter continues by outlining the costs and benefits of capital
account liberalization and proposing, as a basis for the remainder of the
discussion, the premise that tight controls that result in a permanent
wide gap between actual and market-clearing exchange rates and real
wholesale interest rates are no longer a practical option.
Finance without Frontiers?
Small systems increasingly
interact with global finance
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Then the three main dimensions of financial internationalization are
considered in turn:
• Internationalization of the provision of financial services, includ-
ing entry of reputable foreign banks and other financial firms, can
be a powerful generator of operational efficiency and competition,
and should also prove ultimately to be a stabilizing force.
• Equity flows, including FDI, have tended to be larger than debt
flows in recent years. We argue that the gains from admitting for-
eigners in terms of risk diversification likely outweigh any imported
volatility in the price of listed equity.
• In regard to debt flows, the key variables are the interest rates and
exchange rates at which the flows are contracted. Liberalization
has resulted in domestic interest rates that are volatile and too high
in many developing countries, reflecting exchange rate and other
policy risks, and requiring careful risk management by financial
intermediaries.
This chapter concludes with some remarks on the accelerating im-
portance of technology and communications—a familiar feature of in-
ternational finance, which has always been at the cutting edge, and is
now reaching new heights with the advances of “e-finance.”
Against the backdrop of a vast global system, all but a handful of
developing economies have financial systems that appear tiny. Taking
the money supply (M2) as a rough but convenient overall measure, apart
from China, only Brazil has more than 1 percent of the world total.1 A
mere 15 other developing countries even reach a threshold of 0.2 per-
cent of world M2. Indeed, seven major countries account for fully three
quarters of world M2, and, again leaving China aside, low- and middle-
income countries account for only 9 percent (figure 4.1). The distribu-
tion of stock market capitalization is even more skewed. In effect, the
market power of any developing country in global finance is altogether
negligible. The financial systems of all developing countries are small
and should be managed with that in mind.
Many systems are extremely  small. Over 200 million people live in
some 60 member countries of the World Bank whose tiny banking sys-
tems’ assets fall short of $1 billion—the size of a single small bank in any
of the advanced economies. Many of these countries also have small
populations, but others are relatively large countries—nine of them with
a population in excess of 10 million—whose financial systems are very
poorly developed.
Financial systems in
developing economy
are all small—
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Small financial systems underperform. They suffer from a concentra-
tion of risks. The smaller the financial system, the more vulnerable it is to
external shocks and the less able its financial system is to insulate or hedge
those shocks—unless the financial system is itself securely integrated in
the world financial system through ownership and portfolio links. Small
financial systems provide fewer services at higher unit costs, party because
they cannot exploit economies of scale, and partly because of lack of com-
petition. Regulation and supervision of small systems is disproportion-
ately costly (Bossone, Honohan, and Long 2001).
For these countries, the policy imperatives of smallness are acute. They
need to think in terms of outsourcing both financial services themselves
(actively seeking to attract foreign-owned banks, insurance companies,
credit registry firms, and so on) and some aspects of financial regulation.
They need to seek cooperative arrangements with neighboring coun-
tries in such dimensions as regional stock exchanges and international,
regional cooperation in regulation of the securities, insurance, and bank-
ing industries. Examples of this sort of cooperation already exist, nota-
bly in West, Central, and Southern Africa, in the Eastern Caribbean,
and in the Persian Gulf area (as well as in Europe). More will come.
Some services are more easily outsourced than others. For example,
in considering the design of the arrangements for private provision of
pensions, even in a small country the government may want to mandate
contributions, create a collection system, and set minimum standards
for pension contracts. As argued by Glaessner and Valdés-Prieto (1998),
Figure 4.1 Share of developing economies in aggregate world money stock
Source: International Financial Statistics.
China (including Hong Kong)
132 other low- and
middle-income
economies
24 other high-income
economies
G7 countries
Share of world M2
—and smaller financial
systems are more
vulnerable to both
domestic and external
shocks
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though, it could license international companies to offer those contracts
to local contributors. In this case, the small country would be de facto
importing supervision services, and avoiding much of the infrastructure
needed for domestic securities markets.
There was a time when establishing a country’s position in the world
seemed to require a steel-making plant and a national airline. Economic
realities mean that policymakers in those fields are now more concerned
with the quality and cost of the steel that is available and the safety and
reliability of air services, and with ensuring that airport infrastructure is
adequately planned. In the same way, financial sector policymakers in small
countries will increasingly think in terms of ensuring the quality and prices
of needed financial services through regulatory and incentive design, re-
gardless of whether those services are provided domestically or from abroad.
Capital Account Liberalization: Costs and
Benefits
THE GUSTING WINDS OF FOREIGN COMPETITION AND OFinternational capital flows have now been blowing through thefinancial systems of most developing countries for a decade or
more. Yet it is not so long since most domestic financial intermediaries
and markets operated behind substantial and effective regulatory barriers
to international borrowing or lending, or more generally to international
trade in financial instruments, and to cross-border ownership of
financial firms.
It sometimes seems that a boom-and-bust roller coaster has been
imported when the capital account has been liberalized. Undoubtedly,
with the wrong incentives, this has been a threat, but there have also
been tangible gains from external liberalization, and above all there is
an inevitability about further opening-up to foreign capital markets
and financial institutions.
After opening up to the rest of the world, individual countries are
sometimes net importers of funds, sometimes net exporters. Some-
times an inflow or outflow of equity investments is balanced by an
offsetting cross-border flow of debt finance. The maturity of inward
and outward flows can also be different. Apart from the international
flows that are involved, cross-border provision of financial services
becomes important, and some of the financial firms operating locally
may have foreign ownership.
The move to capital flow
liberalization has been
fairly recent—
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Advocates of free capital movement point to several advantages, go-
ing beyond the static gains attributable to reallocation of loanable funds
from capital-rich to capital-poor countries.2 Because local equities can
now be combined in a much wider portfolio, they become effectively
less risky. That should increase their price, lowering the cost of capital
for local companies. This in turn can make viable investment opportu-
nities previously seen as too risky to finance, and in aggregate these can
add substantially to growth. There is some evidence of an investment
boom being associated with liberalization of equity markets. What is
more important is that the quality or productivity of investment should
also improve if the arrival of reputable foreign providers of financial ser-
vices is associated, as it appears to be, with the kinds of improvements in
the functioning of the financial system that come from financial devel-
opment as discussed in chapter 1. (We review empirical evidence on
some of these channels below.) Other dynamic advantages include the
transfer of technology that can be embodied in or associated with capital
inflows, and a possible disciplining effect on macroeconomic policy.
As international capital flows expanded, especially after 1973, con-
cerns about their impact broadened from fear of speculative attack on an
exchange rate peg, to a fear of macroeconomic destabilization triggered
by overenthusiastic and reversible inflows. Numerous instances have been
observed where capital flows, which had had the macroeconomic effect
of bidding up local labor costs, have suddenly stopped (Calvo and
Reinhart 2000), throwing the recipient economy into a recession. Nor
are the victims of these sudden stops always countries where macroeco-
nomic policy has been weak or the economy has been overheating.3
Despite a huge research literature, there is nothing near a professional
consensus on whether the net impact of full capital account liberaliza-
tion on growth, poverty, or volatility should be regarded as favorable or
not. Growth regressions, which include various measures of international
financial openness in growth regressions, tend to suggest either that there
is no statistically significant relationship (Kraay 1998; Rodrik 1998c),
or that any such relationship is limited to higher-income countries
(Edwards 2000d).
What is clear is that setting policy to cope with the stresses, as well as
to take advantage of the benefits, of internationalization on the domes-
tic financial system presents one of the greatest policy challenges to-
day.4 The impact and importance of international capital movements
clearly extends beyond their impact on domestic financial intermediar-
ies and markets. They are in the front line, however, and cannot remain
—and there is no
consensus on the net
benefits
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unaffected because, regardless of what measures may be put in place to
restrain capital movements, the actual openness to such movements is
unlikely to diminish, given the rapid and continuing improvements in
information technology and communications, allowing more and more
of finance to be conducted across frontiers at essentially zero cost. While
measures of control that have intermittent effect—that is, although con-
stantly in place, they only bite in a crisis—could remain viable, the
steady impact of other measures will be increasingly limited.
This, then, is a premise of the remainder of the chapter: that govern-
ments can no longer hope to maintain a permanent wide gap between
actual and market-clearing exchange rates and real wholesale interest
rates, without a panoply of administrative controls on international trade,
as well as payments to an extent that is demonstrably damaging to growth
and living standards. That premise, however, does not in itself rule out
milder forms of control, including taxes and restrictions on international
capital movements, on the purchase by foreigners of local equities and
the admission of foreign-owned financial service companies, such as
banks. These indeed are the three main areas where the actual empirical
experience of, and impact on, small domestic financial systems needs to
be understood, and we take them up in turn.
Financial Services: Allowing Foreign Provision
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY IN ANY COUNTRY STANDSto incur losses from the elimination of the protection thathas allowed providers to operate at a high-cost, high-profit level
over the years. Ease of communications and the removal of restrictions
on borrowing and depositing abroad forces local banks to cut their costs,
at least for large customers, and also forces them to improve the quality
of their services, if they are to limit the loss of business. As we will see,
most of the trading in local shares that is generated by depositary receipts
(DRs—also see box 4.1) occurs offshore, and new initial public offerings
from firms in developing countries are often now being made in mature
markets, bypassing the local exchanges altogether.
Undoubtedly, the accelerating presence of the Internet will begin to
make direct international financial transactions available even to small firms
and individuals, although the speed of these developments and the extent
to which they will displace the need for local presence of financial service
companies remain unclear (Claessens, Glaessner, and Klingebiel 2000).
Emerging markets can
benefit from importing
financial services
163
F I N A N C E  W I T H O U T  F R O N T I E R S ?
For the present, most financial service companies, whether they spe-
cialize in banking, insurance, fund management, or stock exchange ser-
vices, still retain an important franchise based on local presence. Mostly
these are locally owned firms, but increasingly foreign firms have also
sought to enter. Privatization of banks, especially in transition economies,
Depositary receipts
DEPOSITARY RECEIPTS (DRs) HAVE LONG BEEN USED
to help U.S. investors to avoid transactions costs and
some of the risks of holding or trading securities in an
unfamiliar market, whether mature or emerging.1 They
can also be used to circumvent regulatory barriers
facing U.S. investors, including institutional investors,
to holding shares in non-U.S. firms. The first DR was
established in the United States in 1927 for the British
retail firm Selfridges. Now DRs are traded in other
mature markets also. There are currently DR programs
for about 2,000 firms, almost half of them from
emerging markets. The wide range of companies whose
shares are now indirectly traded in the United States
now means (as shown by Errunza, Hogan, and Hung
1999) that U.S. investors can achieve essentially full
diversification without moving outside the securities
traded within the United States.
Issued typically by one of four large U.S. banks,
a depositary receipt certifies that the depositary bank
is holding shares in the non-U.S. firm as trustee for
the holder of the certificate. Normally it is at the
request of the non-U.S. firm that the depositary bank
launches a DR program, with the objective of en-
abling the firm to reach a larger pool of worldwide
investors. DRs can be offered for sale in the United
States only in accordance with regulations established
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
which ensures, inter alia, an adequate degree of dis-
closure of the foreign firm’s accounts. The more dis-
closure, the more unrestricted the trading of the DR
can be in U.S. markets. The high standards of
disclosure required for a DR program also benefit
shareholders in the local market, and can indirectly
generate pressure for increased disclosure, even for
firms that do not have a DR program.
Country funds
The role of mutual funds, established in the U.S. (and
European) markets, and specializing in the equities
of specific emerging markets, or in regional groups of
emerging markets, was important in the process of
extending foreign ownership of emerging market eq-
uities, especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
World funds hold diversified portfolios, including
emerging market securities, and are increasingly im-
portant. There has also been a rapid growth in coun-
try funds marketed in the United States and special-
izing in specific industrial countries. Not only do these
funds offer the usual risk-pooling and transactions
cost benefits of collective savings media, but in some
cases access to the markets was restricted to approved
funds, which then represented the only way for for-
eign investors and local firms to gain access to each
other. Nowadays, part of the emerging market secu-
rity holdings of institutional investors in rich coun-
tries is directly held, but part is still in the form of
country fund shares.
The first funds were closed-end, that is, their shares
could not be redeemed—a suitable restriction when
the funds were invested in illiquid markets. With in-
creasing liquidity in the emerging markets, open-end
funds have predominated. The price of the shares in
closed-end country funds can deviate widely from the
Box 4.1 Depositary receipts and country funds
(box continues on following page)
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and fire sales of failed banks have provided great opportunities for banks
from advanced countries to acquire a pre-existing branch network and
thus to enter retail banking. Banks in several of the smaller Western
European countries have been very active in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, and the expansion of Spanish banks into Latin America has been
dramatic—in some countries giving rise to policy concerns about in-
creased concentration of ownership in the banking industry. Indeed,
the share of banking assets controlled by foreign banks has soared in
several countries in recent years (cf. IMF 2000; figure 4.2).
Some countries, however, have remained slow to admit foreign-owned
financial firms to the local market, fearing that they will destabilize the
local financial system and put local financial firms out of business, with
the ultimate result that particular sectors and particular national needs
will be poorly served.5 This section considers whether these fears are
justified, and concludes that they are not.
There are certainly some potential drawbacks to excessive reliance on
just a few foreign financial institutions, especially if they come from just
one country. It can introduce a new source of contagion, as when do-
mestic conditions induced credit contraction by Japanese banks in other
East Asian countries (and in California), with significant consequences
for the host country. Furthermore, it is conceivable that a government
could find itself in a weak position to counter abuse of power by a cartel
of dominant foreign-owned entities. And, while the prosperity of a bank
tends to be correlated with that of the countries in which it operates, it is
Despite worries that
foreign firms could
destabilize domestic
finance—
Box 4.1 (continued)
1. Hence the usual designation American depositary receipts (ADRs). There is no difference between an ADR and a global depositary
receipt (GDR), the latter term sometimes being preferred for marketing reasons. A Euro-denominated DR differs mainly in that divi-
dends are paid to the holder in Euros, whereas dividends on ADRs and GDRs are paid in U.S. dollars at the current rate of exchange.
2. For further discussion, see Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler (2001) and IMF (2000).
market value of the underlying shares. Such deviations
are also found in mutual funds that invest in domestic
securities and in country funds specializing in advanced
markets. However, the deviations tend to be wider for
emerging market country funds and to be highly vari-
able. Even before the turbulence of 1997–98, the vari-
ance of country fund returns was found to be about
three times as large as for the underlying assets
(Hardouvelis and others 1994). Where the country
fund is less restricted in its access to the emerging
market than other foreign investors, it has tended to
be at a premium to net asset value.2
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plausible that foreign-owned banks would have a lower long-term com-
mitment to the host countries.
Nevertheless, despite the growing presence of foreign-owned finan-
cial intermediaries, it is difficult to find any hard evidence for the propo-
sition that admitting foreign firms has adverse consequences for the
economy as a whole. Indeed, the indications are that, by improving overall
operating efficiency, and by leveraging improvements in both official
and private elements of the financial infrastructure, foreign entry helps
create the conditions for improved financial intermediation and long-
term growth (Levine 2000).
It is banking that has generated the greatest concern among those
who oppose foreign entry. Now much evidence exists on how foreign
banks behave and how they contribute to financial sector development
and national economic growth.
In high-income and upper-middle-income countries, although they
represent on average more than one in five of the banks, foreign-owned
Figure 4.2 Increase in the market share of majority foreign-owned
banks, selected countries, 1994 and 1999
Source: Bankscope; IMF (2000).
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—there is little evidence to
support such fears
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institutions still usually account for much less than 10 percent of local
banking assets. They generally are niche players, often catering to for-
eign companies and concentrating on international trade business. In
these environments, they tend to operate with lower unit costs and lower
unit profitability than the domestic banks. In several of the more pros-
perous countries of Latin America and Central Europe, though (as well
as in some advanced economies, such as in New Zealand), foreign-owned
banks begin to play a larger role (cf. figure 4.2).6
Even before the recent expansion, foreign banks tended to have a
larger share of the market in poorer countries. In 16 of these, the for-
eign banks account for more than a third of the system. Here the foreign-
owned banks are more profitable on average than local banks, despite
incurring higher operating expenses, which likely reflects their invest-
ment in higher-quality services. They also have higher interest mar-
gins and higher tax payments. The smaller the country, the more likely
it is to rely on foreign-owned banks, but some larger countries, such as
India, Indonesia, and Pakistan, also have a sizable share of foreign-
owned banks.
Anecdotes to the contrary notwithstanding, there is no evidence that
the local presence of foreign banks has destabilized the flow of credit.
Instead, the entry of these banks has been associated with significant
changes in the competitive environment and in the quality of regulation
and disclosure.
Numerous case studies of bank entry into countries as different as
Argentina, Australia, and Hungary document the dynamic impact of
foreign entry on the efficiency and competitiveness of the local banking
systems (see Levine 1996 and Claessens and Jansen 2000 for reviews).
The very threat of entry has often been enough to galvanize the domes-
tic banks into overhauling their cost structure and the range and quality
of their services, with the result that foreign entry has often proved not
to be as profitable for the entrants as they may have anticipated.
Statistical analysis of data on the accounts of individual banks con-
firms the impression that entry of foreign banks can make national bank-
ing markets more competitive. Thus, the higher the share of foreign-
owned banks, the lower is the profitability and the higher are the loan-loss
provisions (albeit compensated by a higher net interest margin) of do-
mestically owned banks (figure 4.3).7 The administrative efficiency of
the incumbents may also improve. Although the raw change in over-
head expenses is not statistically significant, this likely results from the
Foreign banks will become
more than niche players
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apparent shift in the portfolio to riskier loans, which also entail higher
administrative expenses.
Though not a magic bullet in this regard, this does suggest that open-
ing up banking to foreign entry can help to extend the price and effi-
ciency benefits of financial globalization to the smaller customer who
still cannot easily access foreign-based financial services.
The fear that a local presence of foreign-owned banks might destabi-
lize capital flows by exporting their resources at times of host country
pressure does not appear to have been substantiated at the time of recent
major crises. On the contrary, foreign-owned banks in Argentina drew
on their external credit lines to meet at least part of the unprecedented
deposit outflow in the Tequila crisis. To some extent, depositors have
run to local branches of reputable foreign-owned banks in a crisis when
they could have shifted their funds abroad (Claessens and Glaessner
1998). More generally foreign banks in Argentina and Mexico have
proved, if anything, a stabilizing force in terms of overall credit flows
(Cull and others 2000, Goldberg, Dages, and Kinney 2000).
Figure 4.3 Estimated impact of foreign bank entry on domestic bank
performance
Note: The chart shows the impact of a 50 percent increase in the market share of foreign banks on
the profitability of local banks.  The vertical line shows the 95 percent confidence interval and the
horizontal bar shows the point estimate;  e.g., the net interest margin increases by 105 basis points
+/– 110 basis points.
Source: Based on pooled national time-series cross-section regressions in Claessens, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Huizinga (2000).
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The pressure on domestic banks from foreign competition could present
prudential risks, if it erodes franchise value of high-cost operators to the
point where they begin to gamble for resurrection, though in practice
intensified domestic competition in a liberalized environment seems to
have been a bigger source of problems in this regard, and the presence of
foreign banks appears to reduce the risk of crisis (cf. Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine,
and Min 1998). Also, there is the risk that some less reputable foreign
bank entrants might prove to be unsound—the case of BCCI, which es-
tablished itself widely in developing countries, as well as in the industrial
world, must remain a cautionary tale. Evidently these considerations should
be yet another reason for strengthening prudential regulation. Actually,
the arrival of reputable foreign banks is usually associated with an upgrad-
ing of transparency, especially if the banks bring improved accounting
practices with them. And if local banks want to establish a reciprocal pres-
ence in advanced centers in order to be able to match the range of interna-
tional services offered by the foreign-owned banks to local clients, they
will need to obtain a license there. To satisfy the host regulator that local
regulation is adequate, such banks will, instead of preferring lax regula-
tion, begin to pressure local regulators to upgrade, as in Mexico in the
context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
As to the concern that foreign banks neglect small customers, it is
evident that a distinction must be made between the conduct of foreign-
owned banks relative to domestic banks and the relative performance of
systems in which foreign-owned banks have a large share. It is true that
foreign-owned banks tend to specialize in other niches, leaving the small
business segment to the local branches. There appears to be no statistical
evidence, however, that systems with more foreign-owned banks neglect
small customers. Indirectly some indication may be obtained from the
experience of banking consolidation in the United States. When small
banks, which have always tended to specialize in small firm finance,
have been absorbed into a larger entity—while there has been some ini-
tial reduction of credit to that segment—the effect has been a transitory
one; soon small business is as well served as it had been. The Argentine
experience may point in the same direction. Banks acquired by foreign
parents did not at first emphasize consumer or mortgage and property
lending, and were disproportionately represented in the capital city,
Buenos Aires. However, they soon entered the mortgage business ag-
gressively, driving down profit margins on this business in the local banks
(Clarke and others 2000).
There is no evidence that
systems relying on foreign
banks disadvantage
smaller customers
Increased competition
reduces domestic profit
margins
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Of the three dimensions of financial globalization reviewed here, en-
try by foreign-owned institutions thus appears to be the least problematic
from a national point of view. Service quality and prices improve, and the
risks are modest and containable. Producer interests in the financial sec-
tor may be damaged, in that market power of existing financial firms is
reduced, but in the long run local firms that can match the efficiency of
the entrants stand to prosper in a more dynamic environment.
Many countries do not have the luxury of choosing whether or not to
admit the top tier of international banks. Indeed, there may be few or
even no suitable applicants (see box 3.3 on the African experience). While
entry by relatively inexperienced banks headquartered in neighboring
countries can help achieve economies of scale, the benefits in terms of
leveraging operational and infrastructural efficiency may be more lim-
ited. Such entrants certainly need to be closely scrutinized to make sure
that their governance is adequate. If the business environment is poor,
or if the market is small, set-up costs may be too high to justify entry
and the authorities may have difficulty in securing suitable owners even
when the largest bank in the country is for sale.
Overall, though, an open-door policy to the admission of qualified
and reputable foreign financial firms seems overwhelmingly to be the
best policy, and one that could have a strongly favorable impact on growth.
Opening the Equity Market
T HE MOST DRAMATIC STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT INinternational finance for developing countries over the past de-cade or so has been the growth in cross-border equity invest-
ment, whether in the form of FDI (where the investor takes a controlling
stake) or in the form of portfolio investment in listed or unlisted equities.
By 1997 the stock of inward FDI represented on average 20 percent
of GDP in developing countries, with a further 1.3 percent of inward
equity portfolio investment (figure 4.4).8 Although FDI was thus the
dominant form of cross-border equity investment, the smaller quantity
of portfolio investment is, perhaps, of greater direct relevance in consid-
ering financial sector policy.
For a country that has an active equity market, opening that market to
foreign investors is a decisive step that can be expected to influence the
level and dynamics of asset pricing. More than 30 sizable stock exchanges
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
170
in emerging market economies undertook significant liberalization mostly
concentrated in a 10-year period from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.
So it is natural to ask: Did the expected effects occur in practice? Were
stock prices higher on average than they would otherwise have been? Was
there an increase or a fall in the volatility of stock prices? In practice, these
questions are tougher to answer than might appear at first sight. Overall,
though (as elaborated below), it appears from research findings that prices
have increased, thereby lowering the cost of capital, without an undue
increase in volatility. Opening up has also accelerated improvements in
disclosure and efficiency of the local stock markets, even though these
have lost some of their share of the increased business in listing and trad-
ing of local equities.
The dramatic stock market collapses in East Asia during 1997 and
1998—with equity indexes during 1998 in Indonesia, Malaysia, and
Thailand averaging only between 20 and 30 percent of their end-1996
U.S. dollar values (and about 40 percent for Korea and the Philippines)—
took much of the shine off what had seemed an almost trouble-free
liberalization. However, by mid-2000, equity prices in Asia on average
had recovered almost to their end-1996 level. Furthermore, much of the
fall was a direct translation of the currency collapses in the region, and as
such not necessarily attributable to the opening-up of equity markets to
foreign investors. Nevertheless, the event clearly raises questions about
the consequences, benefits, and costs, of equity market liberalization.
Figure 4.4 Stock of foreign holdings of (gross) debt and equity, 1997
Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (1999).
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Nowhere has opening the equity market been a clear-cut leap from
complete prohibition of foreign ownership of listed securities to a fully
free market with all listed shares accessible to foreigners. Important in-
termediate steps have included the following:
• Phased increases in the ceiling on the proportion of the equity of
each listed firm that foreigners can purchase.
• The establishment (in a mature market) of dedicated mutual “coun-
try” funds, with foreign shareholders, but which can invest in the
local market.
• The launch of a depositary receipt (DR) program in the United
States or other mature markets (box 4.1).
Beyond the headlines about the transmission of stock price volatility
among open markets, there is a debate about the impact of equity mar-
ket liberalization in part due to the difficulty in deciding when the liber-
alization occurred. Getting this right is crucial: if one assumes a liberal-
ization date that is too late, some price movements will be misattributed
to the period of closure, thereby dampening the estimate of any change.
If one brings the assumed date of liberalization too early, however, the
true effects of the change will also be understated.
Three general approaches have been adopted by researchers to dating
stock market liberalization:
• The regulatory announcement approach, where the date of open-
ing is related to the operative date of some relevant measure adopted
by the host country, such as a significant expansion in the propor-
tion of shares that can be held be foreigners.
• The investor action approach, where the date of announcement
in the U.S. market of a country fund, or a DR program, is the
key input.
• The statistical approach looks at the evolution over time of data on
stock prices and other market-sensitive variables and determines
the date of change by reference to an observed break in the statis-
tical properties of the time series.
The first two approaches give widely different dates. Indeed, a com-
parison of the earliest and latest dates arrived at for each of 10 different
countries in just 4 recent studies shows an average gap of 44 months
(figure 4.5). Even if there were agreement on the date on which entry
was effectively opened, it is likely that, as soon as the liberalization could
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be foreseen, the market would anticipate the actual opening by bidding
prices in advance to their expected new values. Here, then, is another
complication in determining the relevant dates for analysis. The third
(statistical) approach does prejudge the issue of whether there is a change
in the dynamic properties of stock prices, but it does not predetermine
the direction of this change as to average level of volatility.
With all the ambiguity concerning precise timing, it comes as no
surprise to find that the measured impact of liberalization on equity
prices, market capitalization, and trading volume is rather small. It is,
however, statistically significant, even after controlling for other simul-
taneous but unrelated events that may also have affected the trend and
volatility of stock prices, such as other policy reforms not directly related
to the equity market, including tariff reductions and removal of other
restrictions on foreign trade.
In their study of 20 liberalizing countries, for example, Bekaert, Harvey,
and Lumsdaine (2000) identified 13 countries where the statistical break
in series preceded a sustained reduction in dividend yield from about 5
percent to 3 percent per annum on average. Market capitalization jumped
Figure 4.5 Equity market liberalization dates
Note: The figure shows the estimated date of equity market liberalization for 12 countries based
on five alternative approaches: (i) examination of news agency reports; (ii) official announcements;
(iii) introduction of first ADR; (iv) introduction of the first country fund; and (v) shift in the
statistical properties of asset prices and dividend yields.
Source: Bekaert et al. (2000); Henry (2000a); Levine and Zervos (1998b).
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in these countries too: more than doubling on average in the first few
years of liberalization, as more firms listed and others raised more capi-
tal. Although the turnover ratio of shares traded to capitalization did not
show any clear-cut pattern, there was a sharp increase in liquidity as
measured by the ratio of average value traded to GDP (as was first shown
by Levine and Zervos 1998a). This latter liquidity variable is of key im-
portance in that (as discussed earlier) it is the stock market indicator
most reliably linked with economic growth.
Another study, focusing on the earliest regulatory announcement or
investor action, reported cumulative excess returns of almost 40 percent
around the time of liberalization, only a third of which could be associ-
ated with extraneous factors. This seems like a worthwhile, though not
overwhelming, adjustment of local equity prices to their new prices re-
flecting the risk-pooling potential of the wider world market (Henry
2000a). In other words, the cost of capital is lower on average as a result
of the equity market liberalization, but not dramatically so.
There is no clear theoretical presumption as to whether local stock
prices will be more or less volatile after integration into the world mar-
ket. Integration should insulate the prices from shocks that affect the
nonmarket wealth or savings behavior of local investors, but could
expose them more to fluctuations in world asset prices and to shifts in
external investor preferences. The studies mentioned above do suggest
a small average increase in the average comovement (beta ) of liberaliz-
ing markets with the world market, but there is no evident pattern on
asset price or rate of return volatility. Some countries saw an increase,
others a decrease.9
An alternative approach sees asset price movements as characterized,
not only by random shocks, but also by more gradual, cyclical fluctua-
tions. When Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) isolated such cycles from
the stock price history of some 28 countries, they found that the ampli-
tude of the cycles did increase in the immediate aftermath of liberaliza-
tion, but that after about three years of functioning under the liberalized
regime, the average amplitude of the cycle shrinks again. This suggests
that liberalization heralds a transitional window of heightened vulner-
ability to a boom-and-bust cycle, but that as the market matures, the
vulnerability diminishes (see figure 4.6).
Extracting the policy-relevant empirical signals from the very substan-
tial noise that surrounds equity price movements is thus not an easy task.
Overall, however, the fall in dividend yields, reflecting the increase in
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average equity prices, followed by new issues further increasing market
capitalization, suggests that the opening-up of the equity market to for-
eign ownership tends per se to be relatively benign.
Liberalization of the capital account means not only access by for-
eigners to the domestic capital markets, but also access by domestic firms
Figure 4.6 Impact of liberalization on the amplitude of equity price cycles
Note: The figures are based on sorting stock market price peaks that occurred within 3 years after
market liberalization from the remainder. The average price trend in the 24 months before and 12
months after a peak are plotted. For emerging markets there is a steep rise to the post liberalization
peak and a sharp subsequent decline (though a bounceback after six months of decline is also
evident).
Source: Based on Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001).
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and households to the world market. Local investors also gain from the
price increases but, in order to benefit fully from the risk diversification
possibilities offered by the world financial market, it may be necessary
for them to include foreign assets in their portfolio. This is a consider-
ation that needs to be taken into account, for example, in designing the
rules governing portfolio investment of pension funds and other collec-
tive investment vehicles. Liberalization of institutional outflows may seem
more problematic, but allowing international portfolio diversification
of institutional investments can, for example, help protect retirees from
the risk of falling into poverty. The state-controlled national investment
funds of Norway and Singapore are either wholly (Norway) or to a
substantial extent (Singapore) held in foreign assets. Still, mutual funds,
pension funds, and other institutional investors in many developing coun-
tries still face substantial regulatory barriers to investing abroad.
In addition to the East Asia case already mentioned, liberalized eq-
uity markets have also been hit by the other major international finan-
cial crises of the 1990s (Tequila in 1994–95; Russia-Brazil-LTCM in
1998), though again the origin of each of these crises was not the equity
market. The behavior of particular groups of foreign investors in emerg-
ing equity markets during these crises has been studied in detail by sev-
eral researchers. Their findings tend to confirm the plausible belief that
swings in purchases and sales of emerging market equities have been
important influences on price fluctuations, but also that the participa-
tion of foreign investors can help insulate markets from domestic shocks,
while increasing their reaction to shocks elsewhere.
Tracking the net flows of a class of foreign investors and the corre-
sponding price movements on a daily basis reveals a pattern of
intertemporal interactions that deviates somewhat from the simple text-
book model of prices adjusting instantaneously to new information.10
Instead, the empirical evidence indicates that a price increase tends to
generate a momentum in inflows over subsequent days, which in turn
drives prices higher with the price movement also being drawn out over
a period. It is as if the immediate impact of a piece of price-relevant news
on the price is only a partial one. The foreign investors adjust their port-
folios gradually, and this pushes prices up further, both because of the
weight of money, and because of an expectation, generally realized, that
the momentum of flows has further to go. This process can overshoot,
and indeed it appears that at the time of crisis the fall in price does not
reflect an outflow of funds by foreign investors as much as a failure of
the expected inflow to continue.
Foreign investors may
dampen domestic
volatility—
Diversification will reduce
vulnerability
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The behavior of open-ended and closed-end mutual funds specializing
in emerging markets throws further light on the behavior of foreign inves-
tors. More than 2,000 such funds are now in existence, and their holdings
of equities in the top two dozen emerging markets reached about 5 per-
cent of total market capitalization by the mid-1990s. For the open-ended
funds, the relevant data is on their flows. They show that the ultimate
investors, rather than the portfolio managers, are responsible for most of
the sensitivity to price movements of their flows into or out of particular
emerging markets. This applies both to own-price movements and to flows
triggered by price movements in other markets, that is, what might be
termed contagious flows. The evidence is that large withdrawals from
mutual funds are mainly from countries where observable economic fun-
damentals are weak, inasmuch as indicators that prove in practice to be
good predictors of future financial collapse have moved into the danger
zone. Importantly, though, it is also found that the most liquid equity
markets (such as Brazil in Latin America, and Hong Kong (China),
Singapore, and Taiwan in Asia) suffer disproportionately from withdraw-
als, presumably reflecting attempts by the managers of mutual funds cov-
ering more than one country to minimize the average impact on the prices
they receive when they have to shrink their portfolio in response to inves-
tor withdrawals (Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler 2000a, 2001). Here is
an unpleasant side effect of equity market development.
For closed-end country funds, further insight can be gained from
movements in the gap, which (as with most closed-end funds in mature
markets), tends to exist between the price of shares in these funds and
the net asset value of the funds. Although there is not full agreement on
the sources of such a gap, there are some interesting regularities. For
example, where foreign access to the equity market is still quite limited,
the country funds tend to trade at a premium. This likely reflects the
pent-up demand by foreigners for the country’s equities, which cannot
be fully satisfied except through the country fund. As further liberaliza-
tion occurs, the country fund price typically drifts to a discount on net
asset value—often more than 5 percent, but quite volatile—thereby com-
ing into line with a common, though not fully explained, feature of
closed-end funds in most markets. At times of crisis, however, when the
local market has collapsed, it is frequently observed that the price of
country funds does not fall as much, with the result that they go to a
premium on net asset value once more (figure 4.7). It seems that local
investors react more strongly to local disturbances—perhaps because they
hold a different view of the true significance of the local information
—but also expose a
country to contagion risks
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shock that has depressed the market, or perhaps because, being less well
diversified than the foreigners, their wealth has been more affected by
the shock. On this view, the country fund shareholders may expect the
equity market to recover quickly enough for it not to be worth their
while to attempt a costly arbitrage (Levy-Yeyati and Ubide 1998).
These glimpses into the mechanics of interaction between foreign
investors and the local market show that foreign participation has conse-
quences that go beyond an initial and permanent upward adjustment in
the general level of local equity prices. Differences in information and in
the reaction to information of the foreign investors, as well as differences
in the time scale over which they adjust portfolios, has an impact on the
dynamics of local equity prices. It may destabilize them, especially by
transmitting world disturbances, as well as disturbances in countries with
actual or perceived similarities through a form of contagion. They can
also, however, have a countervailing effect to disturbances emanating
from local conditions.11
It must be noted, however, that not all the increased trading activity
in local equities takes place on the local exchange. For example, trad-
ing in closed-end country funds does not in itself trigger any trading
on the local exchange, and the same is true of most trading in DRs,
which simply change hands in the mature market. Perhaps 95 percent
Figure 4.7 Mexico country fund discount, 1993–99
Note: While the fund traded generally at a discount to net asset value before the Tequila crisis, in
the immediate aftermath of that crisis, with the local equity market sharply down, the fund price
held up well, and moved to a premium on net asset value for several months. Local investors
seemed to react more to the crisis than the foreign investors in the fund.
Source: Updated from Frankel and Schmukler (1996).
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of trading in DRs does not involve the local exchange, though the
remaining trades are mostly sufficient to avoid unexploited arbitrage
opportunities between the two markets.
This can have an adverse impact on the importance of the local market
to the extent that the major firms start to issue DRs. For these firms,
activity and pricing can become dominated by the external mature mar-
ket, so that the original issuing market becomes less and less important—
eventually little more than a satellite to the DR market. In that respect,
opening up can mean that much of the action moves abroad.
Internationalization has also resulted in some equities being delisted
in emerging markets, often as a result of the takeover of listed firms by
foreign entities. New issuers, especially in the technology sector, now
sometimes choose to list only in a mature market.
On the other hand, the disclosure requirements of the DR program
also tend to force improvements in disclosure in the local market even
beyond what is formally required by the local regulations. Once a firm
has satisfied the information requirements for a DR listing, neither they
nor their competitors will find it easy to get away with lesser disclosure
on home markets. In this way, the existence of DRs has been having an
indirect effect on improving the quality of information disclosure even
for firms that have not sought a DR listing, thereby enhancing the infor-
mational efficiency of the emerging markets. These positive effects of
DRs surely outweigh the negative.
The possible loss of business on local exchanges may concern the own-
ers of the exchange, but should not be accorded much weight by the
authorities—notwithstanding the possible costs of opening up for the em-
ployment and profitability of local brokers and others providing services
associated with the local exchange. Thus, it is worth bearing in mind that
generating more business for market professionals is not the primary policy
goal of opening up the equity market. Instead the goal is to achieve the
growth, macrostability, and antipoverty gains offered by overall financial
development as discussed in chapter 1. If the migration of larger firms to
foreign markets and the reduction in volume and liquidity on local mar-
kets had the effect of restricting access of small firms to equity finance as a
result of consolidation and closure of some exchanges, that would be an-
other matter, but some suggestions to that effect seem unduly alarmist.
Harsh though the message may seem to financial sector producers, it is
access to financial services that matters, not who provides them.
Access to financial
services is more important
than who provides them
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Debt Flows and Interest and Exchange Rates
B EFORE THE EXPLOSION IN INTERNATIONAL EQUITYinvestment, the classic form of international finance involveddebt flows: international borrowing and lending. Analysis of
these flows and the related policy issues forms one of the most active and
long-established branches of economic and financial research. We confine
ourselves here to a discussion of a handful of current policy issues with a
special relevance to the functioning of domestic finance.12
Although most international lending and borrowing has long been
expressed in terms of major international currencies (or originally in terms
of gold-based currencies) openness to international flows has an indirect
impact on domestic interest rates, and on the exchange rate. Here is where
the risks arise, and where macroeconomic, fiscal, and monetary policy
has long been directed to containing those risks. Specifically financial
policy measures, too, can be contemplated, whether addressed to the flows
themselves, to domestic interest rates, or to the exchange rate regime.
This section briefly considers these three in turn. We note an emerging
consensus that tax-like measures can be somewhat effective in damping
short-term debt flows, but that piecemeal attempts to control the struc-
ture and pricing of domestic financial flows when the system is open to
foreign flows are counterproductive and damaging. The liberalization both
of domestic and international finance has resulted in a convergence of
interest rate movements, although developing countries are now experi-
encing a structural risk premium. Some of this premium is attributable
to exchange risk: adjustable pegs may accentuate this, especially in the
presence of extensive but incomplete dollarization.
One clear lesson of the period of international financial liberalization
of the past couple of decades is that the costs of domestic financial repres-
sion become quite unsustainable when the capital market is opened. In-
deed, the heyday of financial repression was during the period between
1914 and 1973 when national financial systems operated largely in isola-
tion from one another. This lengthy interruption of international finance
markets was created by World War I and its inflationary aftermath, and
continued with the protracted and doomed effort to restore the gold stan-
dard in major countries. It deepened with the attempts to protect national
economies from the World Depression of the 1930s (a time when protec-
tionism and a wider isolationism was on the rise and which prompted
Interest-sensitive flows
force a review of financial
policies
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even Keynes to write “above all, let your finance be national”). It persisted
through World War II. Thereafter, despite progressive trade liberalization,
regulatory barriers to capital flows continued, chiefly because liberaliza-
tion of capital outflows was seen as incompatible with pegged exchange
rates and with policies of managed aggregate demand.
Behind the walls of exchange controls, managed finance emerged.
With barriers against international movements of funds allowing con-
siderable bite for domestic regulations, not only the currency, but also
interest rates, banking (ownership and conduct), and stock exchanges
were at first kept substantially under national control.
Although constrained from international business and with lending
interest rates often pegged, banks benefited from ready access to cheap
deposits as they were protected de facto from vigorous competition,
whether domestic or foreign, and were often partially cartelized. In re-
turn, the banking system channeled sizable fractions of their loanable
funds to government and its designated borrowers or sectors (Wyplosz
2001). Securities markets, where they were developed, also tolerated re-
strictive practices by insiders, and often rationed firms’ access to the new
issue market in the interest of maintaining orderly conditions.
The effectiveness of administrative controls on capital movements
was limited, and it declined with improvements in transport and com-
munication and with the increase in the volume of trade, associated with
large payments flows whose timing and volume could be modified to
conceal capital flows (Dooley 1996). Speculative pressure on exchange
rate pegs—especially during the late 1960s—highlighted this declining
effectiveness, although the volumes of speculative flows and the interest
rate differentials they generated were modest when compared with later
experience. When the system of fixed exchange rates was abandoned by
the major industrial countries in the early 1970s, the perceived need to
maintain capital controls also became less acute, and a process of dis-
mantling them began.
Today, only three types of private market participant are likely to con-
tinue to be excludable de facto from the international capital markets,
namely, low-income households, very small firms, and regulated financial
firms. Even financial firms, however, that are excluded from direct partici-
pation in the global financial market are indirectly affected by it.
Domestic financial liberalization would be possible even without open-
ing up the economy to international capital movements. With the opening-
up, it becomes unavoidable. Open capital markets make attempts to fix
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interest rates and other domestic financial prices away from market-
clearing prices altogether futile.13 Large depositors have always responded
to such attempts by placing their funds and making their investments
abroad. Large firms make use of their access to foreign finance. Capital
account liberalization thus weakens and distorts a repressed domestic fi-
nancial sector, eventually forcing domestic liberalization. If the process is
long drawn out, haphazard partial liberalization of external and domestic
finance can result in a very risky and unsound situation emerging. This is
well exemplified in the important and classic case of the Republic of Ko-
rea in the 1990s, where the sequencing of liberalization resulted in the
large firms moving their borrowing abroad at inappropriately short matu-
rities, and the domestic financial system turning to lower-grade domestic
firms to which they in turn lent too much (box 4.2).
DESPITE A RELATIVELY RAPID RATE OF RECOVERY,
the collapse of the Korean economy in 1997 was a
severe blow. Indeed, the Korean crisis had global
implications, though in the event these were largely
contained to a smaller scale than had at one time
appeared likely. For some, the Republic of Korea’s
experience provided evidence that the financial
liberalization on which the Republic of Korea had
embarked only a few years before had been a mistake,
and that a continuation of the previous practice of
financial repression would have been a sounder policy.
Others tell the story differently, asserting that the
Republic of Korea’s financial system had remained
substantially repressed, and that a sham liberalization
had not been to blame.
The full story is more subtle, although clear and
strong lessons can be drawn. The Republic of Korea
did liberalize its financial markets substantially, but
it did so in the wrong order, encouraging the devel-
opment of a highly fragile financial structure both in
terms of the financial instruments employed (too
much reliance on short-term bills), in terms of the
financial intermediaries that were unwittingly encour-
aged (lightly regulated trust subsidiaries of the banks,
and other newly established near-bank financial in-
termediaries), and in terms of market infrastructure
development (failure to develop the institutions of
the long-term capital market).
By liberalizing short-term (but not long-term)
foreign borrowing, the Korean authorities made it
virtually inevitable that the larger and better-known
banks and chaebols  would assume heavy indebted-
ness in short-term foreign currency debt. Restrictions
on the use of derivatives limited the possibility of
hedging. Meanwhile, the second tier of large chaebols
greatly increased their short-term indebtedness in the
domestic financial markets (funded indirectly
through foreign borrowing of the banks). The funds
borrowed were being invested in overexpansion of
productive capacity.
The phasing of interest rate liberalization, too, was
misconceived. Bank deposit interest rates were held
Box 4.2 Poor sequencing of the Republic of Korea’s financial liberalization
(box continues on following page)
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With the progressive opening up of financial systems in developing
countries, it was to be expected that market-clearing interest rates at
home would increasingly become subject to international pressures. This
has proved to be the case, as evidenced by the data. The rise in interest
rates in developing countries from their repressed levels, however, has
not stopped when they reached industrial country levels.
In both industrial and developing countries, treasury bill rates were
unusually low in real terms in the later 1970s, reflecting the acceleration
of inflation worldwide and, in developing countries, general continua-
tion of financial repression. As real yields increased in industrial countries
during the 1980s, developing countries lagged behind, but caught up as
more and more developing countries liberalized their rates de facto, mov-
ing closer to market-clearing conditions. By the 1990s, median real rates
in developing countries exceeded those in the industrial countries, pre-
sumably reflecting higher-risk premia (table 4.1, figure 4.8). The subse-
quent reduction in industrial country real rates from the mid-1990s, how-
ever, was not systematically followed in the developing world. Instead,
Box 4.2 (continued)
Source: Based on Cho (2001).
well below competitive levels, thereby driving resources
off bank balance sheet or away from the regulated
banking sector altogether. Moral suasion meant that
formal deregulation did not result in completely free
market determination of many interest rates.
The reasons for this pattern of deregulation in-
clude a mechanical adherence to the importance of
monetary aggregates (which induced the authori-
ties to retain controls on these, while liberalizing
near-substitutes), the preoccupation with maintain-
ing an orderly long-term capital market (which dis-
tracted them from paying attention to the emer-
gence of a new and much more disorderly
short-term corporate paper market) and the persis-
tence of directed policy lending (which meant that
interest rate spreads needed to be wide enough to
allow for cross-subsidization, but at the cost of los-
ing market share for the banks).
The quality of loan appraisal, bank regulation,
and private credit rating was always in doubt. Over-
optimism and complacency reigned.
In the end, it was not the bursting of a property
bubble that ended the Korean expansion, but the
refusal of foreign creditors to roll over their loans. A
refusal prompted by their increasing unease at the
loss of competitiveness and heavy indebtedness of
Korean corporate borrowers. Even if the main sources
of the Korean crisis lay elsewhere, the mistaken se-
quencing of financial liberalization contributed to
the speed and severity of the crisis both by exposing
the system to rollover risk and by encouraging exces-
sive indebtedness of firms.
Higher interest rates in
emerging markets reflect
higher risks
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wholesale interest rates in developing countries have moved to a premium
over those of industrial countries on average. This predates the crises of
1997–98 and suggests a structural problem.
There are several likely sources of this premium: doubtless one factor
relevant for many developing countries is their precarious fiscal position
to which the fiscal costs of large banking crises and of state ownership
will have contributed, which serves to underline the importance of the
Table 4.1 Real interest rates
Real interest rates (percent, medians)
Money market Treasury bill Deposit
Year Industrial Developing Industrial Developing Industrial Developing
1975–79 –0.8 –1.3 –1.4 –4.8 –2.9 –4.7
1980–84 3.8 2.8 3.1 –0.7 0.9 –0.9
1985–89 5.1 4.1 4.9 1.0 2.5 1.3
1990–94 5.8 4.3 5.2 3.2 2.9 2.0
1995–99 2.7 6.4 3.3 5.0 1.7 3.4
Source: Honohan (2001a).
The figure shows how the
median Treasury bill yield in
developing countries, once well
below, has caught up with and
now exceeds that for industrial
countries.
Figure 4.8 Real treasury bill yields for industrial and developing
countries
Source: Honohan (2001a).
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messages of the previous chapters. In many cases, however, they also
likely reflect doubts not just about government policy credibility in gen-
eral, but specifically exchange rate risk. To the extent that policy risk is
the source, the premia are economically inefficient and costly: improved
policy design might reduce them.
During episodes of financial crisis, whatever their origin, speculation
about future exchange rate movements can become the dominant issue,
destabilizing interest rates and threatening severe capital losses to some
financial intermediaries and to some of their customers. It is an open
question—widely discussed, but beyond the scope of the present study—
as to whether choice of exchange rate regime can influence the level and
volatility of interest rate premia. No matter what exchange rate regime
one opts for, however, one must recognize that movements in world
interest rates will tend to be transmitted to the domestic economy.
The well-known and plausible “uncovered interest parity” hypothesis—
that domestic interest rates will equal those abroad plus the expected rate
of currency depreciation plus a risk premium—works well on average over
any period of several years (except under conditions of financial repres-
sion), and especially when there is a fairly steady rate of currency deprecia-
tion. It does less well in predicting short-term movements. When the in-
terest differential is unusually high, that does not reliably predict a
devaluation. In other words, there can be significant and unpredictable
short-term fluctuations in risk premia, and higher interest differentials
seem to be correlated with higher risk premia.14
Exchange rate risk has become of central importance for the conduct
of financial intermediation. If they are to tap external sources of fund-
ing, or meet the demands of their internationally trading customers,
banks inevitably become exposed to the risk of sizable movements in
foreign exchange rates.
Such risks may appear to be manageable with known techniques of
risk measurement and hedging. Calculating and pricing the risk of an
emerging market exchange rate is not straightforward, however. The
risk is not likely to be stationary over time, and could be dependent on
intrinsically unforecastable considerations, such as changes in the
country’s policy preference as between inflation and output stabiliza-
tion. This is especially true of quasi-fixed exchange rate regimes, be-
cause of the large but rare devaluation events that they involve. Fur-
thermore, attempts to hedge the risk, for example, by matching currency
Exchange rate risk weighs
on financial intermediation
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denomination of assets and liabilities, can often fall foul of counterparty
credit risk. If the currency collapses, with widespread business disloca-
tion, a bank’s customers who borrowed in foreign currency may well
be unable to service the debt. Yet many firms have been prepared to
take on such risks, perhaps relying on an implicit safety net (see box
4.3). The assumption of sizable exchange risk by financial intermedi-
aries or large corporate borrowers can impose a social cost if the bet
OPENING UP TO FOREIGN CAPITAL CAN FORM A
lethal combination with implicit government
guarantees provided to bank creditors. When added
to exchange rate uncertainty and unhedged foreign
exchange positions of banks and their borrowing
clients, the mixture is explosive. The essential problem
is that, by extending the implicit guarantee in a
virtually unlimited way to foreign creditors—and in
foreign exchange—the potential scale of moral hazard
is enormously expanded.
Domestic banks are often keen to source funds
abroad (and in foreign exchange) not only because
of their ready availability, but because they typically
have a lower interest cost, reflecting the lack of ex-
plicit exchange rate risk to the foreign depositor. They
do, however, involve an exchange rate risk for the
bank, even if it onlends these funds to local custom-
ers in foreign exchange, as exchange rate movements
will affect the borrowers’ ability to repay. The moral
hazard is that, with a generous implicit safety net,
banks and their depositors will proceed as if there
were no risk. There are clear parallels with the dis-
cussion of chapter 2.
When the crisis occurs, this exchange rate element
provides an extra twist not present in a domestic cri-
sis. Domestic crises are characterized by a decline in
the money price of most assets. After all, that’s what
makes it difficult for borrowers to repay money. For
an open economy overborrowed in foreign exchange,
however, in addition to the fall in the money price of
most domestic assets, the money price of a major
liability—foreign exchange—actually increases, as the
currency collapses.
The scale and timing of the currency collapse is
linked to the market’s expectations about the
government’s ability to meet the liability to bank
creditors. If the banking system is insolvent at cur-
rent exchange rates, and if the market expects the
government to rely on the inflation tax to cover some
of the bailout costs, a fixed exchange rate will be
unsustainable. If so, the currency will collapse, thereby
worsening the insolvency of the banks .
Even if the banking system is not insolvent at
current exchange rates, a market belief that there will
be a devaluation can be self-fulfilling, thereby “bust-
ing” the banks and triggering a bailout requirement
that does end up being partly covered by the infla-
tion tax.
This pattern has been well known to astute ob-
servers at least since the Chilean financial crisis of
the early 1980s (Díaz-Alejandro 1985), but that did
not prevent banks and their borrowers from going
down the same route in East Asia, which helped to
trigger not only the crisis of 1997–98, but also an
explosion of theoretical analysis that has greatly deep-
ened our understanding of the processes involved (cf.,
for example, McKinnon and Pill 1999; Burnside,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2000).
Box 4.3 Theory of twin crises—currency and banking
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goes wrong. This has been argued as a justification for imposing regu-
lations not only on banks, but also on nonfinancial firms, which re-
stricts their foreign exchange exposure. The ease with which some
Mexican banks evaded these controls in 1994, by use of special pur-
pose derivatives, is a classic example of the practical difficulty of en-
forcing such controls (see box 4.4).
HISTORICALLY, CAPITAL CONTROLS HAVE BEEN
evaded through a variety of techniques, such as under-
or overinvoicing exports or imports, as well as by
other practices, often illegal in nature. Wealthy
individuals and large firms are able to evade controls
rather easily, which is one reason why, when controls
on capital outflows were removed in Italy, net inflows
followed; not only were some more disposed to
investing in Italy with the knowledge that they could
get their money out easily, but also many wealthy
Italians reportedly had Swiss bank accounts long
before the controls were removed.
With the explosion of derivative products in re-
cent years, however, evasion of capital controls or
taxes is easier without breaking any laws, and it is
also much more difficult to separate short- and long-
term capital flows. Consider a few examples, from
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (1997). Suppose first
that there is a tax on gross inflows of capital, and
foreigners want to make an equity investment. They
can buy offshore an equity swap (a financial deriva-
tive that entitles them to receive the return on that
investment position, presumably the reason they want
the investment), and a domestic resident will be the
counterparty, promising to pay the total return on
that investment, and hedging this exposure by pur-
chasing that investment (the equity)—without in-
curring any capital inflow tax. Other types of taxes—
though not yet the specific one used in Chile—can
be evaded with different derivative transactions.
Worse still, authorities cannot even tell short-term
from long-term capital flows. These data are based
entirely on “on-balance sheet” transactions, yet with
derivatives this is only one part of the transaction.
For example (again from Garber and Folkerts-
Landau), suppose that a Mexican entity wants to buy
a local stock on margin, which is forbidden. He can
buy an equity swap from a firm in New York, prom-
ising to pay a floating rate return to the firm, and
putting up some collateral. The New York firm is
unhedged in this position, but can offset the risk by
purchasing the stock on the Mexican market. That
stock purchase, if sufficiently large, shows up as a long-
term capital inflow into Mexico, but the offsetting
transaction, the equity swap, is not recorded. Yet
clearly the New York firm only purchased the stock
to cover its position, and as soon as the swap expires—
these are usually highly short-term transactions, which
also contributes to the difficulty in tracking them—
the equity position is extinguished. Derivatives thus
have the ability to transform what appear to be the
most stable form of capital inflow into one of the
most volatile. Although it is difficult to quantify, it is
likely that the large volume of supposedly long-term
capital inflows lulled the Mexican authorities into
thinking that their exposure to any reversal of flows
was much less than it turned out to be.
Thus, even if capital controls are desired for the
long term, such as because of the fear of multiple
equilibria, they will be increasingly difficult to en-
force in the future, as derivatives become more widely
accessible. Authorities may be able to establish con-
trols that cannot be evaded immediately, but the pros-
pects for doing so permanently are low.
Box 4.4 Derivatives and capital control evasion
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This risk of extreme currency movements resulting in losses to insuffi-
ciently hedged intermediaries (and businesses in general) is arguably the
most acute problem generated by globalization for the functioning of the
financial sector. A strongly capitalized financial sector with both the capacity
and incentives for managing such risks is clearly needed. In addition, how-
ever, over and above the choice of exchange rate regime, a coherent, credible,
and stable macroeconomic policy is needed to help reduce the risks.
Another effect of the increasing internationalization of trade, com-
bined with currency uncertainty, has been a great expansion in the use
of the dollar (or the DM/Euro) as a parallel currency in many coun-
tries, whether in the form of cash, in denominating bank accounts, or
for pricing and contracting more generally. Often a surge of inflation
and currency depreciation has triggered the first widespread
dollarization in a country, and this process generally has not been re-
versed. Once asset holders are taxed through inflation or depreciation,
they continue to hold a certain fraction of their wealth in dollars. A
subsequent crisis often causes these holdings to ratchet upwards, de-
spite a higher interest differential in favor of local currency assets (cf.
Reding and Morales 1999).
When the economy becomes dollarized, currency speculation comes
onshore, and is no longer just a question of international flows destabi-
lizing exchange rates. Partially dollarized systems present special chal-
lenges to monetary management, and to the financial sector. For one
thing, an economy in which prices are widely quoted in dollars is one in
which a nominal exchange rate change tends to be quickly and fully
passed through to local currency prices. Accordingly, a given change in
the real exchange rate—such as may be required to adjust to a real exter-
nal shock—tends to require a larger nominal exchange rate movement.
Large nominal exchange rate movements can, however, as we have noted,
have a considerable impact on the financial position of unhedged finan-
cial intermediaries and their customers. And in dollarized economies,
the share of foreign currency assets and liabilities in financial intermedi-
ary balance sheets tends to be large. The tension between the need for a
real exchange rate adjustment—to restore equilibrium in trade and cur-
rent economic activity—and the costs, including bankruptcy costs, of
the resulting nominal exchange rate movement has repeatedly presented
policymakers with a difficult dilemma (box 4.5).
Their room for maneuver is also limited by the fact that the national
monetary authority does not have an unlimited capacity to provide lender-
of-last-resort facilities in respect of foreign currency deposits in the
Growing dollarization
presents new challenges to
the financial sector
F I N A N C E  F O R  G ROW T H :  P O L I C Y  C H O I C E S  I N  A  V O L AT I L E  W O R L D
188
DOLLARIZATION HAS TWO DIMENSIONS: THE
currency denomination of assets and the use of
foreign currency in pricing and internal payments.
The impact on policy choices depends on how much
of each type of dollarization has occurred. It is
important to bear both dimensions in mind in
considering what model of exchange rate policy
applies in any given country.
Traditionally, thinking about the role of exchange
rate changes related to a world in which both types
of dollarization were unimportant (bottom left
quadrant of the figure). In such conditions, ex-
change rate adjustment works mainly through its
effect on the relative prices of current goods and
services. This is the world of J-curves, elasticity pes-
simism or optimism and pass-through coefficients,
familiar to international economics textbooks of the
1960s and 1970s.
Where it is finance that is highly dollarized, the
role of the exchange rate as an asset price comes to the
fore. This means that the authorities and market par-
ticipants need to be acutely concerned with the capi-
tal gains and losses that will occur with changes in the
exchange rate. Indonesia in 1997 provides a good ex-
ample: wild fluctuations in the exchange rate had much
more impact on the solvency of unhedged firms than
with the competitiveness of exports (upper left quad-
rant in the chart below; see also box 4.3).
The more it is that pricing of goods and services
is in dollars, the faster and more complete the pass-
through of exchange rate changes onto domestic
prices will be. If there is little dollarization of finan-
cial assets, but pass-through is high, the economy is
relatively insensitive to nominal exchange rate
changes. Movements in the exchange rate are not
effective in achieving real adjustment—they only
change the price level. Something like the “classical
dichotomy” between real and monetary sectors pre-
vails (lower right quadrant).
Where both types of dollarization are high, the
local currency loses its role as the main numeraire or
measuring rod for economic transactions, as agents
have switched to thinking in terms of dollars. Al-
though government wages and payments are still
made in the local currency, it is now seen as a risky
asset. Holdings of cash are minimized, and the price
of local currency-denominated securities builds in a
substantial risk premium reflecting the
unpredictability of the exchange rate—even if it has
up to now been stable.
Box 4.5 Dollarization—asset price and pass-through effects
Low
Exchange rate
policy constrained
by finance
Pass-through coefficient
Degree of
dollarization
of finance
High
Traditional position:
nominal exchange
rate is a real
sector price
Local currency riskier
than dollar; little
impact on
current transactions
Classical dichotomy:
nominal exchange
rate does not matter
High
Low
Influence of dollarization and pass-through on policy
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banking system. The rescue through liquidity support of even a solvent
bank suffering a run from domestic depositors may thus be beyond the
ability of a central bank in a dollarized economy. This is, of course, only
an extreme example of the limitations placed on national policy instru-
ments by global financial integration in its various forms.
Could the scale and volatility of speculative flows be reduced by the
introduction of a tax on capital imports (or a tax-like control, such as a
compulsory deposit) designed to penalize short-term movements, while
leaving longer-term capital movements broadly unaffected? Adopted by
a single country, such a tax cannot be a substitute for sound macroeco-
nomic policy, for an appropriate exchange rate stance, and for adequate
prudential regulation and risk management—but can it help?15
Using a mechanism of unremunerated reserves equivalent to a tax,
Chile is one widely studied country that operated such a system through
most of the 1990s. The effects of the Chilean system have been studied
in some detail to assess whether it has had the hoped-for effects of length-
ening the maturity of capital flows, and to what extent it has been vul-
nerable to evasion by the use of financial derivatives or otherwise.16 The
conclusions of this research are that, by progressively closing loopholes
and extending the scope of the tax, the Chilean authorities were able to
maintain its bite at a roughly constant share of the relevant capital flows.
This process could not have been continued indefinitely. There was a
clear impact on the maturity of flows, and probably a small impact on
overall flows and on interest differentials. Complemented as it has been
for much of the period by other restrictions on capital movements, both
import and export controls the Chilean regime thus seems to have had a
modest, but perhaps worthwhile role in protecting the Chilean economy
from volatile speculative flows, and in allowing the authorities to raise
interest rates to stabilize macroeconomic boom conditions; but there
may also have been costs, for example in terms of reduced investment
over the long run (Gallego, Hernández, and Schmidt-Hebbel 1999;
Edwards 2000c).
The attractive feature of the Chilean design is the way in which it tilts
incentives towards stability of capital flows rather than just prohibiting
flows outright. The goal can be seen as working with the market to en-
courage a shift in the maturity of capital inflows without affecting net
flows much over the longer term. It has relatively little impact except
when it is needed, that is, when short-term inflows threaten to be large.
Most observers agree that a standing regime of this type is likely to be
Chile offers a useful model
of limited exchange
controls
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much more effective and have less adverse side effects than a hastily imple-
mented attempt to ban outflows in a crisis. The ex post nature of the
latter is likely to have a longer-term adverse effect on general confidence
in the predictability and credibility of policy generally.17 The recent ex-
perience of Malaysia offers an apparent exception to this statement,
though this plausibly reflects the high initial credibility of the authori-
ties with regard to the temporary nature of the restriction, as well as on
their continued commitment to low inflation, both of which were facili-
tated by their long and favorable track record with inflation.
For all the dogmatic rhetoric that has surrounded the recent debate
on the merits of capital controls, it would be difficult to justify an ex-
treme position based on the evidence that has been advanced. Controls
have their problems, but they can in some situations be effective.
Into the Future: Technology and Communications
C ONTINUING DEVELOPMENTS IN COMPUTING ANDcommunications technology seem sure to reshape the way inwhich financial services are delivered worldwide. To some
extent, the impact on developing economies will be an acceleration of
the trends of recent years, but there will be qualitative changes, too.
Economies of scale or scope for some financial services are declining and
for others increasing, and the synergies between financial and other
economic services are also changing and often increasing. This will alter
the organization of the industry, with consolidation in some areas, and
fragmentation in others.
The process has been under way for some time. Already by the 1980s,
banks were being disintermediated by the growth of commercial paper
and mutual funds on the one hand, while on the other, more and more
banks were becoming involved in securities and insurance. Mergers and
alliances seeking scale and scope have been occurring both within the
banking, insurance, and securities market sectors, between firms in dif-
ferent sectors, and between financial and other information intensive
services. These alliances are often designed to exploit cross-economies and
to leverage brands. The tangled process of bundling and unbundling
financial services and financial service firms seems likely to continue as
market participants respond to the impact of technology.
Accelerating trends
in technology and
e-finance—
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The main driver is the pressure of much-altered cost structures, such
as the oft-noted contrast between an average cost—in the United States
—of over $1 for a physical transaction in a bank branch as against a
couple of cents through the Internet.
Not only are new financial products and new market structures emerg-
ing, fundamentally new types of firms have arrived in the form of
financial portals (which provide guidance on the availability of services and
other topical information and, as such, are perhaps best described as an
Internet counterpart to specialist magazines) and aggregators (providing
an electronic analog to brokerage). None of these is unique to finance, but
finance is uniquely well positioned to take advantage of electronic innova-
tions, notably because physical delivery of financial products is typically of
secondary importance. (One must not, however, ignore the continuing
role of personal contact and trust in parts of finance.)
There has been an increase in the number and sophistication of elec-
tronic exchanges at which professionals trade financial instruments. Some
of these operate as satellites of the traditional regulated exchanges, some-
times independently.
This whole process may present some opportunities for financial ser-
vice providers in small developing countries. In particular, the trend to-
ward unbundling of financial products may allow them to become
involved in providing subproducts whose efficient production does not
require large scale or sophistication.
The greater potential benefit in prospect for developing countries,
however, will be for users of financial services. Technology should allow
them to access these services on terms comparable to consumers in ad-
vanced countries, especially insofar as physical distance from the pro-
vider begins to lose much of its importance. Undoubtedly, the accelerat-
ing presence of the Internet will begin to make direct international
financial transactions available even to small firms and individuals. Al-
ready, many banks in middle-income countries have begun to offer on-
line banking, which is just the first step.
In the face of this pervasive technology, any attempts by governments
to monitor or block e-finance transactions seem doomed to be either
ineffective or prohibitively costly. International finance will surely be
open to the middle classes, let alone the corporate sector.
Once the set-up costs have been incurred, access to Internet-based fi-
nancial services can be provided remarkably cheaply. Of course, it is wise
—which will primarily
benefit the users of
financial services
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not to get carried away as to the immediate potential for reaching the
poorest of the poor. Certain basic preconditions, such as literacy, electric-
ity, and telephone service, must be achieved before anything else is done.
Because of the lack of some or all of these, many of the smallholder coffee
and cocoa growers in, say, West Africa, now at the mercy of middlemen
exploiting local monopolies, will be able to make immediate use of, for
example, the recently established Web-based business-to-business (B2B)
futures exchange in coffee and other commodities.
Public policy, however, can help here. For example, broadband com-
munications links now being put in place throughout India’s postal sys-
tem will potentially bring Internet-based financial services to some 150,000
access points. Speedy and cheap payments both by and to customers in
relatively isolated locations, a simplification of procedures for insurance,
current information concerning prices on agricultural commodity ex-
changes, as well as possible efficiencies in loan approval and other finan-
cial services, can all be envisaged. In addition, the same network could also
be employed to effect speedy delivery of other public and private services
at low cost. This will not solve all the barriers to access on the part of small
firms and individuals, but it can do away with much of the heavy costs
and lack of competition inherent in relying on local bank branches. Simi-
lar initiatives offer considerable potential to other countries, especially those
with low population density where formal finance has hitherto not pro-
vided a comprehensive local physical presence.
To ensure that the potential benefits of electronic media are widely
available to users of finance, including to users in developing countries,
and that there are not new concentrations of market power, a number of
wider policy issues will need to be considered by prudential and compe-
tition policy in the advanced countries where the major financial service
providers will continue to be regulated. These include the following
(Claessens and others 2000):
• Attention to a likely explosion in nonfinancial institutions bypassing
the banking system to provide payment and deposit-type services.
• The complex issues of competition policy in an environment in-
creasingly subject to network externalities.
• Securely identifying the relevant regulatory authority for financial
firms whose chief geographical presence is in the Internet and whose
range of activities corresponds to none of the traditional segments
of the financial sector.
Policy issues
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For policymakers in developing countries, the major questions emerg-
ing are likely to relate to the stability of domestic financial institutions
in the face of the increased competition. Concerns about the conse-
quences of the inevitable erosion of franchise value will be reinforced
and will require proactive measures as discussed. The authorities will
have to face up to the need to ensure that weakened firms exit the mar-
ket and act preemptively to develop their exit policy.
Increased access to foreign financial services is likely to entail increased
use of foreign currencies, which will accentuate the risks of exchange
rate and interest rate volatility for countries that choose to retain their
own currency. Once again, heightened prudential alertness will be needed.
The increased complexity of the financial instruments being offered
by the financial system can mask the true risk of asset positions, and the
speed with which their value can change. This can present problems,
especially for small and less experienced users of financial services in
developing countries, and there will be a need for education programs to
heighten awareness both of these risks and of the dangers of fraudulent
services being offered over the Internet.
The likely speed of these developments and the extent to which they
will displace the need for a local presence of financial service companies
remain unclear, but the question that will be increasingly asked is whether
smaller developing countries need to have local securities and debt mar-
kets in the traditional sense, and even how much of banking needs to be
domestic. The most fruitful way of thinking about this is to isolate the
elements of domestic financial services that, given new technology, can
be efficiently provided in small economies, and to plan institutional ar-
rangements that allow these elements to be unbundled and provided
locally while other services are efficiently imported.
The smaller the country, the more pressing are these considerations, but
the general point here is not just one that applies to a minority of tiny coun-
tries. In an increasingly integrated and technology-driven global financial
system, the relative costs of being small will likely increase, and the logic of
planning policy on the basis of being small will apply with greater force to
more countries. The global financial market has much to offer small finan-
cial systems. Working with this market, while respecting the risks it conveys,
is the way forward. Risk management is crucial, but if it is mastered, the
global market can help shift risk to those most ready to bear it and provide
the instruments for doing so at the lowest cost. Better infrastructure and a
more incentive-compatible regulatory framework will make it so.
Globalization and
technology will accentuate
the relative costs of small
financial systems
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Conclusions
THE OVERALL IMPACT OF FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION ON THEdomestic financial sector is thus profound. Liberalization ofcapital flows has effectively made domestic financial repression
obsolete. The consequences have not been uniformly favorable. Following
liberalization, domestic interest rates in developing countries have moved
to a premium over industrial country rates, and can surge at times of
currency speculation. Heightened interest rate and exchange rate volatility
pose practical risk management difficulties for financial intermediaries,
especially in partially dollarized economies, and reinforce the need for
appropriate infrastructures and incentives for risk containment, as well
as for good macropolicies.
On the other hand, the cost of equity capital has been reduced by
allowing foreign investor access to local equity markets and allowing
local firms to list abroad. Increased international flows through the eq-
uity markets have not been the major contributor to increased interna-
tional sources of volatility.
In addition to opening access to foreign-sourced financial services,
more and more countries have been admitting foreign-owned banks and
other financial firms to operate locally. Although this can represent a
threat to domestic owners of financial firms, the drawback is outweighed
by improved service quality when reputable foreign firms leaven the do-
mestic system with their better procedures and practices.
On all three fronts—debt, equity, and services—our assessment ac-
knowledges the costs and risks of increased financial globalization, but
there are strong benefits too. Graduated taxation of intermittent effect
on inflows may in some cases cushion economies from the effects of
volatile speculative capital flows, while maintaining the benefits of
steady access to the global financial market. There can be little doubt,
however, that aggressive attempts by individual governments to block
financial flows are likely to backfire, and there is much to be gained
from adopting instead a policy stance that supports deeper access of
the local economy to top quality financial services in an internation-
ally open context.
The financial systems of most developing countries are very small
when compared with the global financial market. E-finance will make
national frontiers even more porous than before. Foolish indeed is the
government that does not make itself aware of these market realities and
learn to work with them.
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Notes
1. Contrast this even with the distribution of World
GDP, where five other developing countries also reach 1 per-
cent (ten, if measured at purchasing power parities (PPPs)).
2. The unsavory side of international finance can-
not be ignored. Capital flight from poor countries, in-
cluding the export of funds acquired through corruption,
has long been a damaging aspect—and one rarely im-
peded by capital controls. There is increasing awareness,
including among regulators in offshore financial centers,
of the need to tighten measures against the use of inter-
national banking transactions to launder or conceal illic-
itly acquired funds.
3. The moral hazard resulting from implicit govern-
ment guarantees, however, including for foreign credi-
tors of the banking system, linked with unhedged ex-
change rate risk, has increasingly been implicated in the
build-up before such sudden stops (see box 4.3).
4. The benefits include the wider potential that could
be offered by international capital markets for national
risk reduction (cf. de Ferranti and others 2000).
5. A somewhat xenophobic popular attitude to for-
eign banks is common, but not universal. When the share
of foreign shareholders in Ireland’s largest bank, AIB, ex-
ceeded 50 percent for the first time in 1999, with the
effect that well over half of the Irish banking system is
now majority foreign-owned, the event passed almost
unnoticed and without any adverse public comment.
6. Analysis of an extensive firm-level database for Ar-
gentina confirms that it does tend to be the larger firms that
are the foreign banks’ borrowing customers. Interestingly,
though, only where the foreign bank is headquartered else-
where in Latin America does it tend to have a higher average
loan quality (Berger, Klapper, and Udell 2001).
7. Cf. Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Huizinga
(2000). They also note that the relative performance of
foreign banks appears different and less positive in indus-
trial countries.
8. Of course, these investment shares were not uni-
form across countries. In particular, as shown by Lane
and Milesi-Ferretti (1999), Latin America and the transi-
tion economies have the largest share of portfolio equity.
9. In any event, it is worth bearing in mind that stock
market price volatility is not robustly linked with growth
(Levine and Zervos 1998a).
10. Here we draw on Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes
(2001). Their database represented the trades made by
the customers of one large U.S. custodian bank.
11. It is important to stress that foreign investors
are not always in the vanguard when there is selling
pressure on local equities cf. Frankel and Schmukler
(1996) for Mexico and Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999);
Kim and Wei (1999) for the Republic of Korea. In gen-
eral, foreign investors seem to prefer to invest in large
firms that export, and especially those with DR pro-
grams (cf. Kang and Stulz 1999).
12. Our discussion is complementary to that which
can be found in the World Bank’s annual Global Develop-
ment Finance report.
13. Monetary policy can continue to influence the
level of nominal interest rates, but in a generally market-
clearing context.
14. For industrial countries, regressing quarterly ex-
change rate changes on the start-of-quarter interest dif-
ferential results in a negative coefficient on the differen-
tial, instead of the predicted value of +1. For developing
countries, though, the estimated coefficient on the dif-
ferential of +0.59 is much closer to theoretical prediction
(Honohan 2001a). Cochrane (1999) suggests that this
interest parity puzzle, and several other well-known asset
market anomalies, can be attributed to low asset prices
(in this case, low foreign bond prices) being correlated
with heightened risk.
15. Bouts of increased capital flow volatility also
regularly unearth a proposal to implement such a tax on
international capital movements not just in one coun-
try, but on a coordinated global basis, with the dual goal
of damping speculative flows and generating a useful
flow of international tax revenue. The practicalities of
such a global scheme, however,—the so-called Tobin
tax—have not yet been proved, and indeed widespread
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skepticism as to how successfully it would function has
left the proposal stillborn (cf. Haq, Kaul, and Grunberg
1996).
16. Though the tax rate is currently set at zero—re-
flecting the substantial capital outflows that have been
associated with Chilean pension funds rebalancing their
portfolios following a liberalization, which has permitted
them to increase greatly their holdings of foreign assets—
so that the system has no practical effect at present. As
operated, the Chilean regime facilitates reserve accumu-
lation by the central bank, a feature that highlights the
potential role of reserves management as a tool of macro-
economic management in helping insulate countries from
external capital account shocks.
17. Bartolini and Drazen (1997) provide a persuasive
account of this mechanism.
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